Opinion
C/A 2:23-04141-BHH-MHC
01-16-2024
Eugene Dingle, Plaintiff, v. Leslie Armstrong, Tim Mose, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge
This is civil action filed by Plaintiff Eugene Dingle, a pro se litigant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff has filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 2.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant Leslie Armstrong (Armstrong), a guardian ad litem (GAL), and Defendant Tim Mose (Mose), the State Director for the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS). Plaintiff's allegations appear to be related to his child custody case brought in a South Carolina family court.
Plaintiff previously filed an action in this Court against Armstrong and South Carolina Family Court Judge Anne Gue Jones. He asserted that Judge Jones was discriminatory or unfair to him and showed favoritism to his minor child's mother, and that Armstrong (the GAL in the state court case) failed to look at all the evidence and failed to properly represent the minor child. The prior case in this Court was summarily dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Dingle v. Armstrong, No. 9:22-CV-2746-BHH, 2023 WL 144717 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2023). After he filed this action, Plaintiff filed another case (which is currently pending and may contain some duplicative claims) against Armstrong, Mose, Judge Jones, and eight other defendants, in which he also appears to bring claims concerning the child custody case. See Dingle v. Sterling, No. 2:23-05333-BHH-MHC (D.S.C.).
In this action, Plaintiff asserts in his “Statement of Claim 1” that:
Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of his liberty on May 17, 2023 and October 24th, after having been unlawfully jailed by public officials for Guardian Ad Litem Fees. On or about May 25, 2023 Plaintiff father paid $13,089 in Guardian Ad Litem fees for Plaintiff. On October 25, 2023 Plaintiff Wife-Tomica Dingle paid $6463.63 for plaintiff release from the Dorchester County Detention Center. Plaintiff Wife-Tomica Dingle didn't receive a receipt until October 30, 2023. Plaintiff was deprived of his liberty until October 31, 2023, of his release. On February 16th, 2023, Plaintiff requested via email from GAL a $100 Payment Plan to settle his debt 2023, but his request was denied. However, the GAL approved a $100 Payment Plan for Candice Sterling to pay GAL fees. The Defendant Candice Sterling in this Case has an outstanding balance of 15k with a payment plan of $100 a month and has not been held in contempt or been jailed, which constitutes Invidious discrimination against Plaintiff by refusing to provide him with the same terms and conditions as Candice Sterling which also violates the Equal Protection Clause.ECF No. 1 at 6 (errors in original). He requests that this Court assign a new GAL and issue a permanent injunction against Defendant Armstrong and Armstrong Family Law LLC “for fraudulent and discriminatory business practices.” Id.
Armstrong Family Law is not named as a defendant in this action.
In his second statement of his claim, Plaintiff alleges:
The South Carolina Child Support Enforcement uses Plaintiff SSN to issue unconstitutional enforcements. In court systems receiving federal funds, these practices violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d, when they unnecessarily impose disparate harm on the basis of gender, race, color or national origin. In April 2023, A violation of due process, a civil contempt of court hearing regarding Child Support was held without proper notice of appearance to Plaintiff, and a unlawful bench warrant was issued. Plaintiff wasn't given the opportunity to defend himself, which violates procedural due process. On or about 8/2002 A unlawfully money judgment was placed against Plaintiff, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1673c and 18 U.S.C. 654. Plaintiff Procedural Due process was violated due to not being given opportunity for a Child Support Hearing.ECF No. 1 at 6 (errors in original). As relief, Plaintiff requests a permanent injunction against the Child Support Enforcement of the South Carolina Department of Social Service “on grounds of Identity theft, fraudulent and discriminatory business practices and violation of the right to a fair procedural due process.” Id. (errors in original).
This agency has not been named as a defendant in this action.
