Opinion
No. AAN-FA 07-4007492-S
July 10, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE APPEAL FROM DECISION OF FAMILY SUPPORT MAGISTRATE
This case is an appeal to the Superior Court by the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services, acting on behalf of the State of Connecticut (hereinafter State), pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b-231(n) and Practice Book § 25-66, from the orders and decision of the Family Support Magistrate (hereinafter Magistrate), dated January 14, 2008, and filed on January 15, 2008.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On June 5, 2007, the Magistrate entered a judgment in which the defendant was ordered to pay current child support of eighty dollars per week to the State, and to pay child support arrears to the State as reimbursement for the financial support, medical support and maintenance provided by the State to and on behalf of his two minor children with Lisachante Dinkins. The Magistrate calculated the child support arrearage owed to the State to be $78 and not the $4,993.00 requested by the State. The Magistrate then entered an order for payment of $8.00 per week on the child support arrearage.
The State appealed the June 5, 2007, findings, orders and decision, contending, inter alia, that an arrearage imputing the defendant's earnings should have been based on the minimum wage; that the Magistrate improperly placed the burden of proving that the defendant had an ability to pay on the State; and that the Magistrate improperly calculated arrearages under General Statutes § 46b-215(a)(7)(B).
On October 9, 2007, the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Ansonia/Milford sustained the State's appeal, vacated the findings, and reversed the decision of the Magistrate. The case was remanded and the Magistrate was specifically ordered to perform the ministerial act of entering an order for the child support arrearage, previously determined to be $4,993.00, calculated based on the minimum wage. When the case came before the Magistrate on November 6, 2007, after remand, the Magistrate did not enter an order for the child support arrearage calculated based upon the minimum wage, as ordered by the Superior Court. The Magistrate instead, and without explanation, took the case on the papers.
The orders were further clarified by the Superior Court in its Clarification of Memorandum of Decision, dated October 11, 2007.
On December 11, 2007, the Magistrate addressed the State's attorney regarding the State not having the defendant habeased into court for the hearing on that day. The State contends that the case was not on the Court's calendar and asserts that it neither knew nor was even notified that the matter would be heard on that day. There is no indication that the Magistrate had ordered that the defendant be habeased into court for that day. The Magistrate endeavored to appoint counsel for the defendant that day by asking an attorney who was present in court on an unrelated matter to represent the defendant, but ended up not doing so.
On January 10, 2008, the Magistrate, without a request from the defendant and without a hearing, unilaterally and sua sponte appointed attorney Joseph Auger to act as attorney in the remanded case for the defendant. The purported basis for the appointment was that any orders entered therein might lead to the defendant's incarceration; to ensure the defendant's right to receive notice and have a reasonable opportunity to be heard; and that it involved matters of public importance susceptible to repetition and involved interpretation of statute. The Magistrate ordered the appointment of counsel for the defendant without prior notice to any of the parties, without a hearing being held, without making a finding of indigency, and without a request from the defendant. The appointment of counsel for the defendant was made by the Magistrate at a time when there was no contempt proceeding pending or a motion for contempt pending or filed. Nor was there anything else on the Magistrate's docket or calendar pending in the case, other than the Magistrate's duty after remand to comply with the Superior Court's order to enter the child support arrearage calculated based upon the minimum wage and previously determined to be $4,993.
Thereafter, on January 15, 2008, the Magistrate issued a "Memorandum Re: Orders on Remand" in which she entered a finding that the amount of child support arrearage owed by the defendant to the State, as of May 1, 2007, was $4,993. However, the Magistrate also modified and vacated the prior order of current child support, contained in the Judgment, dated June 5, 2007. Furthermore, she reduced the defendant's obligation to pay current child support and child support arrears to zero dollars retroactive to an unspecified "date of re-incarceration."
