Opinion
No. 05-14-00817-CR No. 05-14-00818-CR No. 05-14-00819-CR
02-18-2016
WILLIAM RUSSELL DENVER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F-1262195-M, F-1262196-M, and F-14-00186-M
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Lang, and Brown
Opinion by Justice Brown
William Russell Denver appeals three convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child. After finding appellant guilty of the offenses, the jury assessed punishment at fifty-five years' confinement and a $10,000 fine in each case. In six points of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred in (1) defining "reasonable doubt" during voir dire, (2) instructing prospective jurors that he was not to be presumed innocent, (3) denying his motion for mistrial after a witness referred to an extraneous offense, (4) overruling his objection to irrelevant evidence, (5) failing to instruct the jury on the law of accomplice witnesses, and (6) instructing the jury that it could consider extraneous offense evidence to show character conformity. For the following reasons, we affirm appellant's convictions.
The grand jury indicted appellant for three offenses involving his girlfriend T.S.'s eleven-year-old son, W. The indictments alleged appellant committed the offenses by knowingly and intentionally (1) causing W.'s sexual organ to contact and penetrate T.S.'s female sexual organ, (2) causing W.'s mouth to contact T.S.'s female sexual organ, and (3) causing appellant's sexual organ to contact and penetrate W.'s mouth. T.S. was a willing participant and, at the time of appellant's trial, she was serving a thirty-year sentence for her role in the offenses. Because appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary.
The assaults began when W. was living in a Dallas motel room with appellant, T.S., and his younger brother, R. Appellant and T.S. slept on the only bed in the room, and the boys slept in the corner of the room, behind a curtain, on a makeshift bed or "pallet."
One night when W. was on the pallet, he heard appellant and T.S. having sex, and began to cry. Appellant called W. to the bed and asked him why he was crying. W. told appellant he thought appellant was hurting T.S. Appellant and T.S. then decided they were going to teach W. how to have sex.
W. testified in detail about the sexual "lessons" that followed that night and continued over the course of the next few weeks. Appellant and T.S. would "show" W. how to engage in various sex acts and would instruct him to engage in the same or similar acts. W. testified that on one occasion, after T.S. "sucked on" W.'s penis, she told W. to "suck on" appellant's penis. On another occasion, T.S. got on top of W. and caused his penis to enter her vagina. When she did so, appellant was "right next" to them "jacking off." W. testified that during this period, he had been instructed not to ejaculate inside of T.S., but he kept doing so. After one such occasion, appellant made W. "eat . . . all of the sperm out" of T.S.'s vagina.
The sexual assaults ceased when appellant broke off his relationship with T.S. and moved out of the motel. Shortly thereafter, T.S. abandoned W. and R. and they were placed in foster care. W. made an outcry a few months later.
T.S. testified and admitted that she and appellant committed the offenses and caused each of the acts of sexual contact alleged in the indictments. She said she participated in the offenses because appellant told her to and she would have done "anything" for him. After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of each of the offenses. This appeal followed.
The jury was instructed on the law of the parties with respect to the two offenses that alleged contact between W. and T.S. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2011) (a person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense).
In his first point of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred by defining "beyond a reasonable doubt" to prospective jurors. During voir dire, the trial court instructed the venire that the State had the burden to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court stated that standard was the "highest standard of proof that exists in our legal system . . . but that it was not "100 percent proof." Appellant did not object to the trial court's comment, but asserts the trial court fundamentally erred by informing the venire the State was not required to prove guilt "beyond all doubt."
A defendant must ordinarily object to a trial court's comment to preserve error, even if the comment implicates constitutional rights. Unkart v. State, 400 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (trial court commented on the defendant's right to remain silent). If a defendant fails to object, he must establish fundamental error. Unkart, 400 S.W.3d at 98-99; see also Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (plurality op.); Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Having reviewed the complained-of comment, we conclude appellant has failed to show error, much less fundamental error.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held it is the "better practice" for a trial court not to define the term "reasonable doubt." Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Instead, the meaning of the term should be left for the jurors themselves to supply, according to their own common-sense understanding of the words. See Fuller v. State, 363 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). But there is no general constitutional prohibition on a trial court defining reasonable doubt. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994); Paulson, 28 S.W.3d at 573.
Moreover, while the beyond a reasonable doubt standard may not be susceptible to precise definition, it does have lawful parameters to which jurors must adhere. See Fuller, 363 S.W.3d at 587. One of those parameters is that the State is not required to prove guilt beyond all doubt. See Fuller, 363 S.W.3d at 587; see also Coleman v. State, 881 S.W.2d 344, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (venireperson who would require State to prove defendant's guilt beyond all doubt may be struck for cause). As a consequence, a trial court does not err in instructing the jury on that correct statement of law. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); O'Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695, 701-02 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. struck). We overrule appellant's first point of error.
