Opinion
March 4, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Wood, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, as a matter of discretion, without costs or disbursements, the plaintiff's motion is granted, and the order entered October 4, 1994, is vacated.
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in imposing sanctions against the plaintiff's counsel. The Supreme Court imposed sanctions on the ground that in making an application for a default judgment, counsel failed to comply with the technical requirements of CPLR 3215 (f) and (g)(3). Although the court may have warned counsel in previous unrelated actions about the necessity of complying with these sections, we nevertheless find that such conduct does not amount to "[f]rivolous conduct" as defined by 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (c). Rosenblatt, J.P., Sullivan, Copertino, Santucci and Goldstein, JJ., concur.