The Magistrate also attached a memorandum from support enforcement services which recommends that if support orders are modified due to incarceration, support enforcement services personnel should recommend that such orders not be reinstated for ninety days after the incarcerated individual is released. It is unclear why the Magistrate attaches this memorandum since she does not cite to it in her order. The memorandum could have two possible meanings: The memorandum could mean that the remand order was meant to limit the state's ability to seek reinstatement of the support and arrearage order until ninety days after the defendant's incarceration ended; or the memorandum could mean that the Magistrate will not order reinstatement of the original order until ninety days after the release of the defendant. Of course, speculation of this kind would not have been necessary had the Magistrate taken more time to clarify why it attached the memorandum instead of criticizing the Superior Court's decision for twenty-plus pages. Ultimately, the exact meaning of this part of the memorandum is not material because it is not cited in the order and the court's disposition of the issue of modification will render discussion moot.
On January 28, 2008, the State appealed the decision and orders of the Magistrate dated January 10, 2008, and issued on January 15, 2008. In support of its appeal the State filed a Memorandum of Law on February 21, 2008. Although the defendant did not file a memorandum, he appeared for the oral argument held on March 31, 2008, and was heard on the appeal.
STATE'S CLAIMS CONSIDERED UPON APPEAL
The following issues, raised by the State, are considered by this Court on appeal: (1) whether the Magistrate's appointment of an attorney for the defendant was erroneous; (2) whether the Magistrate's order and decision to (a) modify and vacate its judgment and order of current support and (b) reduce the current support order to zero dollars was erroneous and constituted a retroactive modification contrary to law; (3) whether the Magistrate's order and decision that the State is owed zero dollars in arrearage retroactive to an unspecified date of incarceration was erroneous and constituted a retroactive modification contrary to law; and (4) whether the Magistrate's "Memorandum Regarding Orders on Remand and Request for Clarification, Reconsideration and Orders," constitutes an impermissible criticism of, and disagreement with the findings, judgment and remand order of the Superior Court.
The State's claim that the Magistrate impermissibly served as an advocate and lawyer for the defendant and abandoned her role as an impartial arbiter of the law and facts, presented by the State in its appeal, is not addressed and has not been considered by the Court.
DISCUSSION
General Statutes § 46b-231(n)(7) provides: "The Superior Court may affirm the decision of the family support magistrate or remand the case for further proceedings. The Superior Court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the decision of the family support magistrate is: (A) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; ( B) in excess of the statutory authority of the family support magistrate; (C) made upon unlawful procedure; (D) affected by other error of law; (E) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." (Emphasis added.)
In support of its appeal the State claims that the Magistrate did not have any authority beyond complying with the remand order: (1) to appoint an attorney for the defendant; (2) to modify its original support order; (3) to request clarification and reconsideration of the original remand order; and (4) to improperly act as an advocate for the defendant. As mentioned above the fourth issue will not be discussed.
As to the third issue requesting clarification and reconsideration of the original remand order, no statute, case or other authority to request such reconsideration has been cited. This court has not found any such authority. Further, General Statutes § 46b-231(o) provides in relevant part: "Upon final determination of any appeal from a decision of a family support magistrate by the Superior Court, there shall be no right to further review except to the Appellate Court." (Emphasis added.) Even if the Superior Court believed that its prior decision deserved further review, which it does not, it has no authority to do so. Therefore, to the extent that the Magistrate's January 15, 2008, memorandum requests reconsideration, such request is denied and the remand order entered by this court on October 9, 2008, stands.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REMAND ORDER
The State avers that the Magistrate was limited on remand to strictly performing the ministerial act of complying with the order of the Superior Court.
Well established principles govern further proceedings after a remand by this court. In carrying out a mandate of this court, the trial court is limited to the specific direction of the mandate as interpreted in light of the opinion . . . This is the guiding principle that the trial court must observe . . . Compliance means that the direction is not deviated from. The trial court cannot adjudicate rights and duties not within the scope of the remand . . . It is the duty of the trial court on remand to comply strictly with the mandate of the appellate court according to its true intent and meaning. No judgment other than that directed or permitted by the reviewing court may be rendered, even though it may be one that the appellate court might have directed. The trial court should examine the mandate and the opinion of the reviewing court and proceed in conformity with the views expressed therein.
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58, 65, 689 A.2d 1097 (1997).
Although this is true for civil actions, support orders are different in that they are often modified upon proper motion. General Statutes § 46b-232 explicitly says that "[a] family support magistrate may alter or set aside (1) any order for payment of support issued by a family support magistrate at any time or (2) any order for payment or support issued by the superior court at any time upon referral of such order by the superior court." With this broad grant of authority to modify at any time, the Magistrate may modify a remand order under limited circumstances.
