In In re Detention of J.R., 80 Wn.App. 947, 956-57, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996), a consolidated appeal resolving the cases of three patients against whom trial courts had dismissed petitions for commitment, we considered the meaning of the term "examining" in RCW 71.05.290:
Since McLaughlin, this exception has been expressly invoked in at least six published cases involving application of the statutory civil commitment scheme. In re R.S., 124 Wn.2d 766, 881 P.2d 972 (1994); In re Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 793 P.2d 962, 804 P.2d 1 (1990); In re LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 728 P.2d 138 (1986); In re J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 912 P.2d 1062, review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1003, 925 P.2d 989 (1996); In re Kirby, 65 Wn. App. 862, 829 P.2d 1139 (1992); In re Chorney, 64 Wn. App. 469, 825 P.2d 330 (1992). In each of these cases, the courts have recognized that clarification of the statutory scheme governing civil commitment is a matter of "continuing and substantial public interest."
Relying on In re Detention of J.R., which held that the same affidavits were required for either a 90- or 180-day petition, the trial court disagreed with the State and granted R.P.'s motion. 80 Wn. App. 947, 912 P.2d 1062, review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1003 (1996). In that case, we considered whether the supporting affidavits had to come from examining physicians.
However, the Court of Appeals has previously, and persuasively, reasoned the procedural protections for 90-day petitions also apply to 180-day petitions. In In re Detention of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 912 P.2d 1062, review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1003 (1996), the Court of Appeals held RCW 71.05.290, which requires a petition for a 90-day commitment to be accompanied by supporting affidavits, also applies to 180-day commitments. J.R., 80 Wn. App. at 955.
Statutes such as this, which curtail civil liberties, are strictly construed so as not to expand their scope beyond that minimally required by the language itself. In re Det. of Martin, 163 Wn.2d 501, 508, 182 P.3d 951 (2008); In re Det. of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996); In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 31, 804 P.2d 1 (1990); Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wn.2d 832, 850, 676 P.2d 444 (1984); In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 379, 662 P.2d 828 (1983). Therefore, application of the plain language of the statute should end the case.
Beyond the plain language of the statute, there are several reasons why a contrary inference would be improper: (1) It would unnecessarily create a statutory conflict between RCW 71.09.030 and .060, whereas it is our duty to avoid creating such a conflict when practical, Timberline Air Serv., Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 305, 314, 884 P.2d 920 (1994); (2) statutes curtailing civil liberties should be strictly construed so as not to expand their scope beyond that minimally required by the language itself, In re Detention of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996); In re Detention of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 31, 804 P.2d 1 (1990); Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wn.2d 832, 850, 676 P.2d 444 (1984); In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 379, 662 P.2d 828 (1983); and (3) statutes should be construed in a constitutional fashion when possible. Id. at 382-83.
Third, even if the petitions were improper, the petitions would only have been dismissed without prejudice. In re Detention of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 953-54, 912 P.2d 1062, review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1003, 925 P.2d 989 (1996). At the time the individuals raised the issue, the State had sufficient time under the statute to file corrected petitions and new probable cause hearings could have been held. No prejudice to the individuals occurred here, as counsel conceded in oral argument.
We recognize a rule of construction which strictly construes statutes which trench upon liberty. In re Detention of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996) ("As civil commitment statutes authorize a significant deprivation of liberty, they must be strictly construed.") (citing In re Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 27, 793 P.2d 962, 804 P.2d 1 (1990) and In re LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 205, 728 P.2d 138 (1986)); In re Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 31 ("In light of the clear language of the statute and Washington case law concerning statutes impacting liberty interests, the time limits at issue [in this civil commitment] must be strictly construed."); Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wn.2d 832, 850, 676 P.2d 444 (1984) ("[S]tatutes that involve a deprivation of liberty are to be strictly construed.")
"As civil commitment statutes authorize a significant deprivation of liberty, they must be strictly construed." Id. (quoting In re Det. of J.R., 80 Wash. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996) ). But we will not import requirements into the ITA when the plain language of the statute demonstrates no legislative intent to impose such requirements.
" ‘As civil commitment statutes authorize a significant deprivation of liberty, they must be strictly construed.’ " Id. (quoting In re Det. of J.R., 80 Wash. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996) ).¶ 7 Under RCW 71.05.590(1), an agency or facility designated to monitor or provide services under an LRO may petition to revoke the LRO. If a petition to revoke is filed and, as a result, the court orders detention for inpatient treatment, "the treatment period may be for no longer than the period authorized in the original court order."