Opinion
No. 05-06-00265-CR.
Filed March 20, 2007. Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F05-50115-TU.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, RICHTER, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Roshanda Yvette Dixon of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. After Dixon pleaded true to an enhancement charge, the trial court assessed her punishment at fifteen years' confinement. Dixon appeals, challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction and contending the trial court erroneously admitted a police money log into evidence. The facts are known to the parties and we do not recite them in detail. Further, because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. In her first two issues, Dixon argues the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that she possessed the requisite amount of cocaine with the intent to distribute it. Instead, Dixon avers, she was merely present in the house to purchase drugs for her personal use. In a legal sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light and ask whether a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). In any event, the fact finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). The State was required to prove that Dixon exercised care, control, or management over the cocaine and knew it was contraband. See Guiton v. State, 742 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); see also Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Police officers carrying out a raid at a crack house discovered Dixon, along with two men, lying face-down on the floor in the back bedroom of the house. She was lying next to and on top of baggies containing crack cocaine. Because Dixon did not have exclusive possession of the house, or the room in the house, where the cocaine was found, the State must affirmatively link her to the cocaine. See Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). This Court has looked to a nonexclusive list of possible affirmative links: (1) whether the defendant was present when the drugs were found; (2) whether the drugs were in plain view; (3) the defendant's proximity to and the accessibility of the drugs; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of drugs when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband; (6) whether the defendant made any incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of drugs; (10) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (11) whether the place the drugs were found was enclosed; (12) the amount of drugs found; (13) whether the defendant possessed weapons; and (14) whether the defendant possessed a large amount of cash. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 831; Porter v. State, 873 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd). We are less concerned with the number of links than with the degree to which the links tend to link the defendant to the contraband. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 831. In Dixon's case, a significant number of the listed factors, alone and in combination, tend to link her affirmatively to the cocaine: (1) Dixon was indeed present when and where bagged cocaine and a large rock of cocaine were found; (2) drugs were in plain view — and under Dixon's body — in the bedroom, as were items of drug paraphernalia, including a razor blade, baggies, and scales; (3) witnesses described Dixon as lying on top of some of the drugs and as being within hands' reach of other drugs; (5) Dixon's pocket contained an amount of marijuana that was consistent with personal use;(11) the drugs were found in an enclosed room; (12) approximately thirty grams of cocaine was seized from the that enclosed bedroom, and more was found throughout the house; (13) Dixon was discovered with her hands under a bed, where two guns were later found; and (14) Dixon carried more than $900 in cash on her person when she was arrested, including $800 wrapped in a bundle with a note that said "50 cent." We conclude Dixon was affirmatively and strongly linked to both the cocaine and the evidence of distribution discovered in the back bedroom. Whether looking at the evidence supporting the verdict or all the evidence offered, a rational juror could certainly have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Dixon exercised care, custody, and management over the cocaine found in the bedroom and that Dixon had the intent to distribute the cocaine. There was ample evidence supporting the jury's finding; we overrule Dixon's first two issues. In her third issue, Dixon argues that the trial court erroneously overruled her objection to the admission of the police "money log" from her arrest. A money log is a form receipt used by the police to record cash taken from an arrested suspect. In this case, the exhibit at issue lists the number and denomination of the bills making up the $919 found on Dixon's person at the time of the raid. The exhibit identifies the officers who seized the cash and the officers who delivered the cash to the property room. Detective Willie Ford, who sponsored the exhibit, is identified in it as one of the seizing officers. In the trial court, defense counsel lodged three objections as the testimony concerning the money log proceeded:
[1] Your honor, I am going to have to object, I don't believe the proper predicate has been laid at this time, that's my objection.
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[2] Your honor, I am still going to object to Exhibit 34, improper predicate, we don't know who produced this document at this point.
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[3] Judge, we would object. Two reasons, this is not a complete record based on his testimony; and if it is in fact a business record, he is not the keeper of the record as being the proper person to testify to those documents.In this Court, Dixon argues the sponsoring witness laid an insufficient predicate to establish the exhibit's relevance or accuracy. Our review of the record surrounding the above-quoted objections shows defense counsel's concern at trial was with the "incomplete" nature of the copy of the log, because the photocopying process had cut off the very bottom of a signature at the bottom of the page. Detective Ford testified that the seizing officers filled out the information on the top portion of the form, including how much cash was seized in what denominations, and then took the money and the log to the property room. Ford testified that the seizing officers were not supposed to sign the form. The face of the form shows that the cataloguing process described by Ford is precisely what happened here. The unknown signature at the bottom of the form did not place the accuracy of the report by the seizing officers in question. Nor did the unknown signature affect the relevance of the log, which tended to prove Dixon was involved in either buying or selling significant amounts of contraband. Finally, as the quoted objections above show, the only hearsay objection lodged by Dixon at trial was that Ford was not the "keeper" of the record and so he could not provide the testimony necessary to show it was a business record. The rules of evidence do not require a business record to be sponsored by its "keeper" or custodian. Instead, the rule requires testimony by "the custodian or other qualified witness." Tex. R. Evid. 803(6); see also, e.g., Brooks v. Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, 926 S.W.2d 316, 322 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, no writ) (non-custodian sponsor of exhibit approved). A witness who creates a written statement or who provides the information to its creator is certainly qualified to testify to the nature of the document and the circumstances of its preparation. We overrule Dixon's third issue. We have decided each of Dixon's issues against her. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
There is no indication in the record that marijuana was sold at the house.
Dixon also argues in this Court that the log should be excluded because (1) it is the equivalent of a search warrant, (2) it is a document generated by law enforcement, (3) it contained incriminating prejudicial statements concerning the nature of the charge against Dixon, and (4) its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. These arguments were not preserved below.
Nor was any challenge raised to the chain of custody in terms of the cash or the log. Thus, the signature played no part in the proceedings.