Opinion
8:24-cv-01489-DOC-DFMx
07-16-2024
NICHALE DENBY v. NATIONAL RESEARCH CORPORATION
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER REMANDING CASE TO STATE COURT SUA SPONTE
On the Court's own motion, the Court hereby REMANDS this case to the Superior Court of California, County of Orange.
I. Background
Plaintiff Nichale Denby began working for Defendant National Research Corporation on May 16, 2023. Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dkt. 1-1) ¶ 9. During her employment, she was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. Id. ¶ 10. On April 3, 2024, Plaintiff requested accommodations for her disability. Id. ¶ 11. Twelve days later, on April 15, Defendant terminated Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 13.
Plaintiff received notice of the right to sue from the Civil Rights Department. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff sued Defendant in Orange County Superior Court, alleging discrimination based on disability, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). See generally id. Defendant removed the case to this Court on July 5, 2024, asserting that this Court has diversity jurisdiction. Notice of Removal (“Notice” or “Not.”) (Dkt. 1) ¶ 1.
II. Legal Standard
“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal of a case from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in relevant part that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This statute “is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction,” and the party seeking removal “bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Federal diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties be citizens of different states and that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The presence of any single plaintiff from the same state as any single defendant destroys “complete diversity” and strips the federal courts of original jurisdiction over the matter. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005).
For purposes of calculating the amount in controversy, the district court has discretion in whether to consider a plaintiff's potential punitive damages and potential award of attorneys' fees. Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1046 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (punitive damages); Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1998) (attorneys' fees). Generally, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional threshold. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2008). If the complaint affirmatively alleges an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, the jurisdictional requirement is “presumptively satisfied.” Id. A plaintiff who then tries to defeat removal must prove to a “legal certainty” that a recovery of more than $75,000 is impossible. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938); Crum v. Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). This framework applies equally to situations where the complaint leaves the amount in controversy unclear or ambiguous. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1996).
A removing defendant “may not meet [its] burden by simply reciting some ‘magical incantation' to the effect that ‘the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of [$75,000],' but instead, must set forth in the removal petition the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds [$75,000].” Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 897 F.Supp. 447, 450 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d at 567). If the plaintiff has not clearly or unambiguously alleged $75,000 in its complaint or has affirmatively alleged an amount less than $75,000 in its complaint, the burden lies with the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010); Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699.
While the defendant must “set forth the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum,” the standard is not so taxing so as to require the defendant to “research, state, and prove the plaintiff's claims for damages.” Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 730 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2010). In short, the defendant must show that it is “more likely than not” that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum. Id. Summary judgment-type evidence may be used to substantiate this showing. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 109091 (9th Cir. 2003); Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). For example, defendants may make mathematical calculations using reasonable averages of hourly, monthly, and annual incomes of comparable employees when assessing the amount in controversy in a wrongful termination suit. Coleman, 730 F.Supp.2d. at 1148-49.
If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, any action it takes is ultra vires and void. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 101-02 (1998). The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by either the parties or the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). If subject matter jurisdiction is found to be lacking, the court must dismiss the action, id., or remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). A Court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
Defendant argues that the Court has diversity jurisdiction in this case because diversity of citizenship exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Not. ¶ 17. The Court disagrees.
Defendant has not met its burden to show that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied to establish diversity jurisdiction. The Court considers lost wages in the period from termination until removal. Here, the amount in controversy is not facially apparent from the complaint itself, but Defendant provides the monetary estimate of $21,153.85 for lost wages in the period from termination until removal, based on Plaintiff's annual base salary of $100,000. Not. ¶ 20; see generally FAC. Plaintiff seeks judgment against Defendant an amount for: general and special damages; compensatory damages including past and future lost earnings and employment benefits, costs of seeking other employment, and damages for emotional distress; interest; cost of suit; and punitive and exemplary damages. Compl. ¶¶ 17. Defendant asks the Court to include these costs to reach the jurisdictional threshold. Not. ¶ 24.
This Court does not, however, include such speculative awards when calculating the amount in controversy. See Galt G/S, 142 F.3d at 1156 (“We hold that where an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys' fees, either with mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may be included in the amount in controversy.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, this Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this case.
The Court's decision not to include speculative awards in the amount in controversy is reinforced by the fact that Congress has not raised the amount in controversy since 1996- nearly three decades ago. See The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3850. Since then, the inflation rate is nearly 100% (i.e., prices have almost doubled). Thus, adjusted for inflation, the amount in controversy should be around $150,000. Stated conversely, a case worth $75,000 in 1996 is worth only $37,500 in today's dollars. Because inflation has plainly decreased the “real” value of the amount in controversy, more and more cases are able to meet the jurisdictional threshold and can be brought in federal court. As federal diversity jurisdiction expands, state court jurisdiction to decide purely state law issues and develop state law correspondingly decreases. Thus, the federal jurisdictional creep is incompatible with the most basic principles of federalism.
For reference, in 1996, the minimum wage was $4.75 per hour, and only 16% of Americans had cell phones. Indeed, the current amount-in-controversy is older than both of my law clerks.
Federalism is not the only loser in Congress's failure to increase the amount in controversy. When a case is improperly removed, as happened here, ultimate resolution is delayed. Moreover, if a court does not immediately remand a case sua sponte, a plaintiff may move to remand. Because cases subject to motion to remand are typically small dollar cases, this increased motion work can quickly cause attorneys' fees to outrun any potential recovery and places an immense burden on a plaintiff's lawyer working on contingency. In this respect, the current low jurisdictional threshold reduces access to justice. Therefore, the Court respectfully encourages Congress to reconsider the amount in controversy minimum.
When remanding a case, a court may, in its discretion, “require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015). Typically, a court may only award fees and costs when “the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Id. (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)). In making this determination, courts should look at whether the removing party's arguments are “clearly foreclosed” by the relevant case law. Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has further clarified that “removal is not objectively unreasonable solely because the removing party's arguments lack merit,” id. at 1065, though a court need not find the removing party acted in bad faith before awarding fees under § 1447(c), Moore v. Permanente Med. Grp., 981 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, while the Court finds that removal was improper, the Court concludes that it was not so inconceivable as to meet the “objectively unreasonable” standard. As a result, the Court declines to award Plaintiffs attorneys' fees.
IV. Disposition
For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby REMANDS this case to the Superior Court of California, County of Orange. All proceedings in this matter are hereby vacated and removed from calendar.
The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.