Summary
observing that "[liquor control] commission proceedings have traditionally been deemed civil"
Summary of this case from TOTT ENTER. v. OH DPSOpinion
No. 68-47
Decided March 26, 1969.
Intoxicating liquor — Permit holder violating law and regulations of Liquor Control Commission — Plea of guilty at hearing before commission — Evidence of guilt — Penalty prescribed — Appeal to Common Pleas Court — Duty and authority of court.
Where the holder of permits to sell alcoholic beverages is charged with the violation of law and regulations of the Liquor Control Commission on the permit premises, his plea of guilty to such charges, knowingly and voluntarily made at the hearing thereon before the commission, is equivalent to testimony on his part that the facts set forth in such charges are true, and a suspension of his permits for a prescribed length of time by the commission, acting within its powers, is authorized. On the permit holder's appeal to the Court of Common Pleas under Section 119.12, Revised Code, that court may properly determine, within the spirit and objectives of the statute, that the orders against him by the commission were supported by "reliable, probative and substantial evidence."
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
Appellee herein, Edward D. Santucci, the holder of permits D-2, D-3 and D-3A to sell alcoholic beverages, was charged by the Department of Liquor Control with four violations of law covering the sale of alcoholic beverages and with the violation of certain regulations of the Liquor Control Commission. Written notices of such charges and the date of hearing thereon were served on the appellee, and such notices concluded with the statement:
"You may be present * * * with or without counsel and at said hearing may present evidence and examine witnesses appearing for or against you."
Appellee was charged in the first instance with selling intoxicating liquor to a minor on August 14, 1965, and with having been convicted of such offense in the Columbus Municipal Court. In the second instance appellee was charged with two violations on April 30, 1965, viz., allowing the consumption of malt liquor on his permit premises after 2:30 a.m., and with knowingly allowing improper conduct thereon, consisting of the use of profane or obscene language.
On December 1, 1965, appellee appeared before the commission without counsel, waived the reading of the charges against him, and in response to the commission chairman's inquiry concerning his plea, he answered, "Guilty." There is no indication that appellee then desired or requested any further delay or that he was not fully cognizant of the offenses with which he was charged.
On the first violations charged and admitted, appellee's permits were suspended for 100 days, and, on the second violations charged and admitted, the suspension was for 150 days, a total of 250 days.
Appellee, being chagrined and aggrieved with the length of the suspensions, asked leave to withdraw his plea of guilty, which request was denied.
Upon appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, that court found that, upon appellee's pleas of guilty, the commission's orders were supported by "reliable, probative and substantial evidence," and affirmed the same. Section 119.12, Revised Code.
Of course, under the decision in the case of Henry's Cafe, Inc., v. Board of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 233, 162 N.E.2d 223, the Court of Common Pleas lacked authority to modify the penalties imposed by the commission, which penalties are within the commission's power to assess.
Appellee's motion for reconsideration was denied, and a further appeal on questions of law was then taken to the Court of Appeals.
In reversing the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, the latter court ended its opinion with the following language:
"Because of the complete lack of evidence at the time of hearing, upon which the commission could predicate a decision, the judgment of the Common Pleas Court sustaining the decision of the commission is reversed and the case remanded to the Liquor Control Commission, State of Ohio, for hearing as required by applicable regulations and statutes."
Allowance of the motion to require the Court of Appeals to certify the record places the cause before this court for decision on the merits.
Mr. Paul W. Brown, attorney general, and Mr. James E. Rattan, for appellant.
Mr. Joseph H. Hans and Mr. James C. Britt, for appellee.
In our opinion, the Court of Appeals was too technical. Although proceedings before the Liquor Control Commission of the kind involved here do not come within the category of criminal cases, we think that the rules pertaining to guilty pleas in criminal cases may properly and by analogy be applied.
In the per curiam opinion in the case of McAuley v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 567, 568, 190 N.E.2d 922, 923, this court said:
"A plea of guilty obviates the necessity of a trial and the presentation of evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. No duty was imposed on the trial court to require or to examine evidence to determine whether the evidence justified appellant's plea of guilty."
Other Ohio cases are of similar import. See McConnaughy v. Alvis, 165 Ohio St. 102, 103, 133 N.E.2d 133, 134; Click v. Eckle, 174 Ohio St. 88, 90, 186 N.E.2d 731, 733; and Yarbrough v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 287, 289, 189 N.E.2d 136, 138.
The cases from other jurisdictions generally hold that by a plea of guilty, understandingly and voluntarily made, the accused admits the allegations of fact charged in the complaint against him, and he may not later successfully contend that there was no evidence presented. See Johnston v. United States (C.A. 8), 254 F.2d 239; Davidson v. United States (C.A. 10), 349 F.2d 530; State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551; State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 249, 403 P.2d 806; Crisp v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 567, 178 P.2d 228; Humphries v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 397 S.W.2d 163; People v. Brown, 13 Ill.2d 32, 147 N.E.2d 336; People v. Milani, 34 Ill.2d 524, 216 N.E.2d 816; State v. Jacobs, 261 Minn. 194, 111 N.W.2d 520; and Rafferty v. State, 29 Wis.2d 470, 138 N.W.2d 741.
When appellee admitted before the commission the truth of the charges against him, it was equivalent to testimony on his part that those charges were correct, and accurately stated his wrongful and unlawful conduct. To hold that any additional testimony or evidence was necessary to support the charges would seem an unreasonable and unnecessary requirement.
Where in a case such as this a permit holder admits his violation of the law and, although present at the hearing and given the opportunity, presents no evidence in mitigation of the penalty or otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the commission which has the record before it to call for and consider other evidence before assessing a penalty within its authority.
The underlying principle of an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas under Section 119.12, Revised Code, from an adverse order of the Liquor Control Commission is for that court to determine whether the rights of the permit holder have been observed and protected and whether his wrongdoing has been sufficiently established. When the Court of Common Pleas found that, upon appellee's admission of guilt, the orders against him were supported by "reliable, probative and substantial evidence," it acted within the spirit and intent of the statute.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
TAFT, C.J., MATTHIAS, O'NEILL, SCHNEIDER, COLE and DUNCAN, JJ., concur.
COLE, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for HERBERT, J.