Opinion
C.A. No. N13C-02-009 FSS
04-10-2015
RE: Nicholas DeLucia, et al. v. Great Stuff, Inc., et al.
William D. Fletcher, Esquire Schmittinger and Rodriguez, P.A. 414 South State Street P.O. Box 497 Dover, De 19901 Michelle D. Allen, Esquire Law Offices of Michelle D. Allen, LLC 724 Yorklyn Road, Suite 310 Hockessin, DE 19707
FRED S. SILVERMAN JUDGE William D. Fletcher, Esquire
Schmittinger and Rodriguez, P.A.
414 South State Street
P.O. Box 497
Dover, De 19901
Michelle D. Allen, Esquire
Law Offices of Michelle D. Allen, LLC
724 Yorklyn Road, Suite 310
Hockessin, DE 19707
Dear Counsel:
This decides Defendants' post-trial motions. The jury awarded Plaintiff $80,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. Now, Defendants move for a directed verdict, remittitur, and relief of judgment, claiming (1) insufficient evidence to support Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery claims stemming from sexual misconduct; (2) the damages award was unreasonable and unjust. Plaintiff also filed a post-trial motion for court costs, totaling $2,993.09.
I.
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict will be granted "only where, under any reasonable view of the evidence, the jury could not justifiably have found for the non-moving party." "A jury's finding is not disturbed if there is 'any competent evidence upon which the verdict could reasonably be based.'" The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Watkins v. Star Bldg. Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A. 90C-10-219, 1994 WL 750363, at *1 (Del. Super. Dec. 12, 1994) (citing Parks v. Ziegler, 221 A.2d 510, 511 (Del. Super. 1966)); see also, Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. Super. 1979) (holding that unless the evidence "preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury could not have reached the verdict," the court will not set aside the verdict).
Delaware Electric Co-op., Inc. v. Pitts, 633 A.2d 369 (Del. 1993).
See Rumble v. Lingo, 147 A.2d 511, 513 (Del. Super. 1958).
A jury's verdict "is presumed to be correct and just." But, in both Delaware and Maryland, a court will set aside a verdict where "under the attendant facts, a grossly excessive verdict is clearly manifest." Furthermore, the court will reduce a punitive damages award that is disproportionate to the compensatory damages award.
Storey v. Castner, 314 A.2d 187, 193 (Del. 1973).
McCredie v. Howard, No. Civ.A. 02C-04-007ESB, 2004 WL 1790120, at *1 (Del. Super. July28, 2004) (citing Lacey v. Beck, 161 A.2d 579 (Del. Super 1960)).
See Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d 715 (Del. 1970) (remanding for remittitur of $50,000 as to punitive damages where the compensatory damages were $90,000 and the punitive damages were $60,000 because the jury must have been "moved by impermissible passion or prejudice in attempting to impose upon these defendants a penalty of such severity in addition to the heavy compensatory damages" already imposed); see also, Darcars Motors of Silver Springs, Inc. v. Borzym, 818 A.2d 1159 (Md. 2003); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
II.
Plaintiff was 17 years old when he started working for Defendant Great Stuff, owned by 49 year old, Defendant Bruette. Defendant Kuehn, 33, was Great Stuff's Vice President. Defendants' eight month relationship with Plaintiff went beyond that of employer-employee. Defendants bought Plaintiff personal gifts, such as an I-phone, designer clothing, and a laptop. The parties socialized outside of work, went on trips together, and commingled family and friends. Moreover, Plaintiff shared a bed with Kuehn when spending the night at Defendants' shared home. During their sleepovers, Defendants plied Plaintiff with alcohol and drugs, including mushroom pills, K-2, Dimethyltryptamine, ecstasy, molly, LSD, and marijuana.
Plaintiff testified that while he was under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, Defendants sexually abused him five to ten times. Occasionally, Bruette would watch while Kuehn and Plaintiff engaged in sexual activity. Because Plaintiff was drugged, he only remembered bits and pieces of the encounters. For example, at his last sleepover with Defendants, Plaintiff took a pill they gave him. He woke up scared, crying, and naked in bed with both Defendants. He has no memory of the eight to ten hours after taking the pill.
Plaintiff also testified that because of what Defendants did, he felt disgusted, and he became resentful, confused, and more reclusive. Further, he "spent a lot of time in [his] own head." Plaintiff described his emotional condition as inner turmoil; he hated himself and struggled every day with the events.
