Opinion
03 Civ. 9536 (RCC)
December 3, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
By means of an Order to Show Cause, District Council 1707 and Local 215 of AFSCME ("Plaintiffs") seek to temporarily restrain and preliminarily enjoin the New York Association for New Americans, Inc. ("Defendant") from terminating five employees effective December 4, 2003 pending arbitration of Plaintiffs' claim that these terminations violate a collective bargaining agreement. Having considered the papers submitted by the parties, for the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' application is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
From January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2002, Plaintiffs and Defendant were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Under this agreement, Plaintiffs, a labor union representing community and social service agency employees, served as the exclusive representative for the individuals employed with Defendant, a non-profit agency providing social services to refugees and immigrants. (Stokely Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.) In the mid-1990s, as Defendant expanded its program, the bargaining unit Plaintiffs represented consisted of approximately four hundred employees. (Id. ¶ 4.) In response to lower immigration trends since 2001, Defendant has experienced a significant decrease in clients. (Valencia Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) Because Defendant's funding is dependent on the quantity of its clients, its funding has diminished since 2001. (Id. ¶ 4.) As a result, Defendant has reduced its work-force from the mid-1990s high of four hundred employees to approximately eighty current employees. (Compl. ¶ 5; Valenica Decl. ¶ 7-8.) Moreover, Defendant is still operating at a deficit, such that it continues to reduce its expenses. (Id.)
Since November 2002, Plaintiffs and Defendant had been in contract negotiations to renew the January 2000 to December 31, 2002 collective bargaining agreement. (Stokely Decl. ¶ 5.) In July 2003, the parties reached an impasse and Defendant imposed a final offer to Plaintiffs. (Id.) Thereafter, on November 5, 2003, Defendant announced that it would terminate five individuals assigned to its Initial Refugee Resettlement Program and its Legal Services Department. (Compl. ¶ 10; Husney Decl. ¶ 23.) Each of the five terminated individuals will receive, at least, fourteen weeks severance pay. (Id. ¶ 35.) The agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant provides that when employees are "retrenched" the employee within the grade and job classification with the least amount of seniority shall be the first employee dismissed. (Stokely Decl., Ex. A ¶ 31D.) The first of the five employees to be terminated is Brenda Stokely, the least senior Case Worker employed by Defendant. (Compl. ¶ 12-13.) Stokely is also the President of Local 215. (Id. ¶ 12; Stokely Decl. ¶ 1.)
Plaintiffs assert that these terminations violate the collective bargaining agreement with Defendant and that because ranking union officials, such as Stokely, are slated for termination, Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed. Plaintiffs therefore request that the Court temporarily restrain and preliminarily enjoin the scheduled terminations.
II. DISCUSSION A. The Standard for Granting a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction
A temporary restraining order, like a preliminary injunction, is an extraordinary remedy that will not be granted lightly. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a preliminary injunction is "one of the most drastic tools in the arsenal of judicial remedies"); see also Borey v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1991); Jackson v. Johnson, 962 F. Supp.2d 391, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In the Second Circuit, the standard for a temporary restraining order is the same as for a preliminary injunction. See Roberts v. Atl. Recording Corp., 892 F. Supp. 83, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). That standard requires that in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show that (1) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits of its case or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in its favor.See Time Warner Cable of New York City v. Bloomberg L.P., 118 F.3d 917, 923 (2d Cir. 1997); Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996); Abley, United States, 44 F.3d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1995): Reuters Ltd, v. United Press Int'l Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir. 1990); Bus. Residents Alliance v. Martinez, 2003 WL 21982960, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2003). "A showing of irreparable harm is considered the `single most important requirement' in satisfying the standard." Ahmad v. Long Island Univ., 18 F. Supp.2d 245, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Alliance Bond Fund Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano deDesarrolo, S.A., 143 F.3d 688, 696 (2d Cir. 1998)). Therefore, the moving party, here Plaintiffs, must show that the injury they will suffer is likely and imminent, not remote and speculative, and that such injury is not capable of being folly remedied by money damages.NAACP v. Town of East Haven, 70 F.3d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 1995). Finally, Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) requires the district court to sufficiently set forth its findings to permit appellate review. See Rosen v. Siegel 106 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1997). The Court therefore considers the requirements for injunctive relief in turn.
