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denying plaintiff's motion for fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), despite granting its motion to remand to state court, citing Williams
Summary of this case from Miller v. HurstOpinion
Case No. 1:15-cv-814
04-25-2016
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee, on behalf of the registered holders of GSAMP Trust 2005-HE-1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-HE1 3815 South West Temple Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-4412 Plaintiff, v. DONNA L. WOLF, et al., Defendants.
Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman
DECISION AND ENTRY ADOPTING IN PART THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. 8) OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case is before the Court pursuant to the Order of General Reference in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western Division to United States Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman. Pursuant to such reference, the Magistrate Judge reviewed the pleadings filed with this Court, and, on February 5, 2016, submitted a Report and Recommendations ("R&R"). (Doc. 8). Defendants Donna Wolf and James Wolf, Jr. ("Wolf Defendants") objected to the R&R. (Doc. 9). Plaintiff filed a response to the Wolf Defendants' objection. (Doc. 10).
As required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Court has reviewed the comprehensive findings of the Magistrate Judge and considered de novo all of the filings in this matter. Upon consideration of the foregoing, the Court does determine that such R&R should be and is hereby ADOPTED in part.
The Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc. 5) be granted. For the reasons stated in the R&R, the Court agrees that it does not have jurisdiction and must remand this case. (Doc. 8). For these same reasons, the Wolf Defendants' objections (Doc. 9) are OVERRULED.
The Magistrate Judge also recommended that Plaintiff's request for the imposition of reasonable costs and fees (Doc. 5) be granted. As noted in the R&R, "[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added). An award of costs and attorney fees is discretionary. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005).
In Martin, the Supreme Court limited a district court's discretion to award fees, absent unusual circumstances, to those cases where "the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal." 546 U.S. at 141. Here, the Court must also consider the directive that district courts should afford the papers submitted by a pro se litigant "some leniency" when determining whether attorney fees should be accessed against that litigant. Williams v. City of Southfield, 99 Fed. App'x 44, 46 (6th Cir. 2004).
Given that the Wolf Defendants are proceeding pro se, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to award fees on the basis that seeking removal was objectively unreasonable.
The Court reaches this decision notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit's decision in Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 507 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2007). There, the Sixth Circuit found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees and costs under § 1447(c) against the defendants, even though they had been granted in forma pauperis status and had filed for bankruptcy. That decision does not require this Court to exercise its discretion in the same manner. --------
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons:
1. Plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc. 5) is GRANTED;
2. This civil action is REMANDED as improperly removed;
3. Plaintiff's request for the imposition of reasonable costs and fees (Doc. 5) is DENIED;
4. This civil action is TERMINATED from the docket of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: 4/25/16
/s/_________
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge