Opinion
C. A. 0:23-3892-CMC-PJG
12-12-2023
Deon Dinkins, Petitioner, v. Warden of F.C.I. Williamsburg, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Deon Dinkins, a self-represented federal prisoner, filed this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the Government's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. (ECF No. 12.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Dinkins of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the Government's motion. (ECF No. 13.) Dinkins filed a response in opposition. (ECF No. 16.) Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the court concludes the Government's motion should be granted and the petition dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken as true for purposes of resolving the Government's motion to dismiss. Dinkins is an inmate of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in the Satellite Prison Camp adjacent to Federal Correctional Institution Williamsburg in Salters, South Carolina. Dinkins is currently serving a sentence of 180 months' imprisonment. Dinkins filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 arguing that the BOP has failed to apply all of the 795 days of time credit he earned pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Specifically, Petitioner argues that the BOP has applied only 365 days of his earned time credit, and that the BOP should have already moved him to prerelease custody if the rest of the time credits were properly applied. Dinkins asks the court to order that the credits be applied.
DISCUSSION
A. Habeas Corpus Generally
Habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the legality or duration of his custody. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973); see also Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 475 (2023) (reaffirming the availability of § 2241 to challenge the legality of the inmate's detention, rather than the validity of his sentence). The proper means of attacking the validity of a federal conviction and sentence is through a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, while a petition for habeas corpus under § 2241 is generally the proper method to challenge the computation or execution of a federal sentence. See United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 678-79 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489-90 (4th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing between attacks on the “computation and execution of the sentence rather than the sentence itself”).
B. The Government's Motion to Dismiss
The Government argues that Dinkins's petition should be dismissed because Dinkins did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the petition. The court agrees.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a discretionary remedy of last resort, and as such, a prisoner must first exhaust his available administrative remedies in the BOP before the prisoner seeks habeas corpus relief. See Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2010). While the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not spoken on whether it is a jurisdictional issue, courts generally hold that the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. See, e.g., Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 471 (11th Cir. 2015); Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing the exhaustion requirement of § 2241 as “prudential,” and thus waivable, as opposed to jurisdictional). Thus, courts in this district recognize that exhaustion may be excused for futility, including that the petitioner's claim presents a purely legal issue of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Jones, v. Phelps, C/A No. 1:21-418-JFA-SVH, 2021 WL 3668885, at *3 (D.S.C. June 16, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-00418-JFA, 2021 WL 3667396 (D.S.C. Aug. 17, 2021).
Here, Dinkins admits he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, but he argues that any attempt at using the administrative remedy process would be futile because the BOP has already made a “final determination.” (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 4.) However, Dinkins fails to explain why the BOP's failure to apply his remaining earned time credits is “final,” when Dinkins admits he has not yet attempted to resolve the issue through the BOP's grievance process. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10, et seq. In other words, assuming Dinkins has a meritorious claim, he fails to explain why the BOP's grievance process cannot provide him relief. Consequently, Dinkins' petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Dinkins also filed a motion for an “emergency” injunction seeking the same relief as Dinkins's petition for a writ of habeas corpus that the court construes as a motion for a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 9.) In light of the court's conclusion that the petition should be dismissed, the motion for a preliminary injunction should likewise be denied because Dinkins fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. See generally Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that the Government's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12) be granted and the petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).