Opinion
Civil Action 18-cv-5326
11-17-2021
CHARLES DOBBINS, Petitioner, v. STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, et al. Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LYNNE A. SITARSKI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Charles Dobbins (Petitioner), an individual currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution - Houtzdale, located in Houtzdale, Pennsylvania. For the following reasons, I respectfully recommend that the petition be DISMISSED without prejudice. Additionally, I recommend that Petitioner's Motion to Stay (ECF No. 18) be DENIED.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because Petitioner's PCRA petition is currently pending, the state court record in this case is not available to the Court. Accordingly, the facts in this background and procedural history were obtained from the Court of Common Pleas criminal docket sheets in Commonwealth v. Dobbins, No. CP-51-CR-0002821-2015 (Phila. Cnty. Com. Pl.), available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-51-CR-0002821 2015&dnh=uSKKTU64pFmD7Mw%2FFtd9dA%3D%3D (last visited Nov. 10, 2021) [hereinafter “Crim. Docket 1”]; and Commonwealth v. Dobbins, No. CP-51-CR-0003983-2015 (Phila. Cnty. Com. Pl.), available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-51-CR-0003983 2015&dnh=iFvz5WmKpqN%2Bxran05%2FRJg%3D%3D (last visited Nov. 10, 2021) [hereinafter “Crim. Docket 2”].
On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court summarized the factual history of this case as follows:
In 2014, S.E., resided with her mother and [Petitioner], who was dating S.E.'s mother. [Petitioner] had a daughter named M.W., whom S.E. considered her step-sister because of the relationship between her mother and [Petitioner]. S.E. and M.W. often played together and M.W. often stayed at S.E.'s house. M.W. slept either in S.E.'s room or in [Petitioner's] bedroom when she did so.
During the summer of 2014, [Petitioner] began trying to spend time alone with S.E. late at night after everyone went to bed. The first two times [Petitioner] did so, he asked S.E. to watch a movie with him and thereafter asked her to listen to some music. She turned down his requests.
Subsequent thereto, S.E. was alone in her room asleep when [Petitioner] entered her room and laid down on top of her under her blanket and began sucking in her chest area. [Petitioner's] actions awakened S.E. and she ordered [Petitioner] to leave her room, which he did immediately. On September 21, 2014, [Petitioner] thereafter again entered [S.E.'s] room late at night and began shaking her legs, arms, and thighs. When S.E. woke up, [Petitioner] offered S.E. $50.00 for a kiss and $100.00 to have sex with him. [S.E.] rejected [Petitioner's] offer and told him to leave. [Petitioner] immediately left the room. After [Petitioner] did so, S.E. used various items, including a chair, to barricade the door to her bedroom, something she did the first three times [Petitioner] entered her room. S.E. told her mother about what [Petitioner] was doing, but did not go into detail.
The next morning, S.E. went to her sister, V.E.'s house. Upon arriving, she hugged V.E. but did not tell her about what [Petitioner] had done to her. S.E. then went upstairs and told her other sister D.B., about what [Petitioner] had done to her the previous evening. D.B. told S.E., who became visibly upset, that she had to tell V.E. about what occurred. Although she was reluctant to do so, S.E. did so. When she did, V.E. and her brother, who was also at her sister's house, began yelling and screaming as did others who were present.
Eventually, several persons, including S.E., returned to S.E.'s house. V.E. called the police and they arrived shortly thereafter and S.E. told them what [Petitioner], who was in his bedroom when the police arrived, had done. S.E. thereafter gave police a formal statement setting forth [Petitioner's] actions.
T.E., S.E.'s mother, testified that S.E. told her about [Petitioner's] actions and behavior at some point in the summer of 2014. T.E. confronted [Petitioner] and he denied having done what S.E. accused him of doing. On the day the police were called, S.E. told her that [Petitioner] had entered her room the previous night and solicited her to have sex with him. V.E. also told her about what S.E. had said in [Petitioner's] presence and [Petitioner] remained silent. T.E. went to the police station with her daughter that day and when she returned home, [Petitioner] was packing his belongings. Approximately a week later T.E. learned that [Petitioner] had left Philadelphia.
V.E. confirmed that S.E. told her about the incident. She also indicated that when she was in her twenties, [Petitioner] twice offered her money to have sex with him and she turned him down. She told her mother about the offer and her mother said that she would take care of it.
