Opinion
23A-JV-737
09-05-2023
D.F., Appellant-Respondent, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
Attorney for Appellant Michael B. Troemel Lafayette, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Erica S. Sullivan Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court The Honorable Tricia L. Thompson, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 79D03-2302-JD-26
Attorney for Appellant Michael B. Troemel Lafayette, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Erica S. Sullivan Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
TAVITAS, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] D.F. was adjudicated a delinquent child, and the juvenile court placed him under the wardship of the Department of Correction ("DOC"). D.F. appeals and argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by reaching this decision. We find D.F.'s argument without merit and, accordingly, affirm.
Issue
[¶2] D.F. raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing him under the wardship of the DOC.
Facts
[¶3] Since the age of thirteen, D.F. has accrued a lengthy history with the juvenile justice system. This history includes, among other things, an unsuccessful informal adjustment and true finding for leaving home without the permission of a parent, removal and escape from home detention and youth detention centers, probation violations, and a placement in the DOC after an adjudication for an act that would be attempted robbery if committed by an adult.
[¶4] In February 2023, then-seventeen-year-old D.F. was on home detention. At some point, D.F. cut off his ankle bracelet and "snuck out of . . . his bedroom window." Tr. Vol. II p. 18.
[¶5] On February 18, 2023, Lafayette Police Department Officer Caleb Bray stopped a vehicle for several traffic violations, and the driver and backseat passenger fled. D.F. was a passenger in the front seat and was detained at the scene when he attempted to leave the vehicle. Law enforcement located a loaded firearm in D.F.'s seat. D.F. lied to police about his and the other occupants' identities.
[¶6] On March 30, 2023, the State alleged that D.F. was delinquent for committing: Count I, auto theft, an act that would be a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult; Count II, dangerous possession of a firearm, an act that would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult; Count III, false informing, an act that would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult; and Count IV, resisting law enforcement, an act that would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
[¶7] The juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing on March 2, 2023, where D.F. admitted to Counts II and III, and the State dismissed the other two counts. The juvenile court, accordingly, adjudicated D.F. to be a delinquent child for dangerous possession of a firearm and false informing and proceeded to hold the dispositional hearing.
[¶8] D.F.'s juvenile probation officer, Jonathan Buck, testified regarding D.F.'s history with the juvenile justice system. Officer Buck further testified that he believed D.F. was "a danger to himself and to others" based on D.F.'s possession of a firearm and failure to cooperate with law enforcement. Tr. Vol. II p. 17. He also testified that he believed D.F.'s mother was unable to prevent D.F. from leaving home.
[¶9] The juvenile court found the following:
[D.F.] is a 17 year old male who has been involved in the Juvenile Justice System since he was 13 years old. His arrests have progressed in severity throughout this time. These offenses include crimes against both property and persons. He was given an opportunity to reestablish himself after his release from [the] DOC in October 2022, but he engaged in an offense similar to that which resulted in his commitment in his last case. Both of his recent arrests involved firearms. [D.F.] lacks understanding of the danger he presents and lacks remorse for his actions.Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 33. The juvenile court placed D.F. under the wardship of the DOC. D.F. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶10] D.F. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing him under the wardship of the DOC. We are not persuaded.
[¶11] The goal of the juvenile process is rehabilitation, not punishment. J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018) (citing R.H. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010)), trans. denied. "Accordingly, juvenile courts have a variety of placement options for juveniles with delinquency problems, none of which are considered sentences." Id. Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-6 sets forth the following factors that a juvenile court must consider when entering a dispositional decree:
If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:
(1) is:
(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and
(B) close to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;
(2) least interferes with family autonomy;
(3) is least disruptive of family life;
(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and
(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.
[¶12] This statute "contains language that reveals that a more restrictive placement might be appropriate under certain circumstances." J.S. v. State, 881 N.E.2d 26, 29 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (citing K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), trans. denied). "That is, the statute requires placement in the least restrictive setting only '[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child.'" Id. (quoting I.C. § 31-37-18-6). "Thus, the statute recognizes that in certain situations the best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive placement." Id. One such placement is a placement in the DOC. See Ind. Code § 31-37-19-6(b)(2)(A)(i).
[¶13] "'[T]he choice of a specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent child is a matter within the sound discretion of the juvenile court and will only be reversed if there has been an abuse of that discretion.'" J.T., 111 N.E.3d at 1026 (quoting J.S., 881 N.E.2d at 28)). "The juvenile court's discretion in determining a disposition is subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy of favoring the least-harsh disposition." Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court's action is "against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it." Id.
[¶14] D.F. argues that the juvenile court should have ordered a less restrictive placement, such as home detention or residential placement. Less restrictive placements, however, have failed. Moreover, D.F. was recently placed in the DOC-the same placement ordered here-yet D.F. reoffended again after his release.
[¶15] Additionally, D.F.'s most recent offenses all involved firearms, and the trial court determined that D.F. "lacks understanding of the danger he presents and lacks remorse for his actions." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 33. Based on the failure of less restrictive placements to curb D.F.'s delinquent behavior and the interest in the safety of the community, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing D.F. under the wardship of the DOC. See J.T., 111 N.E.3d at 1027 (affirming minor's placement in the DOC when less restrictive alternatives failed to curb delinquent behavior).
Conclusion
[¶16] The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by placing D.F. under the wardship of the DOC. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶17] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.