Opinion
IP 01-1339-C-M/K
March 11, 2003
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on defendants', Indiana-American Water Company, Inc. ("Indiana-American"), and Indiana Gas Company ("Indiana Gas"), Motion for Summary Judgment on the claims of plaintiff, Nancy M. Dell ("Dell"). Dell's claims include retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and state law claims of defamation, blacklisting, and tortious interference with a business relationship.
Because the Court has original jurisdiction over the Title VII retaliation claim, and because the federal claim and the state law claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact, constituting a single case or controversy, Dell's invocation of the Court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is proper. Indiana-American and Indiana Gas move for summary judgment on all counts, and the motion is now ripe for ruling.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. DELL'S EMPLOYMENT AT INDIANA-AMERICAN
The facts in the light most favorable to Dell, the nonmoving party, reveal that Dell worked for Indiana-American from November 1, 1997, to January 22, 1999, as a meter reader. During her employment at Indiana-American, Dell's supervisor was district superintendent Tim Lee ("Lee"). Shortly before the termination of her employment at Indiana-American, Lee filed a written sexual harassment claim against Dell. Dell Depo. at 45. Dell also filed a sexual harassment claim against Lee. Dell Depo. at 45.
Though there is a factual dispute about who complained first of the harassment by the other, it is not material to resolution of the issues before the Court.
Shortly after the sexual harassment complaints, Dell left Indiana-American pursuant to a mutual separation agreement. Def.'s Ex. 4.
Lee considered Dell's work performance at Indiana-American to be "average." Lee Depo. at 17. Dell was never denied any pay increase while she was at Indiana-American. Lee Depo. at 22. While Dell was working for Indiana-American, Lee wrote a letter of recommendation on Dell's behalf for a program at Ivy Tech: "Indiana-American Water Company is fortunate to have [Dell] as part of our team . . . [Dell] performs her meter reading responsibilities with enthusiasm and vigor . . . [Dell] will do well at . . . Ivy Tech." Lee Depo. at 18. Lee did remember an instance where Dell was reprimanded for a dispute she had with a homeowner: "During her normal duties as [sic] reading meters [Dell] confronted a homeowner who was having a garage sale . . . The particulars, she had paid for — according to her, she had paid for an item at the garage sale, returned to pick it up and the person who she had given the money to was no longer there. And she got into an argument with, I believe, the father of the lady that she had paid the money to." Lee Depo. at 18.
B. DELL'S EMPLOYMENT AT FIELDSTAR
Dell subsequently found employment as a meter reader with Fieldstar Meter Reading Services ("Fieldstar"), a contractor with Indiana Gas, more than a year after she left the employment of Indiana-American. Dell began her employment at Fieldstar on May 16, 2000. Frank Raines ("Raines"), a supervisor at Indiana Gas, testified that another Indiana Gas employee named Denny Miessen ("Miessen") told him that Dell had "trouble" with Indiana-American. Raines Depo. at 10. Raines was told that Dell "had been dismissed from the water company. They had a restraining order against her and that there was some vandalism that was done to some vehicles there." Id. Raines heard that Dell "had put some sugar in the tank of a truck." Exs. 10,11. After Miessen gave Raines this information, Raines contacted Mary Dixon, an Indiana Gas employee who interfaces with Fieldstar, and recommended that Dell not be assigned to read Indiana Gas meters. Raines Depo. at 11, Pl.'s Ex. 10. The message was passed along to Fieldstar. The following was the basis for Raines' recommendation that Dell not be assigned to read Indiana Gas meters:
Basically if she had vandalized vehicles up there, I got 25 of them down there I am responsible for, plus probably 20 or 25 employee vehicles we are responsible for on our property or they are on our property. If she has a restraining order against her I didn't want her, if she can't go read meters at those places I didn't feel like she needed to be going out to other people's houses.
