Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:22-CV-157-CHB
2022-09-13
Bridgett DINTER, Plaintiff, v. Rok MIREMAMI, Defendant.
Evan Barret Smith, AppalReD Legal Aid, Prestonsburg, KY, James Fahringer, ARDF, Somerset, KY, for Plaintiff.
Evan Barret Smith, AppalReD Legal Aid, Prestonsburg, KY, James Fahringer, ARDF, Somerset, KY, for Plaintiff.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
CLARIA HORN BOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Bridgett Dinter's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [R. 8]. On September 9, 2022, the Court referred the Motion to Magistrate Judge Hanly A. Ingram for a telephonic status conference, [R. 10], which Judge Ingram held that same day, [R. 11; R. 12]. The matter is now ripe for consideration. For the reasons below, the Court will grant in part Dinter's motion and issue a temporary restraining order.
Dinter's counsel appeared for the telephonic status conference, and, because Miremami is outside the country for the next few weeks, his agent (property manager Jenny Eubanks) represented him. [R. 12]. At the conference, both parties "requested a ruling on the motion." Id.
I. Factual Background
On August 26, 2022, Dinter filed a Complaint in this Court claiming violations of the Federal Fair Housing Act and the Kentucky Fair Housing Act. [R. 1, pp. 3-4]. Shortly thereafter, on September 8, 2022, Dinter filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. [R. 8]. In her Motion, Dinter seeks emergency injunctive relief to prevent Defendant, Rok Miremami, from evicting her. Id. at 1. Specifically, Dinter alleges that Miremami unlawfully refused to renew her lease based on her request to have a service dog to help monitor her severe diabetes. Id. at 6-7.
In an Affidavit attached to her Motion, Dinter explains that her lease with Miremami for the property at 31 Charlotte's Place, Somerset, KY 42503 began in August 2020. [R. 8-7, p. 1, ¶ 1]. On the issue of pets, the Lease states:
PETS : Our property gladly allows Assistance Animals as an accommodation for qualified tenants with disabilities. However, pursuant to KRS 383.085, knowingly providing false information or documents in an attempt to obtain an Assistance Animal in housing is a criminal violation punishable by a fine of up to $1,000.00. All other pets are not allowed. If, at any time, there is found to be a domestic animal in the premise [sic], the damage/deposit is forfeited and tenant is responsible for all repairs and damages by pet, and tenant will replace all carpeting. Upon Lease or its agent's discretion, tenant will be subject to immediate eviction.[R. 8-1, p. 5]. The parties previously renewed the lease once for August 2021 through July 2022. Id. In February 2022, Dinter was diagnosed with a serious case of Type I Diabetes, which causes her to struggle with hypoglycemia, particularly at night. Id. at ¶ 2. Dinter sometimes fails to notice her low blood sugar in time to take precautionary measures. Id. Because of her "frequent nocturnal hypoglycemia," Dinter's doctor recommended that she "would benefit from a hypoglycemia alert dog." See [R. 8-4]. Near the end of April 2022, she inquired about getting a service dog. [R. 8-7, p. 1, ¶ 3]. The property manager, Jenny Eubank, told Dinter that the property did not allow service dogs, and if they allowed one, they would have to charge her a deposit. Id. at 1-2, ¶ 3.
Dinter then received a notice of non-renewal on June 14, 2022. [R. 8-2]. In the notice of non-renewal, Miremami does not state a reason why he would not be renewing Dinter's lease. See id. Dinter called Eubank after receiving the notice and recorded the conversation. She asked Eubank about the provision of her original Lease that states that the property "gladly accepts Assistance animals." See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zgifyr1zjMM, at 0:35-0:48 (on file with the Court) (hereinafter "Call Recording"). Eubank responded that "The law is that it has to be one of PTSD . . . like for the vets and stuff where they have to have their animals for the PTSD" and that "Rok [Miremami] brought a bunch of paperwork in" on that issue See id. at 0:47-1:10; [R. 8, pp. 2-3, ¶ 4]. Dinter asked, "Is there any way possible to renew my lease and can I have my service dog?" to which Eubank responded, "No . . . we've already sent you the letter notice that we're not going to be renewing the lease and it had come from Rok, it didn't come from me, it come from Rok, and I have to[.]" See Call Recording at 1:18-1:38; see also [R. 8, p. 3, ¶ 4].
