Opinion
FBTCV146046647
03-31-2016
Victoria DiMatteo v. Castle Sedans, LLC et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Richard E. Arnold, Judge.
The defendant William Ernst has moved for summary judgment as to Count Three of the plaintiff's complaint dated October 10, 2014, bearing a return date of November 18, 2014. The defendant Ernst claims he did not cause the subject motor vehicle accident because his vehicle was at a complete stop when it was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by the defendant Arriago, causing the Ernst vehicle to be pushed into the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. In support of the defendant Ernst's motion, he has submitted his legal memorandum of law, his sworn affidavit and copies of deposition testimony. The plaintiff has filed her legal memorandum, as well as, copies of excerpts from deposition testimony.
The plaintiff's complaint contains three counts. Count One alleges negligence against the defendant Jorge Arriago, who was operating a vehicle owned by defendant Castle Sedans, LLC, with the permission of Castle Sedans. Count Two alleges vicarious liability as against Castle Sedans for the negligence of its employee Arriago pursuant to General Statutes § 52-183. Count Three alleges negligence against the defendant vehicle operator Ernst. The plaintiff alleges that on January 24, 2013, she was operating her motor vehicle on Route 15 at the New Canaan Road Exit and was stopped in traffic. At that time the defendant Arriago was operation the Castle Sedans, LLC vehicle when Arriago's vehicle struck the rear of the Ernst vehicle, which caused the Ernst vehicle to, in turn collide with the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle in a " chain collision" reaction. The plaintiff alleges both Arriago and Ernst, whose vehicle was in the middle of this chain collision, were negligent in that Arriago and Ernst both: (1) failed to keep their vehicles under reasonable and proper control; (2) failed to keep a reasonable and proper lookout; (3) operated their vehicles at an unreasonable speed; and (4) violated General Statutes § 14-240 by following too closely.
Gen. Stat, § 52-183 is a statute setting forth a presumption of agency in the operation of a motor vehicle.
The defendant Ernst argues that he did not cause or contribute to the accident because his vehicle was fully stopped when it was struck in the rear by the Arriago vehicle, which was owned by Castle Sedans, LLC. It was this striking by the Arriago vehicle which pushed Ernst's vehicle forward into the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. Thus, the defendant Ernst argues he did not breach any duty of care owed to the plaintiff. Additionally, Ernst argues he could not have violated General Statutes § 14-240 by following too closely because immediately prior to being struck by Arriago's vehicle, Ernst's vehicle was fully stopped and not moving.
Summary judgment may be granted under Practice Book § 17-49 of the Practice book if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving part is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. " A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." Arnone v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 90 Conn.App. 188 193, 878 A.2d 347 (2005). Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of a motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the opposing party to provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fernandez v Standard Fire Ins. Co., 44 Conn.App. 220, 222, 688 A.2d 349 (1997); State v. Goggin, 208 Conn. 606, 616, 546 A.2d 250 (1988). To oppose a motion for summary judgment, a party must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter-affidavits and concrete evidence and is not rebutted by bald assertions. To oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the non-movant must recite specific facts which contradict those stated in the movant's affidavits and documents. Pion v. Southern New England Telephone, 44 Conn.App. 657, 663, 691 A.2d 1107 (1997); 2830 Whitney Avenue Corp. v. Heritage Canal Development Associates, Inc., 33 Conn.App. 563, 567, 636 A.2d 1377 (1994); State v. Goggin, supra, 616. When the non-moving party makes no motion in opposition to summary judgment or recites no specific facts to contradict the facts stated in the motion for summary judgment, the court has to rely on the facts stated in the movant's affidavit as being undisputed. Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co., 190 Conn. 8, 11-12, 459 A.2d 115 (1983).
In deciding whether there is a material issue of fact, the court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Fernandez v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., supra, 222; Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 247, 571 A.2d 116 (1990).