Raines Depo. at 11. On May 19, 2000, after only three days of work, Dell was dismissed from her employment at Fieldstar by her supervisor, Jeff Wialage ("Wialage"). Wialage told Dell that Indiana Gas had requested that Dell not be allowed to read Indiana Gas meters.
It is unclear who provided Indiana Gas with this information about Dell. Miessen does not recall providing this information to Raines. Miessen Depo. at 16. Miessen only recalls mentioning to Raines that Dell was a former Indiana-American employee. Id. at 17. Miessen stated that he never knew any of the information (prior to hearing about it through the lawsuit) that, according to Raines, Miessen had communicated to Raines. Id. at 18. Raines maintains that Miessen is lying, and that Miessen did, in fact, provide him with information about Dell. Raines Depo. at 16.
Fieldstar called Lee at Indiana-American seeking a job reference for Dell, and, according to an e-mail sent on May 19, 2000, Lee referred the caller to the human resources department. Pl.'s Ex. 8. Lee and Raines were members of the Midday Rotary Club of Noblesville in 2000. Pl.'s Ex. 13.
C. PROTECTIVE ORDER
On May 5, 2000, Lee swore to a notary public that Dell had been making abusive, harassing phone calls to him and other employees since she left Indiana-American. Pl.'s Ex. 12. The allegations were contained in an Emergency Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protective Order (the "petition"). On May 19, 2000, Lee sent an email to a supervisor at Indiana-American to explain that the petition had been submitted to the court but had not received a docket number. Pl.'s Ex. 8. The petition was filed with the Hamilton County Superior Court on May 25, 2000. A temporary protective order was issued, and, subsequent to an evidentiary hearing that Dell did not attend, the Indiana-American employees obtained a final protective order from the court on June 14, 2000. Def.'s Ex. 8.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). See also United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997). It is not the duty of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which she relies. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chi. Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, one on which [she] would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
On certain occasions, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that a court approach a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case with a particular degree of caution. See, e.g., Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989). The language implied that summary judgment might be less appropriate in this context based upon the presence of issues of motive and intent. See Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. As the Seventh Circuit emphasized, however, these cases do not establish a heightened summary judgment standard for employment-related cases. Instead, the language from the prior cases simply means "that courts should be careful in a discrimination case as in any case not to grant summary judgment if there is an issue of material fact that is genuinely contestable, which an issue of intent often though not always will be." Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). Even when discriminatory intent is at issue, summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant presents no evidence to indicate motive or intent in support of her position. See Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. Further, the nonmovant will not defeat summary judgment merely by pointing to self-serving allegations without evidentiary support. See Cliff v. Board of School Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION A. TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIM
Dell's first count is a retaliation claim under Section 704(a) of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter. . ."). Dell asserts this claim against Indiana-American, her former employer. Former employees are considered "employees" in Title VII retaliation actions. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) ("We hold that the term "employees," as used in § 704(a) of Title VII, is ambiguous as to whether it includes former employees. It being more consistent with the broader context of Title VII and the primary purpose of § 704(a), we hold that former employees are included within § 704(a)'s coverage."). However, post-employment acts of retaliation must have a nexus to employment or impinge on future employment prospects for a former employee to be able to sue under Title VII. See Veprinsky v. Flour Daniel, 87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996).
Dell alleges that Indiana-American provided Indiana Gas with false information about her, and contends that this information led to her discharge at Fieldstar. Dell asserts that Indiana-American provided Indiana Gas with the following information:
a) information that [Dell] opposed an unlawful employment practice and made a charge against her former supervisor; b) information about [Dell] that was defamatory; c) information that blacklisted [Dell], and otherwise discriminated against her because of her opposition to sexual harassment in her workplace.
Comp. ¶ 19.
