Noting that “the United States' [m]otion comes very late in the litigation process,” the District Court nevertheless determined that intervention would not “prejudice the original parties or unduly delay the proceedings concerning the appropriate injunctive remedy to be imposed.” Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03–cv–3209, 2009 WL 4506301, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009). Accordingly, the Court granted the United States' motion.

The United States has standing to bring this claim. Judge Bennett relied on the following cases to support his position: United States v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 927 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Colo. 1996); Smith v. City of Phila., 345 F. Supp. 2d 482 (E.D. Pa. 2004); United States v. City of Baltimore, 845 F. Supp. 2d 640 (D. Md. 2012); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-cv-3209, 2009 WL 4506301 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009); United States v. Va., No. 12-cv-59, 2012 WL 13034148 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2012); United States v. N. Ill. Special Recreation Ass'n, No. 12-cv-7613, 2013 WL 1499034 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2013). Additionally, what the State fails to mention about Dudek is the court's acknowledgement that despite its lack of standing under Title II, the United States had another avenue to pursue its claims—the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 ("CRIPA").

Four others concern the Department's intervention in existing litigation. See Lane v. Brown , Case No. 12–CV–138 (D.Or. May 22, 2013); Steward v. Perry , Case No. 10–CV–01025 (W.D.Tex. Sept. 20, 2012); Lynn E. v. Lynch , Case No. 12–CV–53 (D.N.H. Apr. 4, 2012); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson , Case No. 03–CV–03209 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009). In Lynn E. , all parties assented to the Department's intervention; in Paterson , no party opposed it; and in Lane and Steward , no party opposed the Department's intervention on the ground that the Department lacked standing.

Courts in the Second Circuit take a "'hospitable attitude' toward 'allowing a government agency to intervene in cases involving a statute it is required to enforce.'" Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03 CV 3209, 2009 WL 4506301, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009) (quoting Blowers v. Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., 527 F.2d 333, 334 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam)); see also 7C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1912, at 472 & n.10 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that courts "allow[] intervention liberally to governmental agencies . . . seeking to speak for the public interest," and collecting cases). 2. Timeliness

The Court has already granted the United States' motion to intervene, and "its pleadings [are] congruent to the pleadings of the Plaintiff." Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03–CV–3209 (NGG), 2009 WL 4506301, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009). The interests of the United States in the enforcement of Title II and the Rehabilitation Act provide a sufficient basis for the United States to raise claims that do not exceed the scope of the original Plaintiffs' complaint.

Other courts have also recognized that DOJ has authority both to bring suit under Title II and to intervene in litigation brought by private individuals. See e.g., United States v. N. Ill. Special Recreation Ass'n, 2013 WL 1499034 at *5 (N.D.Ill. April 11, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss in Title II action brought by the United States alleging discriminatory segregation against individuals with epilepsy); United States v. City of Baltimore, 845 F.Supp.2d 640, 642–43 (D.Md.2012) (granting summary judgment in Title II action brought by DOJ); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 2009 WL 4506301 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009) (allowing intervention by DOJ in Title II action alleging that individuals with mental illness were denied the opportunity to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs); United States v. City and County of Denver, 927 F.Supp. 1396, 1400 (D.Colo.1996) (finding that the United States has authority to initiate action under Title II of the ADA to enforce the provisions of the Act); Smith v. The City of Philadelphia, 345 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (E.D.Penn.2004) (upon dismissal of private individual's claim, the court retained jurisdiction over the United States's Title II claim, finding a “separate and independent basis for jurisdiction under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2) permits state agencies to intervene in lawsuits based on statutes or regulations within their administrative purview. See Disability Advocates. Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209 (NGG), 2009 WL 4506301, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009). It is undisputed that the State AGs have parens patriae standing to assert their "quasi-sovereign interest" in "securing an honest marketplace in which to transact business." New York ex rel. Abrams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 547 F. Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).