M.W. confirmed that in the summer of 2014, when she was fourteen, she often stayed at [Petitioner's], S.E.'s and T.E.'s residence and either slept in S.E.'s room or with [Petitioner]. On every other weekend, when she slept with [Petitioner] in his bed, [Petitioner] would touch her vagina and buttocks over her clothes while she was sleeping. M.W. would wake up during the episodes and would roll over to signal [Petitioner] that she was awake in an effort to get him to stop. [Petitioner] twice told her to be quiet when she began crying, and not tell anyone. On one occasion, [Petitioner] gave her money the morning after one of the episodes to pay for the ride back to her mother's residence. M.W. told her mother what was happening with [Petitioner] when M.W. was being treated at a hospital for an accidental injury.
L.W., M.W.'s mother, learned that [Petitioner] had done something to M.W. in September of 2014 after M.W. told a nurse about [Petitioner's] activities while she was being treated for injuries suffered in an accident. L.W. then learned from M.W. that on one occasion, when she slept in [Petitioner's] bedroom, [Petitioner] touched her breasts and vaginal area over her clothes while she was asleep.[ ] Her daughter also told her that [Petitioner] offered her to have money for sex with him. L.W. thereafter called T.E. and T.E. filled her in about what [Petitioner] had done to S.E. She thereafter learned that [Petitioner] had left Philadelphia and was living in South Carolina, where [Petitioner] was eventually taken into custody pursuant to a warrant and then extradited to Philadelphia.Com. v. Dobbins, 239 A.3d 122, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020).
Petitioner waived a jury trial, and on June 7, 2018, the trial court judge found Petitioner guilty of four counts of criminal solicitation, two counts of unlawful contact with a minor, two counts of endangering the welfare of a child, and two counts of corrupting a minor. (Crim. Docket 1 at 5-6, 11). Petitioner was also found guilty of one count of indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age, and one count of simple assault. (Crim. Docket 2 at 6, 11). On September 10, 2018, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of thirteen to twenty-six years' imprisonment, with ten years of probation. (Crim. Docket 1 at 5-6; Crim. Docket 2 at 6). Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and on July 31, 2020 the Superior Court affirmed the verdict. (Crim. Docket 1 at 14; Crim. Docket 2 at 14). On February 24, 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for allowance of appeal. Id.
On December 10, 2018, while Petitioner's direct appeal was still pending, he filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1). The Honorable Judge Jan E. Dubois found the petition to be incomplete and directed Petitioner to re-file the petition using the court's standard form. (Order, ECF No. 3). On December 11, 2020, Petitioner filed a Writ of Supersedeas requesting that the case be stayed until he could determine if his petition was premature. (ECF No. 6). On May 24, 2021, the Court granted Petitioner an extension of time to file his petition. (Order, ECF No. 12).
On May 19, 2021, Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Resp., ECF No. 20, Ex. 1). Counsel was appointed, and on August 3, 2021 filed an amended PCRA petition. Id. at 15. As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, that PCRA remains pending.
Petitioner also submitted the amended PCRA petition to this Court on November 12, 2021. (Am. PCRA Pet., ECF No. 23).
Meanwhile, on May 18, 2021, Petitioner refiled the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 13). In his petition, Petitioner raises the same claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as those contained in his PCRA petition. (Id. at 5, 17-23; Am. PCRA Pet., ECF No. 23). On June 10, 2021, the Honorable Jan E. Dubois referred this matter to me for a Report and Recommendation. (Order, ECF No. 16). On June 21, 2021, Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay, requesting that his habeas petition be stayed while he amended his PCRA petition to include a claim based on newly-discovered evidence. (Mot. to Stay, ECF No. 18). On July 27, 2021, the Commonwealth filed its Response to Petitioner's habeas petition and motion to stay. (Resp., ECF No. 20). On September 3, 2021, this case was reassigned from Judge Dubois to the Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II. (Order, ECF No. 22).
Pennsylvania and federal courts employ the prisoner mailbox rule, pursuant to which the pro se petition is deemed filed when it is given to prison officials for mailing. See Perry v. Diguglielmo, 169 Fed.Appx. 134, 136 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Little, 716 A.2d 1287 (Pa. Super. 1998)); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998); Commonwealth v. Castro, 766 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2001). In this case, Petitioner certified that he gave his habeas petition to prison officials on May 18, 2021, and it will be deemed filed as of that date. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 13, at 16).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) grants to persons in state or federal custody the right to file a petition in a federal court seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the AEDPA,
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion requirement is rooted in considerations of comity to ensure that state courts have the initial opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to state convictions. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 365 (3d Cir. 2007); Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).