Disclosing information about a former employee's opposition to an unlawful employment practice or providing false information about a former employee is actionable conduct if it has a relationship to an employment impairment. See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 891, 894-95 (reversing the district court because a genuine issue of material fact existed on former employee's claim of retaliation in providing inaccurate information to his new employer and disclosing pending EEOC charge). See also Reed v. Shephard, 939 F.2d 484, 492-93 (post-termination physical attacks and shooting by former employer unrelated to employment). Thus, Dell's claims, if she can support them with sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment, have a nexus to employment and may have impinged on her employment at Fieldstar such that she may, as a former employee, bring a Title VII retaliation claim.
The Court now turns to the substance of Dell's retaliation claims. A recent Seventh Circuit case clarified the proper summary judgment standard for courts considering Title VII retaliation claims. See Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2002) (creating "a new rule for adjudication of retaliation cases"). There are two distinct routes to prevent/obtain summary judgment in a retaliation action. See id. at 644. The first avenue "is to present direct evidence (evidence that establishes without resort to inferences from circumstantial evidence) that [s]he engaged in protected activity (filing a charge of discrimination) and as a result suffered the adverse employment action of which [s]he complains." Id. In this case, because Dell has no direct evidence of retaliation, she must resort to the second route:
[T]he adaptation of McDonnell Douglas to the retaliation context . . . requires the plaintiff to show that [1] after filing a charge [2] only [s]he, and not any similarly situated employee who did not file a charge, [3] was subjected to an adverse employment action [4] even though [s]he was performing [her] job in a satisfactory manner. If the defendant presents no evidence in response, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. If the defendant presents unrebutted evidence of a noninvidious reason for the adverse action, he is entitled to summary judgment. Otherwise there must be a trial.
Id. (numbers added). Dell need not present evidence of a "causal link" between the protected expression in which she engaged and the adverse employment action of which she is complaining. See id. at 642-43 (reasoning that the imposition of a causation requirement on a plaintiff proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas retaliation test essentially required direct evidence of retaliation rather than indirect evidence for which McDonnell Douglas was designed).
1. "Similarly Situated"
It is undisputed that Dell engaged in a protected activity while at Indiana-American — she filed a sexual harassment charge against Lee shortly before she left her employment there. The second element that Dell must establish is that only she, "and not any otherwise similarly situated employee who did not complain, was . . . subjected to an adverse employment action." Stone, 281 F.3d at 642. For Dell to meet her burden of identifying a similarly situated employee, she "must show that there is someone who is directly comparable to her in all material respects." Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). "In determining whether two employees are similarly situated a court must look at all relevant factors, the number of which depends on the case." Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir. 2000). "A plaintiff must show that [she] is similarly situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and conduct. This normally entails a showing that the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them." Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted).
Dell does not offer any evidence at all about similarly situated employees who did not file discrimination charges. Ordinarily, the case would end here because this is a threshold element of a retaliation claim, and "failure to satisfy any element of the prima facie case proves fatal to the employee's retaliation claim." Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2002). However, for the reasons that follow, the Court regards this a harsh result for a plaintiff in Dell's circumstances.
Requiring a former employee to find a similarly situated co-worker who did not file a discrimination charge may be an overly onerous, if not impossible, burden for a plaintiff to carry. According to Indiana-American, the similarly situated employees "would have been accused of sexual harassment during their employment and, ultimately, been the subject of a restraining order." Def.'s Memo in Support at 12. Although this overstates Dell's burden, it does show how difficult the burden could be for a plaintiff in Dell's unique circumstances. Dell would have to identify another former Indiana-American employee who received a job reference from Indiana-American at a new job. Tracking down the names and locations of former Indiana-American employees would be a very difficult task. Even if a plaintiff like Dell in a post-employment retaliation suit was able to locate a handful of former employees, a meaningful comparison would require Dell to offer "comparables" that were similarly situated with respect to performance and conduct while at Indiana-American. It may be that there are no former Indiana-American employees that are directly comparable with Dell due to the unique problems that she and Lee have had.
