Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD224519 & JD224520
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
Petitioner, Desiree M., mother of the minors Tyler H. and Derek G., seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing and requests a stay of the proceedings. Petitioner contends the court erred in concluding that reasonable reunification services had been provided because her disability was not appropriately accommodated. We shall deny the petition and the request for a stay of proceedings.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner has had some 23 referrals to Child Protective Services (CPS) in the course of approximately 10 years. On each occasion, she refused to cooperate with social workers. On three occasions, she was offered voluntary services and refused the offer.
This petition was instituted after petitioner had been admitted to the hospital for taking 45 Vicodin tablets, and after Derek was twice admitted to the hospital and placed on section 5150 psychiatric holds. After each hospitalization, Derek was discharged with a follow-up treatment plan. Petitioner failed to get him treatment on either occasion.
During the period between the filing of the petition in June 2006 and the jurisdictional hearing in August 2006, petitioner continued to refuse to get mental health treatment for Derek, hung up on the clinician trying to help her get services for Derek, refused to drug test, stated it was “unfeasible and unrealistic” for her to participate in services, and threatened to drive her car through the lobby of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) if she did not get what she wanted.
In July 2006, petitioner’s general practitioner indicated she had been diagnosed with fibromyalgia, anxiety and depression. Her treatment included analgesics and anti-depressants. While she had difficulty walking short and long distances, she had no limitations or restrictions on her ability to participate in court ordered services. She was advised to wean off of her medications and go into a detoxification program.
On July 18, 2006, petitioner was provided with a request for accommodation of disability form. This form is used by the department for parents to indicate whether or not they have any illnesses or need special services to help them participate in reunification services. Petitioner refused to sign the form.
Although she had previously been uncooperative regarding services, on August 22, 2006, petitioner indicated she was now willing to participate in services because she had a car. Petitioner also reported she had been diagnosed with lupus. She did not provide any medical support for this diagnosis.
At the September 5, 2006, jurisdictional hearing, the court found both Derek and Tyler were children described by section 300, subdivision (b). The court continued the disposition hearing to allow petitioner to participate in two psychological evaluations to determine her ability to benefit from reunification services.
Petitioner was referred for her psychological evaluations to Dr. Nakagawa and Dr. Moazam. She cancelled two appointments with Dr. Moazam. She was late to her appointments with Dr. Nakagawa and was repeatedly using her cell phone, which she refused to turn off. At her second appointment with Dr. Nakagawa, petitioner informed the doctor she had to leave early. Petitioner was late to her rescheduled appointment and hostile to the doctor when she could not reschedule for the following day.
Petitioner followed a similar pattern with the social worker, having to schedule and reschedule appointments to discuss her case plan several times. When she finally did show up for her appointment, she was an hour late.
On November 27, 2006, petitioner was advised that if she “continue[d] to refuse to cooperate with the [psychological] evaluations, the Court can draw an adverse inference from your refusal to cooperate . . . and can make findings contrary to your interest. . . .” The court also informed petitioner it was tired of her excuses for failing to comply with court orders.
Petitioner completed her psychological evaluations by January 2007. Dr. Moazam concluded petitioner was “self-centered, dissatisfied, demanding of attention, complaining and generally negative and pessimistic. She tends to use her somatic complaints to control and manipulate others. . . . She seems to be highly skilled in frustrating and sabotaging the help of others. She may develop physical complaints in response to stress and may use her complaints to avoid responsibility.” Dr. Moazam concluded petitioner needed to complete parenting classes and be educated on how to care for, and interact with, her children. He also recommended she participate in individual and conjoint counseling to resolve the parent-child problems. He further noted “it is also important for her to treat her substance abuse problems by attending a rehabilitation program and participate in a Narcotics Anonymous group. Frequent random testing is imperative to assure sobriety.”
Dr. Nakagawa noted petitioner was minimizing problems with her children. She was testy and obstreperous. Dr. Nakagawa noted petitioner had had problems keeping appointments and that petitioner’s “defense was to a take a challenging, blaming stance, conveying that this evaluator was uncooperative in completing the assessment. The theme of others not cooperating or working with her was likely a defense mechanism she may overly use to her detriment.” Dr. Nakagawa shared the belief it was important for petitioner to complete parenting classes and engage in both individual and family counseling. Based on the results of these evaluations, DHHS recommended petitioner receive reunification services.
