Opinion
No. X02 UWY CV97 0150435S
February 17, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action, claiming money damages for medical malpractice, originally came to the superior court for the Judicial District of New Haven on March 4, 1997. Thereafter, on November 2, 1998, the matter was transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket at Waterbury. On January 27, 2000, Michael J. Daly, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of the plaintiffs, was substituted as a party plaintiff. The matter was tried to a jury, which returned verdicts for the defendants Thomas P. Anderson, M.D. and Yale University School of Medicine. On September 1, 2000, the court entered judgment for the defendants Thomas P. Anderson, M.D. and Yale University School of Medicine, and ordered a new trial with respect to defendants County Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, P.C. and Scott Casper, M.D.
On October 10, 2000, the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court concerning the judgment of the trial court as to defendants Thomas P. Anderson, M.D. and Yale University School of Medicine. On July 29, 2003, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the defendant Thomas P. Anderson, M.D., reversed the judgment with respect to the defendant Yale University School of Medicine, and remanded the case for a new trial.
On remand, the matter was tried to a new jury, which returned verdicts against the defendants Yale University School of Medicine, County Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, P.C. and Scott Casper, M.D. on November 10, 2005. Following the filing of various postjudgment motions, the court entered judgment on July 14, 2006 against the defendants which included prejudgment interest, offer of judgment interest and costs. On August 2, 2006, the defendants filed appeals with the Appellate Court. Thereafter, the Supreme Court transferred the appeals to itself and argument was held on September 15, 2008. The first appeal claimed insufficient evidence to support the findings of the jury, improper charge to the jury, and an improper award of offer of judgment interest. On June 29, 2010, the judgment was reversed with respect to the award of offer of judgment interest and the case was remanded to the trial court with direction to vacate the award and to award offer of judgment interest accruing from the date of Michael J. Daly's substitution as the plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. The second appeal claimed several improper evidentiary rulings by the trial court, but that claim was determined to be moot and the appeal was dismissed.
On July 29, 2009 the federal bankruptcy court for the District of Connecticut discharged Michael J. Daly as trustee of Michelle DiLieto's bankruptcy estate and appointed a new trustee, Ronald I. Chorches. Plaintiffs filed a motion to substitute Mr. Chorches as plaintiff on October 22, 2010 which was granted by the court (Shaban, J.) on October 28, 2010. Subsequently on December 8, 2010 plaintiffs filed a second motion to substitute Michelle DiLieto as a party plaintiff which was granted by the court (Shaban, J.) on December 22, 2010.
Following the remand from the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs have filed a motion for the assessment of prejudgment and post-judgment interest (#543) which is now the issue before this court. The defendants have filed a partial objection thereto (#550) wherein they do not contest the amount of prejudgment interest consistent with the remand order of the Supreme Court, but do contest the plaintiffs' claim for postjudgment interest. The plaintiffs have filed a reply to the objection (#554) as well as a supplemental reply (#557). The defendants have filed a supplemental objection (#560). The parties also jointly filed a stipulation (#559) relative to the motion. Oral argument was held before the court on December 22, 2010.
II
DISCUSSION
Following the December 22, 2010 hearing, the court entered judgment and awarded damages, costs and prejudgment interest in the amount of $9,255,140 consistent with the agreement of the parties as to the amount due pursuant to the Supreme Court's order. That left to this court the issue of an award of postjudgment interest. The plaintiffs have moved the court to award interest at the rate of ten percent from July 15, 2006 to the present under General Statutes § 37-3b. Because the plaintiffs' cause of action arose prior to May 27, 1997, the statute as first enacted in 1981 is applicable. Prior to its amendment in 1997, it provided: "For a cause of action arising on or after October 1, 1981, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in any action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, computed from the date of judgment." (Emphasis added.) Under the terms of the statute in effect at the time the award of postjudgment interest is discretionary.
Following its amendment by Public Act 97-58, General Statutes § 37-3b provided that: "(a) For a cause of action arising on or after May 27, 1997, interest at the rate of ten percent a year, and no more, shall be recovered and allowed in any action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, computed from the date that is twenty days after the date of judgment or the date that is ninety days after the date of verdict, whichever is earlier, upon the amount of the judgment."
"(b) If any plaintiff in such action files a postverdict or postjudgment motion or an appeal, the recovery of interest by such plaintiff shall be tolled and interest shall not be added to the judgment for the period that such postverdict or postjudgment motion or appeal is pending before the court. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply if the reason for the filing of a postverdict or postjudgment motion or appeal by the plaintiff is to reply to or answer a motion or appeal filed by a defendant." (Emphasis added.)
In Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 112 Conn.App. 767, 963 A.2d 1117 (2009), our Appellate Court addressed the issue of a postjudgment interest award in circumstances strikingly similar to the case now before the court. There, as here, the plaintiff had recovered a verdict against the defendants in a medical malpractice action. The defendants appealed the verdict to the Supreme Court which ultimately remanded the case to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff but in a lesser amount. Following the remand, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for an award of postjudgment interest under General Statutes § 37-3b. Upon the appeal of that ruling, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's decision noting that "[i]n Bower v. D'Onfro, 45 Conn.App. 543, 696 A.2d 1285 (1997), this court set forth the applicable criteria for reviewing a trial court's award of postjudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3b, prior to the 1997 amendment, under the discretionary standard for recovery. A decision to deny or grant postjudgment interest is primarily an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court. General Statutes [Rev. to 1985] § 37-3b provides in relevant part that interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in any action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence, computed from the date of judgment. In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action . . . The court's determination regarding the award of interest should be made in view of the demands of justice rather than through the application of any arbitrary rule . . . Whether interest may be awarded depends on whether the money involved is payable . . . and whether the detention of the money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 112 Conn.App. 772-73.
In that case, the Appellate Court noted that the trial court, in denying the plaintiff's motion, found that the defendant's appeal from its initial judgment was bona fide and was filed in good faith. It specifically stated that "[a]lthough a divided Supreme Court ultimately upheld the plaintiff's judgment, it reduced the award of economic damages by a significant amount. Under those circumstances, a determination that the money was not wrongfully withheld clearly is supported by the record." Id., at 773-74.
In arguing the claim for postjudgment interest in this case, the plaintiffs conceded that the defendants had the right to take an appeal and acknowledged that although language regarding wrongful detention did not appear in the statute, appellate case law "appears to make wrongful detention an element of an award of postjudgment interest under § 37-3b." (Plaintiff's Reply Brief #554, p. 23 citing Bower v. D'onfro, supra; see also, p. 11.) While acknowledging Carrano's holding, the plaintiffs argued that it was wrongfully decided and that had the Appellate Court been aware of other case law not referenced in its decision, it would not have made wrongful detention an element of an award under § 37-3b. Such argument is unavailing as this court is bound by the precedent set forth in the appellate decisions relative to the version of General Statutes § 37-3b applicable to the plaintiffs' claim.
In this case, following the July 14, 2006 judgment of the court awarding prejudgment interest, the defendants took an appeal of that judgment and of the verdict. Upon consideration by the Supreme Court, the verdict was affirmed, but the amount of prejudgment interest awarded was reduced by nearly $1.9 million. The course of the appeal took over four years with no evidence that the defendants encouraged or sought, for frivolous reasons, delay in its hearing. While the plaintiffs have noted that numerous extensions of time were requested by the defendants for the filing of briefs in the matter, they acknowledge that several were objected to by the plaintiffs and that those objections were overruled by the Court. The plaintiffs contend in part that the length of time that it took to resolve the appeal is inequitable to their client and that interest should be allowed to compensate them for the period of time they were without the use of the money due them under the judgment.
In Hartford Steam Boiler v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 121 Conn.App. 31, 994 A.2d 262 (2010), the court addressed General Statutes § 37-3a which also deals with the award of postjudgment interest in matters other than negligence actions, condemnation actions, and offers of compromise. That statute, unlike § 37-3b, specifically refers to the "detention of money after it becomes payable" as a basis for the recovery of interest. There the court held that the trial court had implicitly found a wrongful detention of money. It noted that "in the context of [§ 37-3a], wrongful is not synonymous with bad faith conduct. Rather, wrongful means simply that the act is performed without the legal right to do so . . . Nevertheless, [t]he allowance of interest as an element of damages, is . . . primarily an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 63.
Whether it be under the standard set forth in Carrano, or even if the court accepts the Hartford Steam Boiler definition of "wrongful detention" given to it under § 37-3a and applies it to § 37-3b, the plaintiffs have in this case presented no authority to establish a legal obligation upon the defendants to compel payment of the judgment while the appeal was pending. Or, put another way, they have failed to show that the defendants had no legal right to withhold payment during that time. The plaintiffs concede that the defendants had the legal right to take their appeal. This court finds that the defendants' appeal from the judgment and verdict was bona fide and made in good faith. Taking into account the circumstances of this case and all equitable considerations, nothing has been presented to this court by way of evidence or argument to compel the conclusion that the money payable to the plaintiffs under the judgment has been wrongfully detained by the defendants. Accordingly, no award of postjudgment interest is made in this case.
In construing § 37-3b in this matter, the court notes there was an analogous analysis of General Statutes § 37-3a in which our Supreme Court upheld a trial court's denial of prejudgment and post-judgment interest. See MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc. v. Member Works, Inc., 273 Conn. 634, 872 A.2d 423 cert. denied sub nom. Vertrue, Inc. v. MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc., 546 U.S. 960, 126 S.Ct. 479, 163 L.Ed.2d 363 (2005).
The plaintiffs' motion is denied and the defendants' objection thereto is sustained. So ordered.