In his second point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by informing prospective jurors that appellant was not to be presumed innocent. During voir dire, the trial court stated:
Now, [appellant] is charged with these offenses, okay. As we sit here today, the law says that he is entitled to the presumption of innocence, okay. As prospective jurors, you cannot and must not take the position that, well, you know, I heard what the charges are, so he must be guilty, okay. The law allows [appellant], as well as everyone charged with a criminal offense the presumption of innocence. So as we sit here today, and you haven't heard any evidence -- and let me caution you that while we are doing this portion of the trial, you will not hear any evidence, okay. The law does not allow us to go into any evidence in this
proceeding until the jury is actually chosen and the State is actually presenting evidence. So you won't hear any evidence.
But as prospective jurors, you must not presume him to be innocent of these charges that he is facing today, okay.
In this issue, appellant complains of the trial court's last comment. Although he did not object at trial, he asserts the comment constituted fundamental error because it tainted his right to be presumed innocent. Appellant relies on the court of criminal appeals plurality opinion in Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129. In Blue, the trial court made comments during voir dire which communicated to the venire that the trial court believed the defendant was guilty. By doing so, the trial court "imparted information" on the venire that "tainted appellant's presumption of innocence." Id.at 132. The plurality concluded the comments in that case rose to the level of fundamental error and required no objection. Id.
According to appellant, he was not required to object to preserve error because the trial court denied him the right to a jury trial and his right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, rights that cannot be forfeited absent express waiver. See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). But appellant neither forfeited, nor was denied, those rights. He was tried by a jury and that jury found him guilty of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Here, unlike the trial court's comments in Blue, the trial court did not give the venire any information, directly or indirect, about either appellant or the trial court's opinion about appellant or the case. Moreover, in assessing whether a trial court's voir dire comments deprived an appellant of a fair and impartial trial, we consider the trial court's comments as a whole. See, e.g., Unkart, 400 S.W.3d at 98-99; Infante v. State, 397 S.W.3d 731, 738 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). Doing so, we cannot agree that the trial court tainted the presumption of innocence by the isolated misstatement.
The record shows the trial court twice clearly informed the venire that appellant was entitled to be presumed innocent. The trial court also explained the significance of the presumption; jurors could not believe appellant was guilty because of the charges against him. However, in purporting to sum up its comments, the trial court instead contradicted itself and told the venire it "must not presume appellant to be innocent." It is, however, apparent from our review of the record the trial court simply misspoke. If appellant feared the venire actually may have been misled, he could have easily cured any possibility of harm by objecting and requesting the trial court to correct its error. See Unkart, 400 S.W.3d at 99; Mays v. State, 05-13-00086-CR, 2014 WL 3058462, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 8, 2014, no pet.). The trial court later did later effectively correct the misstatement in the jury charge and properly instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence. We conclude the trial court's comment did not constitute fundamental error. Cf. Thomas v. State, 587 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (evidently inadvertent mistake in charge could not so have misled the jury as to constitute fundamental error); see also McIntosh v. State, 855 S.W.2d 753, 760 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd) (fundamental error must be so egregious and create such harm that the defendant was denied fair and impartial trial). We overrule appellant's second point of error.
In his third point of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial after evidence of an extraneous offense was admitted into evidence. During T.S.'s testimony, the prosecutor asked her where she met appellant. In a non-responsive answer, T.S. stated she met appellant "the day he got out of jail." Appellant objected to the extraneous "reference." The trial court sustained appellant's objection and promptly instructed the jury to disregard. The trial court denied appellant's motion for mistrial. On appeal, appellant asserts he was entitled to a mistrial because T.S.'s answer was so prejudicial that the jury could not have followed the trial court's instruction to disregard. We disagree.
A mistrial is a remedy appropriate for a narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Patterson v. State, 138 S.W.3d 643, 651 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). A mistrial is required only when an improper question or answer is "clearly prejudicial" and "of such character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on the minds of the jurors." Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567; see also Guzmon v. State, 697 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Ordinarily, a prompt instruction to disregard will cure error associated with an improper question or answer, even one regarding extraneous offenses. Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We presume the jury followed a trial court's instruction to disregard testimony in the absence of evidence that it did not. Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567; State v. Boyd, 202 S.W.3d 393, 402 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref'd).
Here, T.S. made an isolated statement which had the effect of notifying the jury that appellant had been in "jail" for some unspecified arrest or offense punishable by jail. We cannot conclude T.S.'s vague reference was so highly prejudicial that the jury would have been unable to follow the trial court's prompt instruction to disregard. Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We overrule appellant's third point of error.
