Opinion
No. 3D18-52
08-14-2019
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan Lerner, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jeffrey R. Geldens, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan Lerner, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jeffrey R. Geldens, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and MILLER, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Mosley v. State, 46 So. 3d 510, 526 (Fla. 2009) (noting: "If the State presents both direct and circumstantial evidence, courts do not apply the special standard of review applicable to circumstantial evidence cases" (citing Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002) )). See also Lincoln v. State, 459 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 1984) (acknowledging that merely driving a getaway car in an elusive manner in an attempt to avoid police is, without more, insufficient for a factfinder to infer complicity in intent to commit a crime; but affirming defendant's conviction as a principal to robbery because the evidence was legally sufficient to permit the jury to reject Lincoln's hypothesis of innocence and conclude she knew in advance that her husband was going to commit a robbery and that she had the intent to assist him); Henderson v. State, 679 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (affirming conviction where, in light of the evidence, defendant's hypothesis of innocence created a legitimate question for the jury to determine).