Petitioners challenged the award before the court of appeals, which affirmed both the award of benefits and the interest award. See DKI Corp./Sylvan Pools v. Industrial Comm'n, 169 Ariz. 357, 819 P.2d 943 (Ct.App. 1991) (2-1 decision). Petitioners asked this court to review the court of appeals' decision on the interest award.
¶ 16 Under the "compensable consequences" doctrine, a claim may not be reopened unless the claimant can show that the current condition is the "direct and natural result" of the original injury and that there is a substantial causal relationship between the original injury and the current condition. See DKI Corp./Sylvan Pools v. Indus. Comm'n, 169 Ariz. 357, 361, 819 P.2d 943, 947 (App. 1991) (distinguishing "between the test for determining the compensability of the initial injury and that for determining how far the range of compensable consequences of that injury may be carried"), vacated in part on other grounds, 173 Ariz. 535, 539, 845 P.2d 461, 465 (1993); Lou Grubb Chevrolet, Inc. v. Indus. Comm' n, 174 Ariz. 23, 26, 846 P.2d 836, 839 (App. 1992) (claimant must show both that the current condition is the direct and natural result of the original injury and also that it is substantially related). ¶ 17 The compensable consequences doctrine applies to cases in which the claimant's subsequent condition, though in some way causally related to the original injury, is "produced by an independent nonindustrial cause."
We presume without deciding that A.R.S. § 23-1021(C) creates an affirmative defense and that a carrier or employer has the burden of proving that an employee was impaired by alcohol consumption at the time of injury and that this impairment was a substantial contributing cause of that injury. Cf. DKI Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 169 Ariz. 357, 362, 819 P.2d 943, 948 (App. 1991) (explaining that "a defendant must plead and prove" an affirmative defense), vacated in part on other grounds, 173 Ariz. 535, 845 P.2d 461 (1993). ¶ 18 Adams, the Employer's plant manager, testified he was aware that employees sometimes pushed the conveyor belt in order to keep it going. Komalestewa's co-worker, Kisko, also testified (in contradiction to Adams) that he was aware that it was necessary to push the conveyor belt "practically every day."
¶ 5 The ALJ proceeded solely on whether Defore had a compensable claim against Rural Metro. Based on Robertson's testimony, the ALJ determined that, while working for Rural Metro on November 19, Defore had "sustained a new injury which consisted of an aggravation" of the May 15 injury. The ALJ further found that Defore had not informed Rural Metro that Robertson had prohibited her from working on the ambulance crew. Noting that Defore "did heavy lifting with Rural Metro against [Robertson's] orders," the ALJ concluded that she "most likely sustained the new injury because she worked beyond [the] restrictions" Robertson had imposed. The ALJ nevertheless found the injury compensable, rejecting Rural Metro's contributory negligence defense, based on the conclusion that Defore's "contributory negligence or fault [could] not [be] considered at the initial compensability stage," citing DKI Corp./Sylvan Pools v. Industrial Commission, 169 Ariz. 357, 819 P.2d 943 (App. 1991), vacated in part on other grounds, 173 Ariz. 535, 845 P.2d 461 (1993). And in her decision upon review, the ALJ rejected Rural Metro's alternative argument that Defore's November 19 injury was noncompensable because it had been purposely self-inflicted.
Thus, if a merit increase in salary is connected with a promotion, it would appear to be the proper subject of an executive session under 25 O.S. 307 [ 25-307]. It is, therefore, the opinion of the Attorney General that your question be answered as follows: A public body, as defined in 25 O.S. 304 [ 25-304] (1977) cannot, under 25 O.S. 307 [ 25-307] (1977), go into executive session for the purpose of discussing the individual salary of an officer or employee. A public body can go into executive session under 25 O.S. 307 [ 25-307] (1977), for the purpose of discussing the employment, hiring, appointment, promotion, demotion, disciplining or resignation of any individual salaried public officer or employee. (GERALD E. WEIS) (ksg) ** SEE: OPINION 96-040 (1996) (THIS OPINION WITHDRAWS THIS ONE) ** Disposition: SEE: 819 P.2d 943 — STATUTE HELD TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL — OVERBROAD