Defendants denied the misconduct, portraying themselves as responsible adults concerned for their young charge. They also featured potential discrepancies in Plaintiff's story. Nevertheless, the jury heard both sides and found for Plaintiff. Because there was substantial evidencing supporting the verdict, the court may not do its own fact-finding. At this point, the court must view the evidence most favorably to Plaintiff, within reason.
III.
The parties agree that to succeed under an IIED claim, Plaintiff must submit evidence that he suffered "severe" emotional distress. Defendants argue that by not offering evidence that he was unable to function daily, Plaintiff failed to support the verdict. Plaintiff responds that Defendants' misconduct itself is enough to find severe distress.
Although Plaintiff must prove it, the jury may infer that severe emotional distress resulted from "the extreme and outrageous nature of the defendant's conduct alone." The "extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct may arise from his abuse of a position, or relation with another person, which gives him actual or apparent authority over him, or power to affect his interests." For example, sexual abuse of a child by a person in a position of authority and trust is outrageous conduct from which a jury could properly find severe emotional distress.
Reagan v. Rider, 521 A.2d 1246, 1251 (Md. 1987); see also, B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1182 (Md. 1988); Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 616 (Md. 1977) ("The extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress [exists].").
Figueiredo Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69, 75 (Md. 1991) ([W]here the defendant is in a "peculiar position to harass the plaintiff, and cause emotional distress, his conduct will be carefully scrutinized by the courts.") (citing Harris, 380 A.2d at 616).
Reagan, 521 A.2d at 1251 ("From the very nature of the outrageous conduct-sexual molestation of a child by a person in a position of authority and trust during six of her more critical formative years; and from the intensity and duration of the emotional distress-a severe depression deteriorating over a three-year period and requiring an additional two years of therapy, the jury could properly find that the emotional distress was severe.").
Defendants' misconduct, having been proved by Plaintiff, is the sort of extreme and outrageous behavior that, by itself, allows an inference of severe emotional distress. Under the circumstances, Defendants were in a position to influence Plaintiff, both emotionally and physically. Bruette and Kuehn were mature adults, almost three times and twice Plaintiff's age. Plaintiff worked for them and, by their admissions, they provided for his guidance and welfare. Plaintiff was barely of age when his relationship with Defendants began. He was young, dependent, and impressionable.
Therefore, this employer-employee relationship falls into the category of relationships carefully scrutinized by the courts. Here, the jury was entitled to infer severe emotional distress based on the parties' special relationship and what Defendants were found to have done.
This is not to say that all employer-employee relationships warrant special consideration. Under Maryland law, which controls this case, not every employee who confronts sexual misconduct and goes home "upset, humiliated, embarrassed" has a cause of action against an employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Nonetheless, as in this case, a jury may find severe emotional distress where a middle-aged boss uses his position and power to gain the trust of a very young employee and then provides drugs and gifts to lure and cajole him into sexual activity. This is because the tort is not just sexual misconduct or drug dealing. It is "the entire course of conduct engaged in by [Defendants], with whom he enjoyed a special relationship."
See Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F.Supp. 720 (D. Md. 1996) (finding employee insufficient evidence as to whether plaintiff's emotional distress, which caused by her employer, was so severe as to have disrupted her ability to function on a daily basis).
Id. at 749.
Figueiredo Torres, 584 A.2d at 77.
Again, as mentioned, Defendants put an innocent spin on the picture painted above. But, Plaintiff swore otherwise and the jury believed him. Therefore, based on Defendants' unseemly relationship with Plaintiff, which started as an employer-employee relationship, but then went far beyond that, there was substantial evidence in the record for the jury to infer that Plaintiff's emotional distress was severe enough to support the damages award.
IV.
As to Defendants' battery argument, Defendants contend there was no evidence that Plaintiff was unable to exercise reasonable judgment while drugged. Plaintiff testified, however, among other things, that he could not hold a coherent conversation and that he experienced blackouts. The record permitted the jury to have found that while Plaintiff was under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, he was impaired and lacked the ability to exercise reasonable judgment to respond to Defendants' conduct.
V.
Turning to Defendants' motion for remittitur, the court is not surprised that the verdict was substantial, given that the torts were shocking. The jury found Defendants to be jointly and severally liable, awarding compensatory damages of $30,000 against Bruette and $50,000 against Kuehn. The jury also awarded punitive damages: $200,000 each against Bruette and Kuehn and $100,000 against Great Stuff. The compensatory damages award covers what Defendants did to Plaintiff. The punitive damages reflects the jury's finding that Defendants' behavior was predatory, that Great Stuff was separately liable for that behavior, and that Defendants needed to punished and deterred.
See Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 973 (Md. 1982); see also, Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 116 (1893) (holding that jury may award punitive damages against a corporation that authorizes or ratifies its employees misconduct).
The punitive damages award "should be apportioned between multiple wrongdoers . . . depending upon the degree of culpability and pecuniary status of each." The court, however, has the duty to ensure that the jury did not get carried away. A punitive damages award should be, among other things, proportionate to the compensatory damages award.
Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 969 (Md. 1982).
See Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, 652 A.2d 1117, 1130 (Md. 1995) ("[L]ike any award of damages in a tort case, the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury is reviewable by the trial court for excessiveness."); see also, Bowden v. Caldo, Inc., 710 A.2d 267, 275 (Md. 1998) ("[J]udicial review of punitive damages awards is a requirement of procedural due process.") (citing Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994)); Borzym, 818 A.2d 1159 (Md. 2003) ("Whether a punitive damages award bears a reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages awarded in the case, is today generally accepted as a factor to be considered in judicial review for excessiveness of a jury's punitive damages award. We agree . . . .") (citing Bowden, 710 A.2d 267); Campbell, 538 U.S. 408.
See Darcars Motors of Silver Springs, Inc., 818 A.2d 1159; Campbell, 538 U.S. 408.
Plaintiff argues that the total damages ratio here of 6.25:1 (580,000 ÷ 80,000), "fully complies with" State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, a United States Supreme Court decision. First, the total damages ratio here is 7.25:1. Second, Campbell favored "sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish." Campbell declared: "[A]n award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety."
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
Maryland courts appear to agree. Darcars Motors of Silver Springs, Inc. v. Borzym used treble damage statutes as a "rough guideline" to "throw[] some light on the appropriate size of a punitive award." Borzym, citing to a 1998 case, concluded: "[W]e believe that the three to one ratio frequently appearing in statutory provisions is some indication of public policy concerning the relationship of monetary punishments to actual damages." While this court appreciates that it is not a hard and fast rule, the three to one ratio makes sense here.
Borzym, 818 A.2d at 1197.
Id. (citing Bowden, 710 A.2d 267); see also, Campbell, 538 U.S. 408).
The punitive damages award against Defendants will be reduced to $240,000. The jury awarded Plaintiff $80,000 ($50,000 + $30,000) in compensatory damages against Defendants Bruette and Kuehn, which can support no more than $240,000 ($80,000 x 3) in punitive damages. Accordingly, the punitive damages award will total $240,000 but will be divided among all three Defendants.
The jury awarded punitive damages against Great Stuff because of the compensatory damages awarded against Bruette and Kuehn. The jury determined that Great Stuff should pay $100,000.00, and the other Defendants should pay $400,000.00 (Bruette's $200,000 + Kuehn's $200,000), resulting in a 1:4 ratio. As mentioned above, the punitive damages award will first be reduced against Bruette to $90,000 ($30,000 x 3) and against Kuehn to $150,000 ($50,000 x 3). Using the 1:4 ratio, the court finds that Great Stuff will then be responsible for paying a portion of each co-Defendants' punitive damages award. So, Great Stuff will pay $22,500.00 (.25 x $90,000) of Bruette's punitive damages and $37,500.00 (.25 x $150,000) of Kuehn's punitive damages, totaling $60,000.00. And, in that way, the court will grant remittitur of $260,00.00 as to punitive damages.
As to punitive damages against Great Stuff, the jury was instructed: "You may award punitive damages against Great Stuff, Inc. because of the acts of its management, if you find that the management was acting within the scope of their employment and one of the following conditions is proved by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) Great Stuff, Inc. authorized the acts of its management with respect to the battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress on Plaintiff; or (2) Great Stuff, Inc. ratified or approved the management's conduct with respect to the battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress on Plaintiff.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict is DENIED. Defendants' Motion for Remittitur is GRANTED. If Plaintiff does not accept a $260,000 remittance within 20 days of this order's date, a new trial will be granted on punitive damages. If Plaintiff accepts remittitur, Plaintiff will submit a final judgment order, after approval as to form. Defendants have 10 days in which to file any response to Plaintiff's Motion for Costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Fred S. Silverman FSS:mes
oc: Prothonotary (Civil)