Dinter then contacted the Lexington Fair Housing Council to make a formal request for her service dog. [R. 8, p. 3, ¶ 5]. The formal request is dated July 26, 2022. [R. 8-3]. Dinter also provided a doctor's note from Dr. Lyle Christopher Meyers to support her request for an accommodation. [R. 8-4]. Eubank responded to the request, on behalf of Miremami, on August 1, 2022. [R. 8-5]. The response states:
1. Ms. Dinter gave notice previously that she was looking for another residence before mentioning she was getting a service animal. I believe
she mentioned "a boyfriend" and her looking for a place together.Id. Dinter argues that these justifications are false and explained: "Although I had complained about the increased rent, I never said that I could not pay it or that I wanted to end my lease at the end of the term for that reason or any other reason." [R. 8-7, p. 3, ¶ 8]. On August 26, 2022, Miremami had a "Kentucky Notice to Vacate" served on Dinter, giving her fifteen days to vacate. [R. 8, p. 4, ¶ 8]; [R. 8-6]. Failure to vacate by that date would likely result in eviction. [R. 8, p. 4, ¶ 8].
2. Rent was raised to $850.00 for all tenants beginning July of 2022. I advised her that rent was going up and she advised that she could not pay that. Because she advised she was looking and because her lease expires at the end of this month, we decided to go ahead and just let her pay the $750.00 to the end of her lease.
3. Ms. Dinter advised she was getting a service animal. We are aware of the laws concerning a service animal and it is stated in our lease that we accept service animals pursuant to KRS 383.085.
We have decided to not renew due to her advising she cannot afford $850.00 monthly and previous notice that she was looking to house elsewhere.
II. Discussion
In determining whether to grant a temporary restraining order ("TRO"), the Court considers the same four factors applicable to a motion for preliminary injunction: (1) the movant's likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant "would likely be permanently harmed absent the injunction; (3) whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to third parties; and (4) whether the injunction would serve the public interest." McGirr v. Rehme, 891 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing S. Glazer's Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017)). Though the standard for a TRO is the same as a preliminary injunction, there is increased emphasis on irreparable harm. ABX Air, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Airline Div., 219 F. Supp. 3d 665, 670 (S.D. Ohio 2016); see also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2, 98 S.Ct. 359, 54 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977).
The grant of a TRO is within the discretion of the District Court. Am. Book Co. v. Blount, 295 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (E.D. Ky. 1969); 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 11A Federal Practice and Procedure § 2951 (3d ed. 2020). "A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it." Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002).
A. Likelihood of Success
To demonstrate a "likelihood of success on the merits," a movant must simply show that it has a "reasonable probability that it will prevail on the merits." Trefelner ex rel. Trefelner v. Burrell Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 581, 589 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 1975)); see also Hall v. Edgewood Partners Ins. Ctr., Inc., 878 F.3d 524, 527 (6th Cir. 2017) ("As long as there is some likelihood of success on the merits, these factors are to be balanced, rather than tallied.").
Here, Dinter has established a likelihood of success on the merits on her federal and state law claims. Under federal law, "[t]he Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 makes it unlawful to 'discriminate against any person . . . in the provision of services or facilities in connection with [a] dwelling[ ] because of a [disability] of . . . a person residing in . . . that dwelling." Kooman v. Boulder Bluff Condos., 833 F. App'x 623, 626 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)). "The statute covers discrimination arising from 'a refusal to permit, at the expense of the [disabled] person, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied . . . by such person if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises[.]" Id. (citing § 3604(f)(3)(A)). To prevail on her federal claim, Dinter must show that (1) she had a disability, (2) she requested a modification, (3) Miremami refused to permit it, (4) Miremami knew or should have known of Dinter's disability at the time, and (5) the requested modification was reasonable and necessary. Id. (citing Hollis v. Chestnut Bend Homeowners Ass'n, 760 F.3d 531, 541 (6th Cir. 2014)).
