Opinion
19-cv-04029-JSC
10-20-2021
MARCO DIMERCURIO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EQUILON ENTERPRISES LLC, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND RE: DKT. NO. 123
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Court previously certified as a class action Plaintiffs' claims for reporting time pay, wage statements, and unfair business practices. (Dkt. No. 116.) The Court declined to certify the claim for waiting time penalties and invited further briefing. (Id. at 15-17, 20.) Before the Court are Plaintiffs' supplemental brief requesting leave to amend and class certification on that claim, the proposed Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), and Defendant's opposition. (Dkt. Nos. 123, 122, 125.) As explained below, the Court GRANTS leave to amend and will hear argument on the class certification issue.
All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 12, 13.)
Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.
I. Leave to Amend
“[L]eave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, but a district court may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . [or] futility of amendment.” Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Grange, 676 F.3d 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Among the discretionary factors, “prejudice to the opposing party [] carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing [by the party opposing amendment] of any of the remaining [] factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id.
Defendant has not established prejudice. The limited number of new facts alleged in the proposed SAC, related to the refinery sale, were all known to Defendant. (See Dkt. No. 122 ¶ 10.) The SAC alleges that Plaintiffs DiMercurio, Gaeth, and Langlitz were discharged in the refinery sale, (id. ¶¶ 11-14), and brings a waiting time penalties claim on behalf of discharged employees under Labor Code Section 201, (id. at 11, 8). While the original complaint did not name any Plaintiffs who had been discharged as opposed to resigned, it did put Defendant on notice that Plaintiffs intended to assert a waiting time penalties claim on behalf of discharged employees. (See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 40 (citing Sections 201, 202, and 203).) And, while Plaintiffs DiMercurio, Gaeth, and Langlitz's Section 201 claims did not exist at the case's outset, because they had not yet been discharged, it is safe to assume that other class members had been discharged prior to that time and had actionable claims under Section 201. Defendant does not identify particular discovery or litigation efforts that it would or would not have undertaken had Plaintiffs amended their complaint at an earlier date. Notably, the SAC broadens only the scope of the waiting time penalties sub-class, not the class.
Nor is there undue delay, for related reasons. “[P]laintiffs were endeavoring in good faith to meet the [] pleading requirements and to comply with court guidance.” Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d at 1053. Finally, amendment is not futile because it produces a waiting time penalties claim that is at least arguably appropriate for class certification.
Because Defendant has not established prejudice or made a strong showing of any of the remaining factors, leave to amend is GRANTED. See Id. at 1052.
II. Class Certification
As to class certification on the waiting time penalties claim, the Court will hear argument on October 28, 2021 at 9:00 a.m., by Zoom video. The Court will hold the further Case Management Conference at that time.
IT IS SO ORDERED.