In the present case, the Magistrate's decision should not be reversed on the grounds that the Magistrate modified the Superior Court's decision, because the remand order complied with the decision of the Superior Court by entering a judgment of arrearages based on the minimum wage, and even if it did not, the Magistrate may still have authority to modify under limited circumstances. The real questions then, are whether the Magistrate had authority to appoint counsel for the defendant and whether she had the authority to unilaterally modify her original support under the particular circumstances of this case.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
A Magistrate's authority is statutorily limited. A Magistrate's authority to appoint counsel is limited to paternity actions under General Statutes § 46b-160(e)(2) and (3), and contempt proceedings that may lead to the defendant's incarceration under General Statutes § 46b-231(m)(7). Since the present action is a support petition only, the Magistrate has no authority to appoint counsel, and even if the Magistrate had such authority, it was not properly exercised, violated the defendant's right to counsel, and improperly ignored the defendant's pro se appearance.
"As a creature of statute, the family support magistrate division has only that power that has been expressly conferred on it. Thus . . . a family support magistrate has only the authority granted by statute . . ." Pritchard v. Pritchard, 103 Conn.App. 276, 284, 928 A.2d 566 (2007). Under statute, a family support magistrate has authority to appoint counsel in only two limited circumstances. Under § 46b-160(e)(2) and (3) a family support magistrate can appoint an attorney for indigent defendants in paternity suits. "[T]aking account of the unique configuration of paternity actions in this state, we conclude that indigent defendants in state-supported paternity actions have a constitutional right, under both the United States and Connecticut constitutions, to court-appointed counsel at state expense." (Emphasis added.) Lavertue v. Niman, 196 Conn. 403, 412-13, 493 A.2d 213 (1985). "[A] paternity defendant's right to court-appointed counsel depends upon the defendant's indigency." DeMace v. Whittaker, 196 Conn. 413, 417, 493 A.2d 219 (1985).
General Statutes § 46b-160(e) provides in relevant part: "(2) The notice to the putative father shall inform him that (A) he has a right to be represented by an attorney, and if he is indigent, the court will appoint an attorney for him . . . (3) The application for appointment of counsel shall include a financial affidavit."
A family support magistrate may also appoint counsel in a contempt proceeding. Section 46b-231(m)(7) provides in relevant part: "A family support magistrate may determine whether or not an obligor is in contempt of the order of the Superior Court or of a family support magistrate and may make such orders as are provided by law to enforce a support obligation, except that if the family support magistrate determines that incarceration of an obligor for failure to obey a support order may be indicated, the family support magistrate shall inform the obligor of his right to be represented by an attorney and his right to a court-appointed attorney to represent him if he is indigent. If the obligor claims he is indigent and desires an attorney to represent him, the family support magistrate shall conduct a hearing to determine if the obligor is indigent. If, after such hearing, the family support magistrate finds that the obligor is indigent, the family support magistrate shall appoint an attorney to represent the obligor." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b-231(m)(7).
The present case does not fall under either of these two circumstances. First, this action is a petition for support, not a paternity action. In the Lavertue case, the Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, the unique nature and peculiar problems of paternity actions, holding that "state-sponsored paternity proceedings manifestly involve significant private interests and a substantial risk of error." Lavertue v. Niman, supra, 196 Conn. 411. Besides the father's concern that a finding of paternity will create a great financial burden and an indirect risk of incarceration, the child also has a significant stake in the outcome; "[a]ny determination that a particular individual is a child's biological father may have profound sociological and psychological ramifications . . . It is in the child's interest not only to have it adjudicated that some man is his or her father and thus liable for support, but to have some assurance that the correct person has been identified." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 408-09. In a petition for support, where the father is already known, and acknowledges his paternity, the potential risk of error that so concerns the court in paternity actions is significantly reduced, if not completely eliminated. In this case, the defendant admits he is the child's father and has made a pro se appearance. With the risk factors of a paternity action absent, the court has no justification for appointing counsel on these grounds.