Defendant Ernst has submitted his sworn affidavit dated November 13, 2015. In his affidavit he states that he had brought his vehicle to a full stop behind the plaintiff's vehicle and his vehicle at that time was not touching the plaintiff's vehicle. Thereafter, the rear of his vehicle was struck by the vehicle operated by Arriago, which then pushed the Ernst vehicle into the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. Ernst has also submitted a copy of his deposition testimony dated January 11, 2016. At his deposition, Ernst testified that he had come to a complete stop approximately eight to ten feet behind the plaintiff's vehicle with his foot on the brake when he was struck from behind. The force of the impact pushed his vehicle into the plaintiff's vehicle which was immediately in front of his vehicle. Ernst testified that the force of the impact from the Arriago vehicle caused his vehicle to be propelled forward at a speed estimated to be one to five miles per hour despite his foot being on his brake. Thus estimate of speed moving forward was after the impact by Arriago's vehicle, not prior to the impact.
The plaintiff in his objection to summary judgment has submitted the identical testimony from Ernst as to the speed of Ernst's car after the impact from Arriago and argues that this testimony raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ernst was a reasonable distance apart from the plaintiff's vehicle because a reasonable distance under the circumstances would not result in a collision at any rate of speed, specifically at one mile per hour. A jury could conclude that it was not reasonable for a middle car in a three car chain collision to hit the car in front of him because he was " so close" to the plaintiff's vehicle; especially " if he was on the brake." This is, therefore inconsistent with the Ernst's argument that he was not following too closely in violation of General Statutes § 14-240. Accordingly, the plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant Ernst was negligent.
General Statutes § 14-240 provides in relevant part:
(a) No driver of a motor vehicle shall follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of such vehicles, the traffic upon and the condition of the highway and weather conditions.
In Wrinn v. State, 234 Conn. 401, 661 A.2d 1034 (1995) our Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of General Statutes § 14-240 and the phrase " follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent." Id., 404. The Supreme Court held that" § 14-240, read in light of the plain meaning of the word " follow, " requires that in order to prove a violation the plaintiff must show that: (1) the rear vehicle " followed" the front vehicle; and (2) the distance between the vehicles was closer than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. Accordingly, we agree with the Appellate Court's conclusion that " § 14-240 is applicable to situations in which one motor vehicle is [traveling] behind another in the same lane of traffic, and there is evidence that the operator of the rear vehicle failed to maintain a reasonably safe distance between the vehicles, and that failure had a causal connection to a resulting collision." Id., 406.
There is no evidence presented by the plaintiff that Ernst was following too closely behind the plaintiff's vehicle. The only evidence submitted by either the defendant or the plaintiff is that Ernst's vehicle was at a full stop when it was struck by the Arriaga vehicle. It was only the striking of Ernst vehicle by the Arriaga vehicle that propelled Ernst's vehicle forward into the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. But for the impact from behind caused by Arriaga, the Ernst vehicle would not have struck the plaintiff's vehicle. " In the context of multi-car accidents, judges of the superior court have consistently granted summary judgment where it is undisputed that the middle vehicle was stopped at the time of the accident and the plaintiff fails to submit any evidence that the driver of the middle vehicle operated his car negligently." Posner v. Jones, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, No. CV044000766, (Aug. 3, 2005, Aurigemma, J.); See, Sadegi v. Tomaino, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 03 0198259 (October 22, 2004, Lewis, J.) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 139); Johnbatiste v. Granskog, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 01 0186063 (October 21, 2002, D'Andrea, J.T.R.) (33 Conn. L. Rptr. 285); Bogart v. Castlevetro, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 95 0049595 (September 25, 1995, Rush. J.) (15 Conn. L. Rptr. 268); Tume v. Yankovich, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 03 0196322 (July 14, 2004, Lewis, J.T.R.) (37 Conn. L. Rptr. 496); Cirelli v. Snape, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 02 0079158, (April 14, 2004, Scholl, J.); Rivera v. Flynn, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 95 0319280, (June 7, 1996, Moran, J.); Siciliano v. Lenoue, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 93 013078, (January 12, 1994, Lewis, J.).
Accordingly, the defendant Ernst's motion for summary judgment as to Count Three is granted.