Opinion
No. SC14–1306.
04-16-2015
Opinion
Appellant Donald David Dillbeck raises the following three claims in his appeal of the denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief: (1) trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for presenting evidence of Dillbeck's lack of impulse control, his status as a model prisoner, and his prior bad acts; (2) trial court erred in finding the escape aggravator because the State did not prove that the primary motive for the killing was witness elimination; and (3) postconviction court erred in denying Dillbeck's newly discovered evidence claim based on scientific studies regarding the effects of juvenile incarceration in adult prisons. However, the first two claims are procedurally barred. See Wright v. State, 857 So.2d 861, 868 (Fla.2003) (“We will not entertain a second appeal of claims that were raised, or should have been raised, in a prior postconviction proceeding.”); Barwick v. State, 88 So.3d 85, 110–11 (Fla.2011) (finding claims alleging error regarding statutory aggravating circumstances to be procedurally barred because they should have been raised on direct appeal). Dillbeck's third claim is untimely and without merit. See Jimenez v. State, 997 So.2d 1056, 1064 (Fla.2008) (“To be considered timely filed as newly discovered evidence, the successive rule 3.851 motion was required to have been filed within one year of the date upon which the claim became discoverable through due diligence.”); Foster v. State, 132 So.3d 40, 72 (Fla.2013) (“[N]ew research studies are not recognized as newly discovered evidence.”).
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the denial of relief.