Second, there was no motion for contempt before the court, nor was the issue of whether the defendant actually paid child support or arrearages ever raised. Under § 46b-231(m)(7), the Magistrate needs to inform the defendant of the possibility of incarceration, needs to inform the defendant of his or her right to counsel, must receive a request for appointment of counsel from the defendant, hold a hearing regarding the defendant's indigence, and find the defendant to be indigent before the Magistrate can appoint counsel. There is no indication that the Magistrate gave the defendant notice that she was contemplating the possibility of incarceration for failure to pay child support; there is no evidence that the defendant failed to make his child support payments in the first place. There is also no indication that the Magistrate took any steps to determine whether the defendant was indigent. As mentioned earlier however, the "defendant's right to court-appointed counsel depends upon the defendant's indigency." DeMace v. Whittaker, supra, 196 Conn. 417. With the issue of contempt not before the Magistrate, and no evidence of the defendant's indigence, either by financial statement or by testimony, the Magistrate acted beyond her authority to appoint counsel under § 46b-231(m)(7).
The defendant did appear before the court on oral argument for the appeal and claimed indigency because of his current incarceration. This information, however, never came before the Magistrate because no motion for contempt came before her and no hearing regarding the defendant's indigency was held.
The Magistrate's order appointing counsel suggests that she was attempting to protect the interests of the defendant. This attempt to protect the defendant's interests has, in fact, violated them. "A critical aspect of making a defense is choosing the person who serves as one's assistant and representative. The right to retain private counsel serves to foster the trust between attorney and client that is necessary for the attorney to be a truly effective advocate . . . Not only are decisions crucial to the defendant's liberty placed in counsel's hands . . . but the defendant's perception of the fairness of the process, and his willingness to acquiesce in its results, depend upon his confidence in his counsel's dedication, loyalty, and ability." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peeler, 265 Conn. 460, 471, 828 A.2d 1216 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1029, 124 S.Ct. 2094, 158 L.Ed.2d 710 (2004). "A defendant . . . must have confidence in the attorney who will represent him or her. For the basic trust between counsel and client . . . is a cornerstone of the adversary system . . . If all attorneys were the same, the choice of an attorney would be of no moment. However, [a]ttorneys are not fungible . . . Attorneys are different, and their differences can influence the defense presented by a defendant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 472. In this case, the Magistrate unilaterally and sua sponte appointed counsel without the defendant's consent or consultation. In so doing, the Magistrate stripped the defendant of his right to choose counsel.
It is true that courts have allowed the unilateral appointment of counsel in some case, such as Wood v. Walker, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. FA 01 0632466 (June 25, 2004, Robaina, J.) (37 Conn. L. Rptr. 339), cited by the Magistrate. The Wood case, however, was a paternity action, and the court took into consideration the peculiar problems and interests the defendant has in a paternity suit. Id., 339-40. It is reasonable to argue that the potential loss of a paternity action, and the consequences it entails, outweighs the defendant's interest in choosing his own counsel. As discussed earlier, however, the present action is a support petition, not a paternity action. Under these circumstances there is no reason to abrogate the defendant's right to choose counsel.
The Magistrate assumed that the defendant was at risk of incarceration (even though no motion for contempt or question of paternity was before the Magistrate at the time), assumed that the defendant was aware of his right to counsel (even though the Magistrate did not inform him of it), assumed that the defendant would exercise it (even though he had already entered a pro se appearance), assumed that the defendant could prove his indigence (even though no hearing on the issue was held), and appointed counsel to the defendant. The Magistrate assumed that she could act beyond the authority granted to family support magistrates under statute and, in so doing, denied the defendant his right to choose counsel. A magistrate cannot act beyond the statutory authority granted magistrates. For this reason the order of the Magistrate appointing counsel for the defendant must be vacated.