For these reasons, the Court agrees with the parties that the Stone test does not "neatly address" a former employee's claim of post-employment retaliation, and concludes that Dell's failure to brief the "similarly situated" issue is not fatal to her case. Pl.'s Memo in Opposition at 9; Def.'s Memo in Support at 11. This is a somewhat unusual Title VII retaliation case, and the Seventh Circuit was likely addressing the more typical retaliation setting when it enunciated the new rule in Stone. However, the Court's conclusion is limited to the "similarly situated" element of the prima facie retaliation case. Dell still has the burden of establishing that she suffered an adverse employment action.
2. Adverse Employment Action
Adverse employment action has been defined broadly in the Seventh Circuit. See Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996). "[A]dverse job action is not limited solely to loss or reduction of pay or monetary benefits. It can encompass other forms of adversity as well." Collins v. State of Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 1987). However, "not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Otherwise, minor and even trivial employment actions that `an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.'" Smart, 89 F.3d at 441 (citations omitted). The action must be materially adverse — "meaning more than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Cullom v. Brown, 209 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). For an employment decision to be actionable, it must be a "significant change in employment status, such as a hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). See also Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 1999).
According to Dell, her discharge from Fieldstar establishes that she suffered an adverse employment action. While it is true that a firing is an adverse employment action, Dell's retaliation claim is against Indiana-American. Comp. ¶ 19. Fieldstar is not a defendant in this action, and the only claim alleged against Indiana Gas is tortious interference with a business relationship. Fieldstar's decision to terminate Dell's employment does not establish that Dell suffered an adverse action at the hands of Indiana-American.
For Dell to survive summary judgment on this issue, she must produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Indiana-American took adverse, employment-related action against her. If Dell can establish that Indiana-American gave her a false/defamatory job reference that led to her discharge at Fieldstar, that would suffice to carry her burden on the adverse employment action element. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346 (holding that an unfavorable reference by former employer can constitute a retaliatory act under Title VII). Dell maintains that Indiana-American provided Indiana Gas with the following information:
a) information that [Dell] opposed an unlawful employment practice and made a charge against her former supervisor;
b) information about [Dell] that was defamatory;
c) information that blacklisted [Dell], and otherwise discriminated against her because of her opposition to sexual harassment in her workplace.
Comp. ¶ 19. First, Dell has not presented any evidence that any Indiana Gas employee knew that Dell filed a sexual harassment charge against Lee while she was at Indiana-American. Nor has she offered evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that her sex discrimination charge was a motivating factor for the alleged false job reference. See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 891 n. 6 ("If . . . the plaintiff has no proof of a nexus between her protected activity and the employer's purported act of belated retaliation, we are confident that her case will be disposed of in short order."). Moreover, Dell cannot even connect Indiana-American to the alleged communication in the first place, which she must do to show that it engaged in some form of post-employment retaliatory conduct against her. Although Dell does have some circumstantial evidence on this issue, she relies so heavily on speculation and conjecture that her claim must fail.
Raines, the Indiana Gas supervisor, testified that he heard three things about Dell: 1) Dell had been fired by Indiana-American; 2) Dell's co-worker's had a restraining order against her; and 3) Dell had put sugar in the gas tank of a Indiana-American vehicle. This information led to Indiana Gas informing Fieldstar that it did not want Dell reading Indiana Gas meters, which led to her dismissal from Fieldstar. The trail, however, ends here as Dell does not have sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that the information that Raines heard about Dell came from Indiana-American. Dell admits that, "No one can definitively say or prove with direct evidence who communicated the information about [Dell] to Raines." However, Dell's problem is that her circumstantial evidence is insufficient to raise a reasonable inference that Indiana-American provided Indiana Gas with this information.
