Opinion
Decided April 11, 1927.
Evidence — Breach of contract to buy land for railroad purposes — Parol evidence relating to consideration admissible — Damages to remainder of farm, greater part of recited consideration — Actual damages recoverable for breach where proposed railroad abandoned.
1. In action against railroad for breach of contract to buy land, excluding defendant's evidence that greater portion of recited consideration in contract was for damages to remainder of plaintiffs' farm from construction of proposed railroad, which had been abandoned, was error.
2. Rule that written contract cannot be varied by parol evidence does not exclude evidence relating to consideration for land.
3. In action against railroad for breach of contract to buy land, that greater part of recited consideration was for damages to remainder of plaintiffs' farm from building proposed railroad, which had been abandoned, would not deprive plaintiffs of right to recover damages actually suffered from breach of contract.
ERROR: Court of Appeals for Fulton county.
Mr. George S. May, and Mr. Wallace Visscher, for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Ward Johnson, for defendants in error.
Clarence Murry and wife sued to recover damages for breach of a contract made by the defendant, the Detroit Ironton Railroad Company, to purchase a strip of land 100 feet wide for a right of way and recovered a judgment for $800.
The petition avers that the real estate sold was at all times and now is of the value of $200. The contract recites a consideration of $1,150, and the railroad sought to prove that it was agreed that the greater portion of this amount was to be paid on account of damages accruing to the balance of plaintiffs' farm by reason of the construction of a railroad across the farm, and that the railroad company had abandoned the plan of constructing the railroad across the farm. The trial court excluded this evidence, and in so doing the court erred.
It is, of course, fundamental that the provisions of a written contract cannot be varied by parol evidence; but it is equally fundamental that this rule does not exclude evidence relating to the consideration. The various circumstances under which the rule may be applied are stated in 10 Ruling Case Law, 1042, and 22 Corpus Juris, 1157 et seq. See, also, Morris Canal Banking Co. v. Ryerson, 27 N.J. Law (3 Dutcher), 457, 466; Windsor v. St. P., M. M. Ry. Co., 37 Wn. 156, 158, 79 P. 613, 3 Ann. Cas., 62; Buckeye Buggy Co. v. Montana Stables, 43 Wn. 49, 85 P. 1077, 117 Am. St. Rep., 1032.
The application of this rule does not deprive the plaintiffs of the right to recover whatever damages they actually suffered, directly arising from the breach of the contract. For the reasons given, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Judgment reversed.
RICHARDS, WILLIAMS and LLOYD, JJ., concur.