MODIFICATION
As discussed earlier, § 46b-232 provides that "[a] family support magistrate may alter or set aside (1) any order for payment of support issued by a family support magistrate at any time or (2) any order for payment or support issued by the superior court at any time upon referral of such order by the superior court." General Statutes § 46b-232. "A trial court," however, "cannot on its own initiative modify child support orders." Lundborg v. Lundborg, 15 Conn.App. 156, 160, 543 A.2d 783, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 818, 551 A.2d 756 (1988). The appellate court aptly noted that "[i]t is such action that appeals are made of." Guss v. Guss, 1 Conn.App. 356, 361, 472 A.2d 790 (1984). This limitation has been applied to family support magistrates as well. See Krauss v. Krauss, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. FA 01 0123272 (February 10, 2005, Fischer, J.) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 693) (holding that family support magistrate's order to reduce the child support obligation of defendant was improper because no motion to modify was before court); DeSenti v. DeSenti, Superior Court, Family Support Magistrate Division, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. FA 92 0337837 (September 21, 1997, Lifshitz, F.S.M.) (holding that absent a motion to modify, a family support magistrate cannot modify a prior support order). Further, under General Statutes § 46b-215e, "Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, whenever a child support obligor is institutionalized or incarcerated, the Superior Court or a family support magistrate shall establish an initial order for current support, or modify an existing order or current support, upon proper motion, based upon the obligor's present income and substantial assets, if any, in accordance with the child support guidelines establishedpursuant to section 46b-215a . . ." (Emphasis added.) The Magistrate, though lacking a motion before the court, ordered a downward modification of the defendant's support obligations because of his incarceration. The Magistrate exceeded the statutory authority granted magistrates by modifying the order without a motion before the court, and entered a statutorily improper, retroactive modification. This action alone is sufficient grounds to reverse the Magistrate's decision. However, it is important to mention other procedural and due process violations that have arisen as a result of the Magistrate's unilateral modification.
It should be noted that the Magistrate relies on § 46b-215e as authority to support her modification. The Magistrate, however, ignores the necessity of a motion before modification.
Under General Statutes § 46b-231(m)(2), "[f]amily support magistrates shall hear and determine matters involving child and spousal support in IV-D support cases including petitions for support brought pursuant to sections 17b-81, 17b-179, 17b-745 and 46b-215 . . ." General Statutes § 46b-215(e) provides in relevant part: "Any support order entered pursuant to this section, or any support order from another jurisdiction subject to enforcement by the state of Connecticut, may be modified by motion of the party seeking such modification upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party or upon a showing that such support order substantially deviates from the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a . . ." Similarly, General Statutes § 17b-745(b) provides in relevant part: "any support order entered pursuant to this section, or any support order from another jurisdiction subject to enforcement by the State of Connecticut, may be modified by motion of the party seeking such modification . . . upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party or upon a showing that the final order for child support substantially deviates from the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a, unless there was a specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate, provided the court or family support magistrate finds that the obligor or the obligee and any other interested party have received actual notice of the pendency of such motion and of the time and place of the hearing on such motion . . ."
Under these two statutes modification can only occur if the court finds that there is a substantial change in the situation of one of the parties or when the child support substantially deviates from child support guidelines under General Statutes § 46b-215a. By modifying the support order without a motion before it, the Magistrate assumed that the defendant's incarceration constituted a substantial change in the defendant's circumstances. This finding, however, ultimately begs a number of questions: was the defendant employed prior to his incarceration; was the defendant able to obtain any assets prior to incarceration; was the defendant paying child support before he was incarcerated; when was the defendant incarcerated; when will the defendant be released; and what are the defendant's employment opportunities upon release? If a defendant was only going to jail for a short period of time or had substantial assets, a downward modification may not be warranted. Without a clear picture of the defendant's financial and employment situation, this Court cannot determine if the defendant's most recent incarceration actually amounted to a substantial change in circumstances. Failure to make such a factual finding is sufficient grounds to reverse the Magistrate's decision.
Besides leaving the Superior Court in a factual void, failure to hold a hearing also violated the parties' due process rights. In Bartley v. Bartley, 27 Conn.App. 195, 604 A.2d 1343 (1992), the court held that "the trial court's failure to afford a hearing on the motion to reargue and for reconsideration [of a motion to modify] deprived the parties of their due process rights to be heard." Id., 197. "It is a fundamental tenet of due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution that persons whose property rights will be affected by a court's decision are entitled to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner . . . Because the parties were not afforded an opportunity to subject the factual determinations underlying the trial court's decision on the motion to reargue and for reconsideration to the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing . . . the order cannot be sustained." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 197-98. The Magistrate failed to hold a hearing regarding the modification, and, in so doing, violated the due process rights of the parties and created further grounds for reversing the remand order.