Similarly, KRS § 344.360 provides that it is unlawful for a "real estate operator" to "discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a housing accommodation to any buyer or renter because of a disability of . . . [t]hat buyer or renter." Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.360(9); see also Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Human Rights Comm'n v. Bradford Green, LLC, No. 2018-CA-000132-MR, 2019 WL 1579602, at *3, 2019 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 262, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019) ("Refusal to make reasonable accommodations to afford handicapped residents 'equal opportunity to use and enjoy' a dwelling is unlawful discrimination under both Kentucky and federal law."). Further, KRS § 383.085 defines "assistance animal" as follows:
"Assistance animal" means an animal that works, provides assistance, or performs tasks for the benefit of a person with a disability, or provides emotional support that alleviates one or more identified symptoms or effects of a person's disability. This shall include a service animal specifically trained or equipped to perform tasks for a person with a disability, or an emotional support animal that provides support to alleviate one or more identified symptoms or effects of a person's disability[.]Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 383.085(a); see also Commonwealth Comm'r on Human Rights v. Fincastle Heights Mut. Ownership Corp., 633 S.W.3d 808, 819-820 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021) (discussing Kentucky law on service animals and housing discrimination, including KRS § 383.085 and § 344.360).
Dinter has sufficiently demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claims. First, diabetes likely qualifies as a disability under both federal and Kentucky law. See 24 CFR § 100.201(a)(1) ("Physical or mental disabilities includes: . . . diabetes . . ."); Fincastle Heights Mut. Ownership Corp., 633 S.W.3d 808 (citing a memorandum from Housing and Urban Development that describes a disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."); see also Norton Healthcare, Inc. v. Turner, Nos. 2019-CA-0328-MR, 2019-CA-0569-MR, 2021 WL 4228329, at *4, 2021 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 743, at *11-12 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2021) ("[D]isability is defined under KRS 344.010(4) as . . . (a) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one (1) or more of the major life activities of the individual."). Second, Dinter plainly requested to have a service dog reside at her residence. [R. 8-3]; see also Call Recording; [R. 8-7, pp. 1-2]. Third, Miremami refused to permit the service dog, as made plain through Dinter's phone conversation with Miremami's agent, Eubanks. In the phone call Dinter recorded after receiving the notice of non-renewal, Eubanks explained to Dinter that Miremami believed he need only accommodate for assistance animals if tenants suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). See Call Recording at 0:47-1:10. However, neither federal nor Kentucky law appear so narrow. Further, the letter sent on Dinter's behalf, sent by the Lexington Fair Housing Council, is consistent with Dinter's assertion that Miremami denied her request for a service dog: "Ms. Dinter states that she received a notice of non-renewal after informing you of her intent to utilize a service animal." [R. 8-3, p. 1]. This evidence casts doubt upon the veracity of the reasons Miremami, through Eubanks, supplied for why Dinter's lease would not be renewed, such as Dinter's alleged refusal to pay increased rent. See [R. 8-5]; see also [R. 8-7, p. 2, ¶ 4] ("Non-renewal of a lease by Mr. Miremami does not appear to be typical in my apartment complex. I can see that most of my neighbors' leases are renewed from one year to the next without apparent issue."). Fourth, Miremami knew of Dinter's disability, as she supplied a note from a physician recommending that she use a "hypoglycemia alert dog" to help with her Type 1 Diabetes, and, specifically, her "frequent nocturnal hypoglycemia." [R. 8-4]. Finally, it appears the accommodation was reasonable and necessary, as the Lease itself provided that the property "gladly allows Assistance Animals as an accommodation to qualified tenants with disabilities" and the service dog would help wake Dinter up to alert her of low blood sugar levels and enable her to take precautionary measures to avoid severe results. See [R. 8-1, p. 5]; [R. 8-7, p. 1, ¶ 2]. Accordingly, the Court finds that Dinter has presented at least a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of her housing discrimination claims. See Trefelner, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 589. Therefore, this first factor weighs in favor of granting the TRO.
B. Irreparable Harm
The most important factor in an application for a TRO is the movant's showing of irreparable harm. ABX Air, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 670; 11A Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, § 2951. To show irreparable harm, a movant must show that, absent a TRO, its interests would be damaged in ways that could not be remedied later on in the legal process. S. Glazer's Distributors, 860 F.3d at 852. Further, the movant must show that the irreparable harm is "likely," not merely speculative. Winter v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20-22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he harm alleged must be both certain and immediate, rather than speculative or theoretical."). "When housing discrimination is shown, 'it is reasonable to presume that irreparable injury flows from the discrimination.' " Chapp v. Bowman, 750 F. Supp. 274, 277 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (quoting Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417, 1423 (11th Cir. 1984)); see also White v. US Bank N.A., No. 17-cv-02671-JPM-dkv, 2017 WL 10311423, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232027 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2017) (citing Wonderland Shopping Ctr. Venture Ltd. P'ship v. CDC Mortg. Cap., Inc., 274 F.3d 1085, 1097 (6th Cir. 2001)) ("As to eviction, White is correct that loss of a unique property interest is considered irreparable harm.")
