The trial court also gave Zoltowski's testimony less weight because Zoltowski did not specifically evaluate ALM's best interests, and did not get information from family members other than respondent. The trial court, as the finder of fact in this matter, is entitled to determine "the weight to be accorded the testimony of an expert, see City of Detroit v Larned Assoc, 199 Mich.App. 36, 41; 501 N.W.2d 189 (1993), and such determinations are given deference, see SSC Assoc Ltd Partnership v Gen Retirement Sys of City of Detroit, 210 Mich.App. 449, 452; 534 N.W.2d 160 (1995). See also In re Schadler, 315 Mich.App. at 408-409.

That is insufficient, however. See SSC Assoc Ltd Partnership v Detroit Gen Retirement Sys, 192 Mich App 360, 363-364; 480 NW2d 275 (1991) (explaining that documentary evidence, admissible in content, is necessary to defeat a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10); opinions and inadmissible hearsay will not suffice); People v Burt, 89 Mich App 293, 295-296; 279 NW2d 299 (1979) ("[N]ewspapers are [generally] hearsay evidence of the facts stated within them and are not admissible in evidence to prove such facts"); see also Detroit v Larned Assoc, 199 Mich App 36, 39-41; 501 NW2d 189 (1993) (same). Even worse, the article at least once references PNC Bank's acquisition of the assets as an "[a]n M and A deal," i.e., a merger and acquisition.

[Emphasis added; citations omitted.] See also Detroit v Lamed Assoc., 199 Mich App 36, 42; 501 NW2d 189 (1993), stating: We hold only that to the extent this case is retried on a business-interruption theory, damages for lost profits will not be allowed.

It contends, however, that ongoing costs incurred as a result of the new location, such as the increased cost of defendants' ongoing van operations because of the new location and the increased operations costs of defendants' new site, simply reduce the profitability of defendants' businesses and constitute ongoing claims of lost profits. In Detroit v. Larned Assoc, 199 Mich App 36; 501 NW2d 189 (1993), the expert witness testified that because of an increase in rent, an increase in advertising expenses, and a steady decline in sales revenue, defendant Buckland-Van Wald would suffer $4,888,000 in business interruption damages as a result of the condemnation. The expert arrived at this figure by projecting Buckland-Van Wald's losses over the 15-year period of its new lease and reducing the amount to present value.

A party cannot base an objection or seek reversal on the basis of an error that the party caused by either plan or negligence. Detroit v Larned Associates, 199 Mich. App. 36, 38; 501 N.W.2d 189 (1993). In the present case, plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Taylor, a board-certified endocrinologist, testified that a genetic predisposition is an essential prerequisite for the onset of Graves' disease.

Thus, a trial court may not rely on the existence of a contingent fee agreement without also considering the extent of services actually performed by the properly owner's attorney. Detroit v Larned Associates, 199 Mich. App. 36, 43; 501 N.W.2d 189 (1993). In circumstances where a full one-third contingent fee is unreasonable, lodestar analysis provides a useful starting point for determining a reasonable fee.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the separate damage awards for the lost state aid and unnecessary future interest costs were not inconsistent or mutually exclusive. Detroit v Larned Associates, 199 Mich. App. 36; 501 N.W.2d 189 (1993). Although defendant argues that the damages awarded under count II placed plaintiff in a better position than it would have been in had defendant's legal malpractice not occurred, the evidence indicates that the damages awarded by the jury were separate and distinct.

The UCPA provides for an award of reasonable attorney fees, but not in excess of one-third of the amount by which the ultimate award exceeds the agency's written offer. MCL 213.66(3); MSA 8.265(16)(3); Detroit v Larned Associates, 199 Mich. App. 36, 42-43; 501 N.W.2d 189 (1993). Where the amount of attorney fees is in dispute, each case must be reviewed in light of its own particular facts.

Defendant cannot now seek reversal on the basis that the court decided an issue that defendant itself asked that the court decide. See Detroit v Larned Associates, 199 Mich. App. 36, 38; 501 N.W.2d 189 (1993). Defendant failed to show good cause to set aside the judgment.

While a contingent fee agreement may be considered by the court in its efforts to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee award, it does not eliminate the need for the court to consider also the other factors, including the extent of services actually performed. Detroit v Larned Associates, 199 Mich. App. 36, 43; 501 N.W.2d 189 (1993). On the basis of the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's decision and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine the reasonableness of the attorney fee award.