In his fourth point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his objection to irrelevant evidence. The State concluded its direct examination of T.S. by asking her how she felt about appellant. Appellant objected that T.S.'s feelings were not relevant. The trial court overruled appellant's objection and T.S. testified she "actually still love[d] the man." On appeal, appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his objection.
A trial judge's evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Bowley v. State, 310 S.W.3d 431, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision is "so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree." Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Rule 401 provides evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." TEX. R. EVID. 401. Under rule 401, to be relevant, the evidence need not itself prove or disprove a particular fact. Stewart v. State, 129 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). If evidence tends to affect the probability of the truth or falsity of a fact in issue it is logically relevant. Mendiola v. State, 21 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
According to appellant, evidence about how T.S. felt about him at the time of trial was not relevant and was offered only to "bolster" her credibility. Specifically, he asserts the jury may have found her testimony more believable because she was saying "very bad things about a man she still loved." But see Stout v. State, 426 S.W.3d 214, 222 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (arguments that witnesses had no reason to lie not improper bolstering).
Assuming the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, we cannot agree any error would require reversal. We must disregard error in the admission of evidence if it did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Substantial rights are affected "when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Rich v. State, 160 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Appellant's claim of harm assumes the jury would have found T.S.'s testimony about the offense more credible based on her own claim that she still loved appellant. Even if we agreed T.S. could have effectively bolstered her own credibility in this manner, appellant successfully discredited that very portion of her testimony. Specifically, on cross-examination, appellant asked T.S., "you might tell this jury that you love [appellant], reality is, you don't care for him, do you?" T.S. conceded, "not particularly, no." T.S. thus acknowledged that she did not love, or even care for, appellant. We conclude appellant was not harmed by her earlier testimony to the contrary. We overrule appellant's fourth point of error.
In his fifth point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the law of accomplice witnesses. Article 38.14 of the code of criminal procedure provides, "[a] conviction cannot be secured upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.14 (West 2005). If a prosecution witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury on the statutory requirement of corroboration. Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Appellant asserts, and the State does not dispute, he was entitled to an accomplice witness instruction because T.S. was an accomplice as a matter of law. See Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). At trial, appellant did not request an accomplice witness instruction or object to its omission in the charge. Therefore, we reverse only if the omission of the instruction was so egregious and created such harm that appellant did not have a fair and impartial trial. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh'g). Egregious harm is the type and degree of harm that affects the very basis of the case, deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defense theory. Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We must assess the degree of harm in light of the entire record, including the jury charge as a whole, the state of the evidence, and the arguments of counsel. See Marshall v. State, PD-0509-14, slip op. at 5, 2016 WL 146450 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2016).
When applying the egregious harm standard to omission of the accomplice witness instruction, we inquire whether the jurors would have found the evidence corroborating the accomplice witness testimony "so unconvincing in fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive." Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). If, however, the corroborating evidence alone would support a conviction without the accomplice witness testimony, we cannot conclude omission of the instruction was egregious or created such harm that appellant did not have a fair and impartial trial. Solis v. State, 792 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (citing Thompson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
Here, the State's primary witness at trial was not appellant's accomplice, T.S., but their victim, W. His testimony, provided a first-hand account of the offenses, identifying both appellant and T.S., as his perpetrators. The child's testimony was neither suspect nor inherently unconvicting, and was alone sufficient to support appellant's convictions. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § art. 38.07 (West Supp. 2015). We conclude omission of the accomplice witness instruction did not cause appellant egregious harm. Solis, 792 S.W.2d at 98; see also Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (non-accomplice evidence can render harmless a failure to submit an accomplice witness instruction by fulfilling the purpose an accomplice witness instruction is designed to serve). We overrule appellant's fifth point of error.
Additionally, because of the nature of the accomplice witness testimony and the non-accomplice witness testimony in this case, the instruction would have served little useful purpose. The jury could not have rationally believed T.S.'s testimony that appellant engaged in the conduct that constituted the offenses and, at the very same time, disbelieved W.'s testimony that appellant engaged in that same conduct.
In his sixth point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his objection to a jury instruction that allowed the jury to consider evidence of extraneous sexual offenses to be used to show character conformity. The charge provided:
You are instructed that if there is any testimony before you in this case regarding the defendant having committed sexual offenses, if any, other than the offense, if any, alleged against him in the indictment in this case, you cannot consider said testimony for any purpose unless you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such other offenses, if any were committed, and even then you may only consider the same for the following purposes:
1) to determine the motive, intent, scheme or design, if any, of the defendant;
2) to determine the state of mind of the defendant and the child;[Italics added].
3) for its bearing on the previous and subsequent relationship between the defendant and the child; and
4) for any bearing it has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.
At trial, appellant objected to the last instruction. Appellant essentially conceded the instruction was a proper statement of law pursuant to recent amendments to article 38.37, section 2(b) of the code of criminal procedure, but complained the amendments were unconstitutional under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Section 2(b) provides that the State may offer evidence that a defendant committed extraneous sexual offenses against children to show the defendant's propensity to commit such offenses. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37 (West Supp. 2015); Fahrni v. State, 473 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref'd).
Having reviewed appellant's complaint, we conclude this point is inadequately briefed. An appellate brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Although appellant is complaining of a jury instruction, appellant begins by complaining extraneous offense evidence is not admissible to prove character conformity. See generally Lockhart v. State, 847 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Appellant then acknowledges article 38.37, section 2(b) "apparently" changed the law and allows certain extraneous offense evidence to be admitted to show character conformity in certain cases. Because of this statutory authorization, he asserts article 38.37, section 2(b) is unconstitutional.
However, appellant does not assert any extraneous offense evidence was actually admitted in this case pursuant to article 38.37, section 2(b). Nor does he even assert any extraneous offense evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. He complains only of the jury instruction on its face. But, in doing so, it is unclear whether appellant is complaining of legal error in the charge, constitutional error in the charge, or challenging the constitutionality of a statute.
The only evidence of extraneous sexual offenses that was admitted at trial was evidence that was admitted without limitation and which appellant conceded was same transaction contextual evidence. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Hammock v. State, 46 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
Article 38.37 itself does not itself include provisions regarding what, if any, instructions are necessary or appropriate when extraneous offense evidence is admitted under its provisions.
Appellant's reliance on the "some harm" standard applicable to preserved charge error would suggest he is complaining of legal error in the charge, rather than constitutional error. See Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Further, appellant has failed to cite either direct authority to support his claim or to provide us with the "relevant jurisprudential framework" to evaluate the claim. See TEX. .R. APP. P. 38.1(h); Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see e.g., Fleming v. State, 376 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012), aff'd, 455 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Instead, appellant effectively concedes the instruction was proper under section 2(b), and then generally contends section 2(b) therefore violates the "due process provisions" of the "Texas and federal constitutions." Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (trial court does not commit error in instructing jury in accordance with statutory mandates). Appellant has not, however, directed us to relevant authority regarding constitutional challenges to statutes generally or to jury instructions specifically. See, e.g., Luquis, 72 S.W.3d at 365-366. Instead, appellant relies entirely on cases regarding the admission of extraneous offense evidence, which only incidentally, and in dicta, reference "due process." See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). We conclude appellant has wholly failed to properly brief his due process complaint. We overrule appellant's sixth point of error.
Several of our sister courts have upheld the constitutionality of article 38.37, section 2(b) against properly raised due process challenges in cases where extraneous offense evidence was actually admitted pursuant to its provisions. See Bezerra v. State, 07-15-00018-CR, 2016 WL 192747, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 14, 2016, pet. filed); Robisheaux v. State, 03-14-00329-CR, 2016 WL 105886, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 7, 2016, no. pet. h.); Belcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 840, (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.); Harris v. State, 475 S.W.3d 395, 403 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 20, 2015, pet. ref'd); see also Balboa v. State, 10-15-00024-CR, 2016 WL 363985, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 28, 2016, no. pet. h.) (not designated for publication).
Of note, the Houston Fourteenth court of appeals considered an almost identically worded instruction to the one appellant complains of as a factor that protected the appellant's rights when propensity evidence was admitted at trial. See Harris, 475 S.W.3d at 403. --------
In reviewing the records in these appeals, it has come to our attention that the judgment in trial court cause number F-1400186-M contains an error. Specifically, the judgment in that case states appellant was convicted of "aggravated sex continuous child/14," but the record shows appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age. When we have the necessary information to correct inaccuracies in a trial court's judgment, we have the authority to sua sponte reform the judgment to speak the truth. See TEX. APP. P. 43.2(b); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). Therefore, we reform the trial court's judgment in cause number F-1400186-M to reflect that appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age. As reformed, we affirm that conviction. We also affirm appellant's other two convictions.
/Ada Brown/
ADA BROWN
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 140817F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1262195-M.
Opinion delivered by Justice Brown. Justices Francis and Lang participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 18th day of February, 2016.
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1262196-M.
Opinion delivered by Justice Brown. Justices Francis and Lang participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 18th day of February, 2016.
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1400186-M.
Opinion delivered by Justice Brown. Justices Francis and Lang participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REFORMED to show appellant was convicted of the offense of "Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child Under 14."
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 18th day of February, 2016.