On November 17, 2006, petitioner was referred to Wanda Baxter for therapy. Baxter reported back to the social worker on December 7, 2006. Baxter advised that halfway through the assessment, petitioner refused to sign the consent to release information for treatment services. Baxter also indicated petitioner was unlikely to benefit from her services, as she required more comprehensive treatment. Accordingly, Baxter recommended petitioner be referred to an interdisciplinary treatment team in order to adequately address her needs. That same day, the social worker referred petitioner to Strategies for Change. By February 28, 2007, petitioner had only completed two of the three required assessments.
Between September 12, 2006, and August 31, 2007, petitioner’s participation in reunification services was “fair.” Petitioner continued to be argumentative with her social worker and service providers. She continued to use prescription drugs (morphine and oxycodon) and was largely noncompliant in her drug testing. Petitioner had 23 prescriptions on file with the STARS Recovery Group (STARS). The social worker and the STARS worker were concerned about petitioner’s continued use of prescription pain medications and the apparent escalation, so they tried to meet with her doctor to determine her physical ailments, her need for medication and what accommodations were necessary for her.
Although petitioner was on a number of prescription medications, she did not provide documentation that her medications were for pain management. None of the medical documentation petitioner provided indicated that her ailments would affect her ability to participate in reunification services. The public health nurse reported that if petitioner had been diagnosed with chronic pain, she would not be able to totally get off of the prescribed pain medications. However, she was also concerned about why petitioner was prescribed both oxycodon and morphine simultaneously.
DHHS provided petitioner with taxi service to assist her in attending the required parenting classes. These transportation services were provided because of the location of the classes, and the belief that providing petitioner with transportation would be helpful. The services were initially offered to petitioner on August 6, 2007, and she completed her parenting classes on October 2, 2007. She was not offered taxi services for any of her other reunification services.
In addition to the taxi service, DHHS also referred petitioner to Paratransit which would have enabled her to “obtain transportation to and from wherever she wanted to go.” DHHS also offered petitioner bus passes. Petitioner did not submit the application to Paratransit because she obtained a “junker vehicle and was able to get around on that.”
Petitioner was discharged from STARS on August 31, 2007, because it did not appear she was benefitting from the services. Petitioner did not appear to understand the concepts of the program, either due to her chronic pain or because of a lack of interest. Petitioner also continued to deny having a problem with substance abuse. Petitioner was offered another recovery group, but she chose not to participate in the group.
Petitioner voluntarily attempted an inpatient substance abuse program and completed only five days of detoxification. She was referred for outpatient drug counseling, but refused as she felt she did not need treatment.
Drug testing was conducted at the STARS office, the treatment facility or petitioner’s home. This variety of meeting places was part of the normal STARS protocol. However, when petitioner would contact the counselor and indicate she could not come into the office because she was not feeling well, the counselor accommodated her by going to petitioner’s home. Petitioner was later referred to Valley Toxicology, which has a number of locations where drug testing can be performed.
Petitioner completed her initial 13 individual counseling sessions. The therapist recommended she participate in 10 additional sessions. Petitioner agreed to those 10 additional sessions and DHHS approved them. Petitioner refused to attend any of those additional therapy sessions.
DHHS attempted to accommodate petitioner by offering her visits with Tyler at the Department, rather than at the foster family agency, so they could be closer to her home. She did not miss any visits because of her medical condition. They also provided for her to attend counseling and substance abuse treatment from Strategies for Change which was closer to her home.
DHHS asked for permission to speak with petitioner’s doctor to find out specific accommodations for petitioner. A meeting was scheduled between petitioner, her neurologist and the social worker on July 27, 2007. Petitioner cancelled the meeting because the N.A.A.C.P. told her social services had enough information about petitioner’s medical condition. Petitioner rescinded her authorization allowing DHHS to speak to her doctor. This rescission of the authorization diminished DHHS’s ability to accommodate petitioner. DHHS requested another medical release on October 22, 2007, in hopes of getting additional information on petitioner’s condition. Petitioner refused to provide the release.
Tyler’s therapist suggested meeting with petitioner for parenting coaching to help reunify with her child. Petitioner initially agreed and later decided not to participate in that coaching.