Accordingly, the following discussion applies equally to Plaintiffs' applications for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.
B. Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs assert that they will be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief because Stokely's absence from on-going negotiations with Defendant will "irreversibly harm" Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶ 24(b).) Plaintiffs maintain that "the bargaining process will be irreversibly damaged if layoffs are initiated in violation of the [Collective Bargaining] Agreement before an arbitrator has ruled on the underlying dispute. Brenda Stokely will be unable to participate in bargaining sessions because she will likely locate a new position . . . and will no longer have release time to attend to union business." (Id. ¶ 24(c).) Plaintiffs continue that, "Without senior employees, such as Brenda Stokely, who are knowledgeable of the Agreement, grievance procedure, or negotiations, Local 215, if not [DC 1707], will face decertification. The results of this damage cannot be reversed." (Id. ¶ 24(f).) In their Memorandum of Law seeking injunctive relief, Plaintiffs further argue that even if Stokely is reinstated and provided back-pay after arbitrating her claims, Plaintiffs will be damaged because the arbitrator will be unable to "compensate employees who were unable to get advice from Stokely on the spot, or who had to go into a grievance meeting with an inexperienced shop steward. The arbitrator will not be able to compensate the unions for the absence of `on the job' training Stokely would have provided to the new shop stewards." (Pls.' Mem. of Law, at 8.)
The thrust of Plaintiffs' argument, namely that they cannot represent their employees without Stokely being employed by Defendant and remaining on site in Defendant's employ, does not support a grant of injunctive relief for several reasons. First, under the collective bargaining agreement, union activity is permitted during work hours for only five hours per week. (Stokely Decl., Ex. A ¶ 34.) Therefore, Stokely is already limited in her ability to perform union business during work hours. Second, contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, Stokely will not "lose her ability to function as a . . . union leader." (Stokely Decl. ¶ 39.) As the parties have agreed, union officials not employed by Defendant may visit the Defendant's premises to engage in union business. In fact, the parties have stipulated that this privilege "shall be exercised without interference with the operations of [Defendant] under reasonable arrangements made between the parties." (Stokely Decl., Ex. A ¶ 34.) Finally, the Court notes that Stokely will be provided fourteen weeks severance upon termination. (Husney Decl. ¶ 35.) The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs' contention that they will be unable to represent their employees should Stokely be terminated rings hollow.
The only identifiable harm presented by this application is, therefore, the loss of employment to five employees. This does not, however, rise to the level of "irreparable harm" necessary for a court to grant injunctive relief. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) (holding that the injuries generally associated with a discharge from employment do not constitute the "irreparable harm" necessary to obtain injunctive relief);see, e.g., Cooney v. Consol, Edison Co. of New York, 2003 WL 22093483, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2003); Hartzog v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 77 F. Supp.2d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Ahmad, 18 F. Supp.2d at 248-49. Given that at arbitration, an arbitrator could reinstate the five affected employees and assess monetary damages, Plaintiffs fail to show precisely how an arbitration would be rendered meaningless or why Plaintiffs lack an adequate remedy absent injunctive relief.
Additionally, Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendant has violated the collective bargaining agreement by not disclosing certain information to Plaintiffs is properly an issue for the National Labor Relations Board, and not this Court. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). To the extent that Plaintiffs claim a right to information pursuant to Article 31 of the collective bargaining agreement, that issue should be presented at arbitration.
Finally, the Court notes that equity requires the Court to deny Plaintiffs' application because Defendant will sustain financial damage if injunctive relief is granted. Defendant is currently operating at a deficit and thus, if the Court enjoins the proposed terminations, the savings associated with less staff will be lost. Coupled with the fact that each of the terminated employees will receive severance and would be entitled to reinstatement and monetary relief should they prevail at arbitration, the balance of hardships do not tip decidedly in Plaintiffs' favor.
C. Likelihood of Success
In determining whether a Court should grant injunctive relief, the second step requires that the movant demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. The Court need not undertake this analysis. See, e.g., Ahmad, 18 F. Supp.2d at 249. As previously stated, Plaintiffs are unable to establish irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not entitled to equitable relief no matter how likely their chance of success on the merits.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is herebyORDERED, that Plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order is denied; and it is ORDERED, that Plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction is denied.
So Ordered.