The Magistrate also erred by retroactively modifying the original support order. Section 46b-215(e) provides in relevant part: "No such support orders may be subject to retroactive modification, except that the court or family support magistrate may order modification with respect to any period during which there is a pending motion for a modification of an existing support order from the date of service of the notice of such pending motion upon the opposing party pursuant to section 52-50 . . ." General Statutes § 46b-215(e). The Magistrate entered "an order for current support . . . based on the defendant's current status as an incarcerated obligor at Zero dollars per week in current support, and Zero dollars per week on the arrearages owed to the State of Connecticut, effective upon the Defendant's re-incarceration." (Emphasis added.) (Magistrate's Orders on Remand, p. 22.) The Magistrate's order not only modifies the defendant's obligation going forward, but also retroactively modifies its prior support order based on an unknown date of re-incarceration (unknown because there was no motion to modify or hearing on the issue). Since retroactive modification is explicitly not allowed under § 46b-215(e) and § 17b-745(b), the Magistrate's actions in this regard constitute further grounds for reversal.
Similar language can be found in § 17b-745(b).
The Magistrate's willingness to act without knowledge of the entire factual situation may have improperly rewarded the defendant for his incarceration. Although § 46b-215e allows for modification during incarceration, downward modification is limited. Specifically, "[d]ownward modification of an existing support order based solely on a loss of income due to incarceration or institutionalization shall not be granted in the case of a child support obligor who is incarcerated or institutionalized for an offense against the custodial party or the child subject to such support order." General Statutes § 46b-215e. The reason for the restriction on downward modification is to avoid rewarding an obligor for hurting the family to whom he or she is obliged to support. "[R]educing the support order to zero would further victimize the child without satisfying the statutory goals." Keeton v. Keeton, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. FA 05 4004281 (March 21, 2006, Cutsumpas, J.T.R.) (41 Conn. L. Rptr. 87, 89).
The Magistrate does not mention why the defendant in this case was re-incarcerated, only that he has been. If the defendant was incarcerated for hurting his child, or the child's mother, he would not be entitled to a downward modification under § 46b-215e. The defendant, having come before the Court during the appeal hearing, has admitted that he was incarcerated for the sale of drugs. The point remains the same, however; the Magistrate made no mention of the reasons for the defendant's incarceration in her order, and never brought the defendant before her to find out. By potentially awarding a defendant with a downward modification, the Magistrate again demonstrates the problems of unilateral modification. If the defendant failed to appear and this Court had to depend on the Magistrate's record, this Court would not know if a downward modification was justified or even allowable under the statutes. It appears that the Magistrate attempted to exceed her authority in order to protect the defendant. Although this attempt seems to have been made with the best of intentions, it was well beyond her authority as a family support magistrate and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The Magistrate has exceeded her statutory authority and violated the due process rights of the parties by retroactively modifying the original support order with no motion before the court and without holding a hearing. For the foregoing reasons, it is accordingly Ordered:
1. That the order and decision of the Family Support Magistrate that the defendant owes a child support arrearage to the State of Connecticut in the amount of $4,993.00 as of June 5, 2007, is affirmed.
2. That the order and decision of the Family Support Magistrate appointing an attorney for the defendant is reversed, vacated, and remanded to the Family Support Magistrate to terminate.
3. That the order and decision of the Family Support Magistrate modifying and vacating its June 5, 2007, judgment and order for current support be zero dollars is reversed, vacated, and remanded to the Family Support Magistrate to reinstate the current support order as set forth in the Family Support Magistrate's judgment of June 5, 2007.
4. That the order and decision of the Family Support Magistrate modifying its June 5, 2007, judgment, and its finding that the State of Connecticut is owed zero dollars in arrearage, retroactive to an unspecified date, is reversed and vacated.
5. That any finding, order and decision issued in this case by the Family Support Magistrate on January 15, 2008, in excess of, and beyond, that which complied with the specific remand order of the Superior Court is reversed and vacated.