In his memorandum in support of his motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff provides the facts below that are not contained in the Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that Armstrong was appointed to his child custody case on April 11, 2022, at which time the South Carolina family court ordered that Plaintiff and the minor child's mother, Candice Sterling (Sterling) share equally in the GAL fees and costs that were initially capped at $5,000. ECF No. 2-1 at 5. The cap on the GAL fees was allegedly raised to $16,000 on August 10, 2022. On October 20, 2022, Plaintiff was purportedly ordered to begin paying child support to Sterling through the SCDSS disbursement unit. Id. He alleges that the GAL fee cap was raised to $30,000 on November 3, 2022. Id. at 6.
On February 1, 2023, the family court allegedly declared that Plaintiff was in contempt of court and ordered that he serve five days in jail as a sanction. Plaintiff asserts that Sterling has not paid her required GAL fees or a retainer. ECF No. 2-1 at 6. Plaintiff claims he left a message on Armstrong's voicemail “to resolve this matter,” but no response was received. He asserts that he asked Armstrong's assistant to have Armstrong call Plaintiff to set up a payment plan, but his call was not returned. On February 16, 2023, Plaintiff claims he emailed Armstrong “to inform her that he would prefer to avoid legal issues by establishing a monthly payment plan.” Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff allegedly received an affidavit of non-compliance and request for bench warrant via email from Armstrong on February 20, 2023, and a bench warrant was purportedly issued by the family court on February 27, 2023. Id. Plaintiff claims he sent an email to Armstrong on March 19, 2023, requesting clarification of the balance owed, a contractual agreement for services rendered, and an itemized bill and explanation of expenses for work performed. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff claims that a court hearing for child support contempt of court was convened on April 19, 2023, but he was not served with notice of the hearing, and another bench warrant was issued. ECF No. 2-1 at 6. In May 2023, garnishments of child support from Plaintiff's wages allegedly began. Plaintiff asserts that a final court proceeding was held on May 11, 2023, at which time Plaintiff's parental rights were terminated/suspended and the GAL fee cap was raised to $32,500.00. Id. at 8. He alleges he was arrested by the Greenville Police Department on May 17, 2023, transferred to the Dorchester County Detention Center the next day, and he remained there for thirteen days. He claims his family paid his GAL fees and child support on May 25, 2023, and he was released on May 30, 2023. Id. at 7-8.
Plaintiff asserts that his basis for federal court jurisdiction is federal question under § 1331. He lists the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as the provisions of the United States Constitution that are at issue in his case. ECF No. 1 at 3. Additionally, Plaintiff may be attempting to bring his claims pursuant to various statutes including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI); 15 U.S.C. 1673(c); and 18 U.S.C. § 654. See ECF No. 1 at 6.
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 1331.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff requests that a preliminary injunction be granted to stop Defendants' “unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair business practices.” ECF No. 2-1 at 5. He argues that a preliminary injunction should be granted because the “Defendants cannot seriously make an argument that they are contesting any of these statements facts in the Plaintiffs complaint or supported evidence and U.S.C Codes As a result this case is appropriate for consolidation of the preliminary injunction and hearing on the merits pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2).” Id. at 14 (errors in original).
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction should be denied because the motion is premature as this action has not yet been served and thus Defendants have not received notice. “The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1).
Even if Plaintiff could show notice to the adverse party, his motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied because Plaintiff has not made a clear showing for relief. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. Similarly, he must make a clear showing that he is likely to be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. Id. at 2023. Only then may the court consider whether the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff's favor. Finally, the court must pay particular regard to the public consequences of employing the extraordinary relief of injunction. Id. at 24. Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he meets these four elements.
Plaintiff has advanced no plausible argument that he is likely to succeed on the merits.Moreover, he is unlikely to succeed on the merits because it does not appear that this court has jurisdiction over his Complaint. Plaintiff is attempting to appeal the results of the state court action to this court. However, federal district courts do not hear “appeals” from state court actions. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983) (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can only be conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see also Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. Jan. 17, 2020). To rule in favor of Plaintiff on claims filed in this action may require this court to overrule and reverse orders and rulings made in the state court. Such a result is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Davani v. Virginia Dep't. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719-720 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293-294 (2005); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 1997).
