Opinion
No. 519, 1999.
Submitted: December 21, 1999.
Decided: January 28, 2000.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Kent County in C.A. No. 99M-10-015.
AFFIRMED.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HARTNETT and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 28th day of January 2000, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Tommy A. Dixon ("Dixon"), has filed this appeal from the Superior Court's denial of Dixon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The appellee, State of Delaware ("State"), has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Dixon's opening brief that the appeal is without merit. In addition, Dixon has filed a motion requesting that the appeal be dismissed "without prejudice."
Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).
(2) "Under this Court's practice, a voluntary dismissal . . . is deemed to be dismissed with prejudice." The Court cannot permit Dixon to voluntarily dismiss his appeal without prejudice.
Quinn v. State, Del. Supr., No. 288, 1990, Moore, J. (Sept. 19, 1990) (INTERIM ORDER); See Supr. Ct. R. 29(a).
(3) On July 22, 1999, Dixon was charged by Information in the Kent County Court of Common Pleas of having committed numerous traffic violations and one count of Resisting Arrest. On August 11, 1999, Dixon pled guilty in the Court of Common Pleas to: (i) Driving after Judgment Prohibited; (ii) Resisting Arrest; (iii) Driving While License Suspended or Revoked; and (iv) Failing to Stop at a Stop Sign. Dixon was sentenced to a total of 240 days at Level V incarceration followed by one year at Level II probation. Dixon did not file an appeal in the Superior Court, as he had a right to do.
(4) On October 26, 1999, Dixon filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court. By order dated October 28, 1999, the Superior Court summarily dismissed Dixon's petition on the basis that Dixon's commitment was regular on its face. This appeal followed.
(5) In his habeas corpus petition in the Superior Court and now in his opening brief on appeal, Dixon alleges that his arrest was illegal because the charging officer obtained the arrest warrant from a Justice of the Peace Court in Sussex County instead of from a Justice of the Peace Court in Kent County. According to Dixon, the arrest warrant should have issued from a Justice of the Peace Court in the same county in which the crimes were alleged to have been committed, i.e. Kent County. Dixon requests that this Court "[d]ismiss all charges and release him from prison, probation and all court cost[s] and fines."
(6) The writ of habeas corpus under Delaware law provides relief on a very limited basis. Habeas corpus provides "an opportunity for one illegally confined or incarcerated to obtain judicial review of the jurisdiction of the court ordering the commitment." Habeas corpus is not a substitute for direct appeal or postconviction relief.
Hall v. Carr, Del. Supr., 692 A.2d 888, 891 (1997).
Curran v. Woolley, Del. Supr., 104 A.2d 771, 773 (1954).
(7) In this case, the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to accept Dixon's pleas of guilt. Any deficiency in the arrest warrant issued by the Justice of the Peace Court was cured by the Information subsequently filed in the Court of Common Pleas. The Court of Common Pleas' subsequent commitment of Dixon to the custody of the Department of Correction to serve a prison sentence for the conviction, is valid on its face. Dixon continues to be held pursuant to that valid commitment.
See 11 Del. C. § 2701(b).
See Brokenbrough v. State, Del. Supr., No. 309, 1994, Veasey, C.J., 1994 WL 605435 (October 24, 1994) (ORDER) (notwithstanding alleged defects in arrest warrant, defendant was properly indicted by the grand jury, which provided Superior Court with subject matter jurisdiction).
(8) It is manifest on the face of Dixon's opening brief that the appeal is without merit. The issues presented in this appeal are clearly controlled by settled Delaware law.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that Dixon's "Motion to Dismiss" is DENIED. The State's motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger Justice