The statement about the protective order was, as Indiana-American argues, substantially true. Dell emphasizes that this communication took place on May 19, 2000, and a restraining order did not issue against Dell until six days later. However, the restraining order was, as Indiana-American argues, "in the works" on May 19. On May 5, 2000, Lee swore to a notary public that Dell had been making abusive, harassing phone calls to him and other employees since she left Indiana-American Pl.'s Ex. 12. This notarized statement constituted the substance of the Petition for a Protective Order that was subsequently filed in court. On May 19, 2000, Lee sent an email to a supervisor at Indiana-American to explain that the petition had been sent to the court but had not received a docket number. Pl.'s Ex. 8. Even if some communication between Indiana-American and Indiana Gas did take place on May 19, any exaggeration of the truth or misunderstanding of the legal situation by the Indiana-American employee that made the communication does not save Dell. A temporary restraining order was issued against her on May 25, 2000, followed by a final protective order on June 14, 2000.
Dell believes that Lee, her former supervisor at Indiana-American, provided Indiana Gas with the information. In large measure, Dell focuses her argument on the bad blood between Dell and Lee that led to the cross sexual harassment charges and the restraining order, and on whether or not the information that Raines heard was erroneous. However, even if false statements about Dell were communicated to Raines, Dell must offer evidence from which a jury could infer that Lee (or someone else at Indiana-American) was the source. Although Fieldstar did call Lee's office at Indiana-American seeking a job reference for Dell around May 19, Dell has not presented any witness, from either Fieldstar or Indiana-American, that questions whether Lee did anything other than refer the caller to the human resources department. Dell's speculation that Lee provided Fieldstar with defamatory information about her at that time does not create a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transportation Corp., 948 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[A] plaintiff's speculation is not a sufficient defense to a summary judgment motion.").
Dell also attempts to pin Indiana-American as the source of misinformation about Dell by offering evidence that Lee and Raines belonged to the same Rotary Club: "Of great significance is the fact that Lee and Raines were members of the Midday Rotary Club of Noblesville in year 2000." Pl.'s Memo in Opposition at 14. Any inference drawn from the fact that Lee and Raines belonged to the same rotary club is very weak. No evidence has been offered to show that Lee and Raines actually knew each other or attended rotary club meetings together. However, even if Raines and Lee knew each other and attended the same club meetings, it does not establish that they ever had a conversation about Dell. Moreover, even if Raines and Lee did have some conversation about Dell, agency law principles make it unlikely that Indiana-American would be liable for the effects of the conversation.
Dell also relies on inconsistencies in the deposition testimony of Raines and Miessen. Raines said that Miessen, an Indiana Gas employee that he supervises, was the source of the information about Dell. Miessen says he does not recall making the statements. Dell maintains that this is another piece of her "mosaic" of circumstantial evidence that allows her to survive summary judgment. However, even if Miessen is lying, there is still no connection to Indiana-American. Both Raines and Miessen are Indiana Gas employees — even if Miessen provided the information to Raines, Dell has not offered any evidence that an Indiana-American employee communicated the information to Miessen.
Dell has not produced a single witness that corroborates her belief that Lee spread misinformation about her. Dell's suspicion that Lee was the source at Indiana-American tells the fact finder nothing about how or when this communication took place, and is insufficient to defeat Indiana-American's motion for summary judgment. Because Dell has not to come forward with specific evidence demonstrating that Indiana-American gave her an unfavorable reference, the Court concludes that Dell has failed to establish that Indiana-American took adverse employment action against her. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Indiana-American's Motion for Summary Judgment on the retaliation claim.
B. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
Because the Court has granted summary judgment on Dell's federal retaliation claim, original jurisdiction is now lacking and the Court may — pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) — properly dismiss Dell's remaining state law claims. "In the ordinary case of supplemental jurisdiction, the presumption is in favor of relinquishment when the claim that is within the original jurisdiction of the district court was dismissed before trial." Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1993). See also Alonzi v. Budget Constr. Co., 55 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1995). The Court chooses to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and hereby DISMISSES without prejudice Dell's remaining state law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Dell has failed to offer evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Indiana-American engaged in post-employment retaliatory conduct against her. This is a threshold element for a plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation action. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Indiana-American's Motion for Summary Judgment on the retaliation claim. Due to this disposition of the federal claim, the Court now lacks original jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice the state law claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11TH day of March, 2003.