Citing to cases from the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit (not the Fourth Circuit) that were issued prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Winter, Plaintiff argues that he meets the first prong of the preliminary injunction test because he “has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for mere deliberate investigation.” Id. at 15. But, as noted above, this is not the applicable standard that requires Plaintiff to make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
An appeal of a final order of the South Carolina family court is to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-630(A) (“Any appeal from an order, judgment, or decree of the family court shall be taken in the manner provided by the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.”); Rule 203(b)(3), SCACR.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable both to claims at issue in a state court order and to claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with such an order. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. At 284. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to indicate that this is a case where the federal complaint raises claims independent of, but in tension with, a state court judgment such that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not be an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction. See Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 676 Fed.Appx. 167 (4th Cir. 2017) (district court erred in applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar appellants' claims where the claims did “not seek appellate review of [the state court] order or fairly allege injury caused by the state court in entering that order”); Thana v. Bd. of Licenser Comm'rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2016) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction when the federal complaint raises claims independent of, but in tension with, a state court judgment simply because the same or related question was aired earlier by the parties in state court).
Moreover, other courts in this Circuit have found that the success of a plaintiff's claims concerning family court matters, including custody and child support, are inextricably intertwined with the state court decision such that the federal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ihenachor v. Maryland, No. RDB-17-3134, 2018 WL 1863678, at *2 (D. Md. April 18, 2018) (As the success of the plaintiff's claims necessarily depended upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided issues of physical custody, legal custody, and child support, the claims were inextricably intertwined with the state court decision and thus the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Richardson v. N.C. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 5:12-CV-180-D. 2012 WL 4426303, at * 1 (E.D. N.C. June 29, 2012) (holding that Rooker-Feldman applied to a claim challenging a child support order on the grounds of violation of due process), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4426059 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 24, 2012). Thus, Plaintiff's request for this Court to review his case is not appropriately before the Court such that he is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Plaintiff should instead seek review with the South Carolina appellate court and thereafter possibly to the United States Supreme Court. See Duncan v. McKinney, No. 1:17CV1026, 2017 WL 6888832, at *3 (M.D. N.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (“[T]o the extent Plaintiffs appear to be attempting to use this proceeding to appeal the state court's no-contact order, or the finding of civil contempt, that request is not appropriately before this Court, and Plaintiff should instead raise any such challenges in state court.”) (citing Casey v. Hurley, 671 Fed.Appx. 137, 138 (4th Cir. 2016) (“To the extent [the plaintiff] seeks review of the state court's adverse decisions, the district court lacked jurisdiction to conduct such a review under the [Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”)), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 377318 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 11, 2018); McAllister v. North Carolina, No. 5:10-CV-79-D, 2011 WL 883166, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 11, 2011) (finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and noting that if the plaintiff was dissatisfied with a state court child support proceeding, he could appeal within the state court appellate system and, thereafter, to the United States Supreme Court).
Additionally, Plaintiff is not likely to be succeed on the merits because his requests for relief appear to be barred by the federal Anti-Injunction Act which provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. “[A]ny injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper ... must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions [in the Act] if it is to be upheld.” Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970). State-court proceedings “should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately [the United States Supreme Court].” Id. The Act “is an absolute prohibition against any injunction of any state-court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of the three s specifically defined exceptions in the Act.” Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977). Plaintiff has alleged nothing to suggest that one of the exceptions to the Act's prohibition against federal-court intervention into state-court proceedings applies or allows that relief.
Even if he can meet the first prong, Plaintiff has not shown that he meets the other three prongs of the Winter test. He has not argued that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief he is suffering. To establish irreparable harm, the plaintiff must show that he is suffering actual and imminent harm, not just a mere possibility, and that harm is truly irreparable and cannot be remedied at a later time with money damages. See Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d at 811. Irreparable harm “is suffered when monetary damages are difficult to ascertain or are inadequate.” Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co., 22 F.3d 546, 551 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Danielson v. Local 275, 479 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2nd Cir. 1973)), abrogated on other grounds by Winter.
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to establish that the balance of equities tips in his favor. Finally, he has not established that an injunction is in the public interest. Thus, Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.
III. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 2) be DENIED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. \0 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).