'" Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 960-61 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Alizoti, 477 F.3d at 453). Chavez-Acosta bears a "heavy burden" because the BIA holds "broad discretion" when considering motions to reopen or reconsider.

The BIA need not "recite . . . magic words every time it denies a motion to reopen on evidentiary grounds," but it must "adequately indicate[] its finding that new evidence was inherently unbelievable." Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 963 (6th Cir. 2020). Otherwise, "evidence of changed country conditions must be accepted as true."

Thus, we review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, which is limited in this context to decisions "made without a rational explanation, [that] inexplicably departed from established policies, or [that] rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group." Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 960-61 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Alizoti v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2007)). Among the reasons why the BIA might deny a motion to reopen are the movant's "failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought, [a] failure to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence, and a determination that even if these requirements were satisfied, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief which he sought."

The BIA abuses its discretion if its decision "was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group." Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 960-61 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

Zakariya is correct that this court "ha[s] found evidence of a material change in country conditions when the petitioner showed that persecution of her social group had 'escalated' since the original immigration proceeding." Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2020). But after reviewing Zakariya's new evidence, the BIA concluded that "this evidence does not demonstrate materially changed conditions, but rather a continuation of earlier conditions already established in the record."

We also note that the BIA has "broad discretion" to examine the evidence at issue on a motion to reopen. Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 961 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Zhang v. Holder, 702 F.3d 878, 882 (6th Cir. 2012)). Still, "cursory, summary, or conclusory statements" will not cut it.

Khalasawi argues that the Board misstated the standard for materiality when it denied his motion. He is mistaken: the standard for reopening requires a "material change in country conditions[,]" see, e.g., Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2020); and that is the standard the Board applied here. Nor is Khalasawi entitled to relief on the ground that Detroit immigration judges have granted relief to other Chaldean Christians.

To hold that the BIA abused its discretion, we must find that it decided this case without providing a rational explanation, "inexplicably departed from established policies," or rested its decision "on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group." Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 960-61 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Establishing abuse of discretion is a heavy burden given the BIA's "broad discretion" in reviewing motions to reconsider.

This claim was independent of the evidence previously discredited by the Immigration Judge, which pertained to other forms of racially motivated persecution. Cf. Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 961-62 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bi Feng Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485, 491 (6th Cir. 2009)) ("In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, the [Board] compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.").

We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 960 (6th Cir. 2020). We will find an abuse of discretion if the denial "was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group."