The court found reasonable services had been provided, noting that “at many different turns in this case over 18 months [petitioner] refused to cooperate with the department’s efforts to provide her services. [¶] And I think that the department has made substantial efforts to provide [petitioner] services, including an AOD assessment, including referrals to counseling, Strategies for Change, including parenting classes, including the dependency drug court that [petitioner was] unwilling to participate in, testing, visits. [¶] And they’ve also tried to accommodate [petitioner’s] particular problems by giving [her] bus passes and Paratransit tickets and taxicab services. And they have attempted to contact doctors and talk to [petitioner’s] doctors to determine just what it is that [she’s] suffering from and why [she is] taking so many medications. [¶] . . . [¶] So I think the department has gone an extra mile in trying to accommodate [petitioner], and for whatever reason, . . . [She’s] been unwilling to do that.”
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends DHHS failed to provide her with reasonable reunification services, in that it acknowledged she suffered from a medical disability but did not appropriately accommodate services for her given that disability.
The purpose of reunification services is to ameliorate the conditions which led to removal so that the child may be returned home. (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 438.) In order to accomplish this goal, the case plan must be “tailored to fit the circumstances of each family . . . .” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) The social worker must make a good faith effort to provide reasonable services responding to the unique needs of each family. (In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254; In re Dino E., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1777.) “[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics omitted.)
On the other hand, “[r]eunification is not without its limits or conditions.” (In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 679.) It is subject to time constraints (§ 361.5, subd. (a)) and requires the cooperation of the parent. (In re Mario C. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 599, 604.) “Reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.)
In evaluating reunification services, the question is not whether more or better services could have been provided, but “whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
The court’s finding regarding reasonable services is subject to review for substantial evidence. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010.) In making a substantial evidence determination, we resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party and leave the resolution of issues of fact and credibility to the trier of fact. (In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) “In the presence of substantial evidence, appellate justices are without the power to reweigh conflicting evidence and alter a dependency court determination.” (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.)
The record in this case supports the court’s finding that petitioner “has been a reluctant participant, to say the least, in following through with [reunification] services . . . . The record also fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that DHHS “tried to accommodate [petitioner’s] particular problems. . . .”
Throughout petitioner’s 10-year history with CPS, she has repeatedly refused offers of services. This petition was initiated, in part, because of her refusal to get mental health treatment for her son. She repeatedly refused to drug test and participate in services. When she got a car in August 2006, she stated she would participate in services. However, it was not until January 2007, that she even completed her initial psychological evaluations, and this was only after a strong warning from the court.
The only medical documentation provided to DHHS indicated petitioner had “no limitations or restrictions on her ability to participate in court ordered services.” Despite this, DHHS made a number of attempts to accommodate petitioner in the provision of services.
DHHS provided petitioner with a request for accommodation of disability form. She refused to sign it. DHHS provided petitioner with a Paratransit application. She did not submit the application. DHHS also provided petitioner with bus passes. She did not use them. DHHS provided petitioner with taxicab services to her parenting classes, moved the location of visits to a location closer to petitioner’s home and arranged for her to attend counseling and substance abuse treatment at a facility closer to her home.
DHHS requested medical consent forms so they could discuss petitioner’s medical diagnoses, treatment and necessary accommodations with petitioner’s doctors. Petitioner failed to show up for scheduled meetings with DHHS and her doctors, rescinded the consent forms and later refused to sign additional consent forms. DHHS attempted to accommodate petitioner with her drug testing, by allowing testing at a different facility. When petitioner advised she could not go to drug testing because she was not feeling well, the drug testing counselor went to petitioner’s home. After petitioner was discharged from STARS, DHHS offered her another recovery group. She refused to go. After petitioner failed at an inpatient substance abuse program, DHHS referred her to outpatient counseling. Petitioner denied she needed drug treatment.
DHHS offered petitioner additional individual counseling sessions. She refused to attend those sessions. At the suggestion of Tyler’s therapist, DHHS offered petitioner parenting coaching. Petitioner refused to participate in those sessions.
All in all, it was not DHHS’s failure to provide accommodation to petitioner, but petitioner’s resistance to accepting responsibility for the problems facing her family and participating in the services to help her overcome those problems that was the major hurdle to reunification.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
We concur: SIMS, J., MORRISON, J.