Opinion
21-cv-10063-PJH
07-29-2024
HADONA DIEP, et al., Plaintiffs, v. APPLE INC, Defendant.
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION
RE: DKT. NO. 70
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On April 19, 2024, this court dismissed plaintiffs Diep and Nagao's claims 4, 5, and 9 with leave to amend. Dkt. 64. That order directed the parties to file an amended complaint alleging additional facts in support of those claims within 28 days. Id. On May 17, 2024, the court stayed the action pursuant to the parties' stipulation for 30 days to allow plaintiff Diep to retain new counsel or elect to proceed pro se. Dkt. 66. That order specified that plaintiffs' second amended complaint must be filed no later than 20 days after either (a) the expiration of the requested stay, or (b) the entry of substitute appearance on behalf of Ms. Diep, whichever occurred first. Id. The stay expired on June 16, 2024. Under the terms of the stipulated order, plaintiffs were required to file an amended complaint by July 6, 2024. That deadline passed, and plaintiffs had not filed any amended complaint.
On July 19, 2024, this court issued an order requiring plaintiffs to file an amended complaint no later than July 26, 2024, and explaining that the action would otherwise be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. Dkt. 70. That deadline too has come and gone, and plaintiffs have not filed any amended complaint. Accordingly, the court finds that the case must be dismissed for failure to comply with orders of the court and failure to prosecute.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), plaintiffs are required to prosecute their case with “reasonable diligence”. Moore v. Telfon Communications Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 967 (9th Cir. 1978). When considering whether to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order or failure to prosecute, the court considers “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The district court has the inherent power sua sponte to dismiss a case for lack of prosecution.”). The court should also afford the litigant prior notice of its intention to dismiss. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 133. A dismissal for failure to prosecute is generally with prejudice. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (“a dismissal under this subdivision . . . operates as an adjudication on the merits.”).
Here, the first factor supports dismissal. This case was filed in September 2021, has been appealed, and now sits stalled lacking only an operative complaint. The second factor likewise supports dismissal, as the action might sit stalled indefinitely as the plaintiffs ignore repeated extensions to file a complaint on which the action could proceed. The third factor supports dismissal, as defendant is prejudiced by being required to track and defend against an indefinitely-stalled litigation in which the plaintiffs fail to heed court deadlines. See Moore, 589 F.2d at 967-68 (“prejudice is presumed from unreasonable delay”); Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423 (“Unreasonable delay creates a presumption of injury to the defense.”). The fourth factor weighs against dismissal, as plaintiffs have declined to proceed on the merits. The fifth factor is largely neutral, but it supports dismissal here. The court could impose money sanctions until plaintiffs proceed with their action, although it is unclear that sanctioning plaintiffs who prefer not to proceed with litigation would be a less drastic sanction. However, given the court's prior warning to plaintiffs, this factor is met. Malone, 833 F.2d at 132 (“warning a plaintiff that failure to obey a court order will result in dismissal can suffice to meet the ‘consideration of alternatives' requirement”). Finally, the court has afforded plaintiffs prior notice that failure to file an amended complaint by July 26 would result in dismissal for failure to prosecute. See Dkt. 70.
For the foregoing reasons, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.