Here, Dinter would suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief. Namely, if the Court declined to grant a temporary restraining order, Dinter would almost certainly face eviction. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20-22, 129 S.Ct. 365. As an initial matter, because Dinter has presented evidence to support her claims of housing discrimination, "it is reasonable to presume that irreparable injury flows from the discrimination." Chapp, 750 F. Supp. at 277; see also Watkins v. Greene Metro. Hous. Auth., 397 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1109 (S.D. Ohio 2019) ("A loss of housing constitutes an irreparable harm.") Further, in her Affidavit, Dinter states:
I do not currently have another place of my own to stay if I am forced to leave my home, and therefore I would suffer a hardship if I am not protected by an appropriate court order. I have an autistic son who would not appropriately handle such a sudden change, which would I believe would [sic] result in significant harm to him.[R. 8-7, p. 4, ¶ 11]. And, as Dinter notes in her Motion, failure to act soon may be a bar to action: the Anti-Injunction Act may prohibit the Court from granting an injunction once Miremami files forcible detainer action in state court. [R. 8, p. 10]. Accordingly, the Court finds that the injuries Dinter and her family would incur if evicted from their home could not be remedied later in the legal process. See S. Glazer's Distributors, 860 F.3d at 852; see also Watkins, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 1110 (finding that the risk of irreparable harm weighed in favor of granting a preliminary injunction "[b]ecause Plaintiff and her children's housing situation is at imminent risk of change and the preliminary injunction will prevent eviction[.]").
C. Harm to Third Parties
"The third factor for a court to consider is 'whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others.' " Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 550-51 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2005)). "While this factor is generally concerned with harm to third parties, courts also often consider the 'balance of hardships' between the parties if an injunction were to issue. Planned Parenthood Great Nw. Haw., Alaska, Ind., & Ky., Inc. v. Cameron, 599 F.Supp.3d 497, 508-09, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73087, at *19 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 21, 2022) (citing Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d at 550-51); see also Mgmt. Registry, Inc. v. Calvetti, Nos. 3:18CV-00201-JHM, 3:18CV-00202-JHM, 2018 WL 1660087, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58184 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 5, 2018) (evaluating the "balance of hardships between the parties" under the third factor).
Here, in analyzing the balance of hardships between the parties, the Court agrees with Dinter that "[t]he potential harms to Ms. Dinter significantly outweigh any potential for harm" to Miremami. [R. 8, p. 11]. As she correctly notes, Miremami will still be entitled to collect rent from Dinter while she lives on the premises. See id. Therefore, the Court finds that this factor counsels in favor of granting Dinter's requested relief.
D. Public Interest
Finally, the Court must analyze whether public interest favors granting the temporary restraining order. In the Fair Housing Act, Congress provided that "it is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601. The Act further authorizes injunctive relief "as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c). Accordingly, the Court finds that the public interest is served by granting the requested TRO in this case. See Entine v. Lissner, No. 2:17-cv-946, 2017 WL 5507619 at *10, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190289 at *30 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2017) (quoting Sellers v. Univ. of Rio Grande, 838 F. Supp. 2d 677, 688 (S.D. Ohio 2012)) ("[T]he existence of statutes such as the ADA, Fair Housing Act, and Rehabilitation Act 'reflects the fact that there is significant public interest in eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities and that this interest is furthered by appropriate injunctive relief.' " Johnson v. Macy, 145 F. Supp. 3d 907, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (collecting cases to support the proposition that "courts have emphatically declared that the public interest is served by effective enforcement of the FHA [Fair Housing Act]."); Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Morgan Prop. Mgmt. Co., LLC, No. JKB-19-0734, 2019 WL 1118066 at *2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38994 at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2019) ("Finally, the public interest in penalizing and preventing discrimination against those with disabilities and those associated with disabled individuals in housing decisions necessitates the issuance of temporary injunctive relief.").
III. Conclusion
The Court finds that all four factors counsel in favor of granting the TRO. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Court will grant in part Dinter's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, [R. 8]. Because Dinter is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court will not require her to post a bond. See Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that district courts possess discretion over whether to require the posting of security under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c)). Accordingly, and the Court having been otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. The Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, [R. 8], is GRANTED IN PART insofar as she requests a temporary restraining order. By separate Order, the Court will schedule a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction.