Detention of J.R

17 Citing cases

  1. In re EJS

    No. 43909-3-II (Wash. Ct. App. Jun. 5, 2014)

    In In re Detention of J.R., 80 Wn.App. 947, 956-57, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996), a consolidated appeal resolving the cases of three patients against whom trial courts had dismissed petitions for commitment, we considered the meaning of the term "examining" in RCW 71.05.290:

  2. Detention of A.S

    91 Wn. App. 146 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 73 times

    Since McLaughlin, this exception has been expressly invoked in at least six published cases involving application of the statutory civil commitment scheme. In re R.S., 124 Wn.2d 766, 881 P.2d 972 (1994); In re Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 793 P.2d 962, 804 P.2d 1 (1990); In re LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 728 P.2d 138 (1986); In re J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 912 P.2d 1062, review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1003, 925 P.2d 989 (1996); In re Kirby, 65 Wn. App. 862, 829 P.2d 1139 (1992); In re Chorney, 64 Wn. App. 469, 825 P.2d 330 (1992). In each of these cases, the courts have recognized that clarification of the statutory scheme governing civil commitment is a matter of "continuing and substantial public interest."

  3. Detention of R.P

    89 Wn. App. 212 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 10 times
    Affirming the trial court's dismissal of a 180-day petition that the State had failed to support with the requisite affidavits

    Relying on In re Detention of J.R., which held that the same affidavits were required for either a 90- or 180-day petition, the trial court disagreed with the State and granted R.P.'s motion. 80 Wn. App. 947, 912 P.2d 1062, review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1003 (1996). In that case, we considered whether the supporting affidavits had to come from examining physicians.

  4. Detention of Dydasco

    135 Wn. 2d 943 (Wash. 1998)   Cited 21 times

    However, the Court of Appeals has previously, and persuasively, reasoned the procedural protections for 90-day petitions also apply to 180-day petitions. In In re Detention of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 912 P.2d 1062, review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1003 (1996), the Court of Appeals held RCW 71.05.290, which requires a petition for a 90-day commitment to be accompanied by supporting affidavits, also applies to 180-day commitments. J.R., 80 Wn. App. at 955.

  5. Detention of Fair

    167 Wn. 2d 357 (Wash. 2009)   Cited 21 times
    Noting that requiring the State to show a recent overt act when a person has been “continuously incarcerated for child molestation and other nonsexual crimes” would be “contrary to the statute and our due process jurisprudence”

    Statutes such as this, which curtail civil liberties, are strictly construed so as not to expand their scope beyond that minimally required by the language itself. In re Det. of Martin, 163 Wn.2d 501, 508, 182 P.3d 951 (2008); In re Det. of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996); In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 31, 804 P.2d 1 (1990); Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wn.2d 832, 850, 676 P.2d 444 (1984); In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 379, 662 P.2d 828 (1983). Therefore, application of the plain language of the statute should end the case.

  6. Detention of Henrickson

    140 Wn. 2d 686 (Wash. 2000)   Cited 52 times
    In Henrickson, this Court held that "[a]lthough chapter 71.09 RCW excuses the State from proof of a recent overt act when a petition is filed against an incarcerated individual, the commitment at issue must still satisfy due process."

    Beyond the plain language of the statute, there are several reasons why a contrary inference would be improper: (1) It would unnecessarily create a statutory conflict between RCW 71.09.030 and .060, whereas it is our duty to avoid creating such a conflict when practical, Timberline Air Serv., Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 305, 314, 884 P.2d 920 (1994); (2) statutes curtailing civil liberties should be strictly construed so as not to expand their scope beyond that minimally required by the language itself, In re Detention of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996); In re Detention of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 31, 804 P.2d 1 (1990); Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wn.2d 832, 850, 676 P.2d 444 (1984); In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 379, 662 P.2d 828 (1983); and (3) statutes should be construed in a constitutional fashion when possible. Id. at 382-83.

  7. Detention of A.S

    138 Wn. 2d 898 (Wash. 1999)   Cited 51 times
    Summoning another physician from Seattle when the attending physician was not able to sign due to illness

    Third, even if the petitions were improper, the petitions would only have been dismissed without prejudice. In re Detention of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 953-54, 912 P.2d 1062, review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1003, 925 P.2d 989 (1996). At the time the individuals raised the issue, the State had sufficient time under the statute to file corrected petitions and new probable cause hearings could have been held. No prejudice to the individuals occurred here, as counsel conceded in oral argument.

  8. Personal Restraint of Well

    133 Wn. 2d 433 (Wash. 1997)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that the 1996 personal restraint petition of an individual committed in 1980 pursuant to an insanity plea was procedurally barred because it was filed after the one-year time bar set forth in RCW 10.73.090, and because the grounds for relief did not fall within the exceptions to the limitation period

    We recognize a rule of construction which strictly construes statutes which trench upon liberty. In re Detention of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996) ("As civil commitment statutes authorize a significant deprivation of liberty, they must be strictly construed.") (citing In re Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 27, 793 P.2d 962, 804 P.2d 1 (1990) and In re LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 205, 728 P.2d 138 (1986)); In re Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 31 ("In light of the clear language of the statute and Washington case law concerning statutes impacting liberty interests, the time limits at issue [in this civil commitment] must be strictly construed."); Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wn.2d 832, 850, 676 P.2d 444 (1984) ("[S]tatutes that involve a deprivation of liberty are to be strictly construed.")

  9. In re B.M.

    492 P.3d 837 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 2 times

    "As civil commitment statutes authorize a significant deprivation of liberty, they must be strictly construed." Id. (quoting In re Det. of J.R., 80 Wash. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996) ). But we will not import requirements into the ITA when the plain language of the statute demonstrates no legislative intent to impose such requirements.

  10. In re Det. of T.S.

    14 Wn. App. 2d 36 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    " ‘As civil commitment statutes authorize a significant deprivation of liberty, they must be strictly construed.’ " Id. (quoting In re Det. of J.R., 80 Wash. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996) ).¶ 7 Under RCW 71.05.590(1), an agency or facility designated to monitor or provide services under an LRO may petition to revoke the LRO. If a petition to revoke is filed and, as a result, the court orders detention for inpatient treatment, "the treatment period may be for no longer than the period authorized in the original court order."