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concluding that "the Superior Court's order remanding the matter back to the DSS Hearing Officer for a new hearing is clearly an interlocutory order"
Summary of this case from 330 Hosp. Grp. v. The City of Rehoboth BeachOpinion
Docket No. 71, 1999.
March 16, 1999.
Appeal from Superior Court, New Castle County, CA 98A-06-003.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellant Below, Appellant, v. MABEL C. DOLINGER BY HER GUARDIAN WILLIS RAY DOLINGER, Appellee Below, Appellee. No. 71, 1999. In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: March 9, 1999. Decided: March 16, 1999.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, C.A. No. 98A-06-003.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 16th day of March 1999, it appears to the Court that:
1) On February 22, 1999, the appellant filed a notice of appeal from an order of the Superior Court dated January 7, 1999 that reversed the DSS' Hearing Officer's determination and directed a new hearing be held regarding the appellee/appellant-below's resources and the Superior Court's order dated January 21, 1999 denying the appellant/appellee-below's motion for reargument. On February 24, 1999, the Clerk issued a notice to appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29(b) for the appellant's failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 42 when taking an appeal from an apparent interlocutory order.
2) On March 9, 1999, the appellant filed a response to the notice to show cause. The appellant states that there is no more litigation pending before the Superior Court. However, the appellant concedes that DHSS is in the process of obtaining information relative to the appellee's application for medicaid benefits and will make a determination regarding that application. The appellant requests that this Court determine that the Superior Court's decision below is an appealable order or, in the alternative, an appeal filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 42.
3) An order is final when the trial court has clearly declared its intention that the order be the court's final act in disposing of all justiciable matters within its jurisdiction. J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corporation of Delaware v. William Matthews, Builder, Inc., Del. Supr., 303 A.2d 648, 650 (1973). Therefore, the Superior Court's order remanding the matter back to the DSS Hearing Officer for a new hearing is clearly an interlocutory order. See Violent Crimes Comp. Bd. v. Linton, Del. Supr., 545 A.2d 624, 625 (1988) (holding that orders of remand by the Superior Court other than remands for purely ministerial functions, are interlocutory).
4) Furthermore, since the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 42 have not been met by the appellant, the appeal must be dismissed.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the within appeal be and hereby is DISMISSED pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 29(b) and 42.
Of course, the dismissal of this appeal does not preclude the appellant from filing a notice of appeal once a final order has issued from the Superior Court.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. NORMAN VEASEY, Chief Justice