Respect for the state court system requires that the habeas petitioner demonstrate that the claims in question have been “fairly presented to the state courts.” Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. To “fairly present” a claim, a petitioner must present its “factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.” McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a claim is fairly presented when a petitioner presents the same factual and legal basis for the claim to the state courts). A state prisoner exhausts state remedies by giving the “state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). In Pennsylvania, one complete round includes presenting the federal claim through the Superior Court on direct or collateral review. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2004). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving exhaustion of all state remedies. Boyd v. Walmart, 579 F.3d 330, 367 (3d Cir. 2009). Generally, if the petitioner fails to meet his burden, the petition will be dismissed without prejudice, thereby allowing the petitioner to exhaust his claims in state court. Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 159-160 (3d Cir. 2000).
Here, Petitioner raises the same claims in his habeas petition as those he raised for the first time in his PCRA petition. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 13, at 5, 17-23; Resp., ECF No. 20, Ex. 1; Am. PCRA Pet., ECF No. 23). Because that Petition is currently still pending and has not been presented to the Superior Court, Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his state remedies. See Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) (while “an appeal of a state criminal conviction is pending, a would-be habeas corpus petitioner must await the outcome of his appeal before his state remedies are exhausted”). Therefore, the petition must either be stayed or dismissed without prejudice to allow the state court the opportunity to review the claims.
B. Stay and Abeyance
Petitioner asks that this case be stayed in order to allow him to amend a newly-discovered evidence claim to his currently-pending PCRA petition. (Mot. to Stay, ECF No. 18). The Commonwealth opposes a stay, arguing that Petitioner has failed to show good cause. (Resp., ECF No. 20). I agree with the Commonwealth.
The Supreme Court has held that instead of dismissing a petition containing unexhausted claims, district courts can “stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust his previously unexhausted claims.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275-76 (2005); see also Heleva v. Brooks, 581 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2009) (extending the Rhines principle to petitions containing only unexhausted claims). But the petitioner must prove: (1) there is good cause for the failure to exhaust state remedies; (2) the unexhausted claims potentially have merit; and (3) there is no indication petitioner intentionally engaged in dilatory litigation tactics. Id. at 278.
Here, Petitioner cannot meet the “good cause” element of the Rhines test. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), petitioners have one year to file a habeas petition after a direct appeal becomes final. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). Additionally, a habeas petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period during the time period in which a properly filed PCRA petition is pending before the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction [review] . . . is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”); see also Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (“an application is ‘properly filed' when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings”). Petitioner's judgment of sentence in this case became final on July 24, 2021, one-hundred and fifty days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. See Crim. Docket at 14; U.S. Supreme Court Miscellaneous Order (Mar. 19, 2020) (extending the deadline to file a petition for a writ of certiorari due to public health concerns related to Covid-19). Petitioner filed his currently-pending PCRA petition on May 19, 2021, before his judgment of sentence became final. Because the timely filing of his PCRA petition tolls the AEDPA statute of limitations, Petitioner will have one full year from the resolution of his state court proceedings to file a habeas corpus petition. Therefore, Petitioner cannot establish the requisite good cause to warrant staying the instant petition. See White v. Phelps, No. 10-731, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124846, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2010) (Robreno, J.) (noting that Third Circuit precedent shows that good cause does not exist even if only thirty days remain on the AEDPA statute of limitations to return to state court) (citing Heleva, 581 F.3d at 193).
Accordingly, because Petitioner still has a PCRA petition pending before the state court, and because the claims in the current petition are unexhausted, I recommend dismissing the petition without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
As fully explained herein, I conclude that Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is unexhausted and should be DISMISSED without prejudice. Additionally, I conclude that Petitioner's Motion to Stay (ECF No. 18) should be DENIED.
Therefore, I make the following:
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW this 17th day of November, 2021, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED without prejudice and without the issuance of a certificate of appealability, and that his Motion to Stay (ECF No. 18) be DENIED.
Petitioner may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. See Local Civ. Rule 72.1. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.