Opinion
CV166060643S
06-13-2016
Elsa Delgado v. G& B Realty, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO STRIKE (#103)
Robin L. Wilson, J.
FACTS
This case arises out of an incident that occurred on defendant's property, located at 79 East Grand Avenue in New Haven, Connecticut, which is owned and/or maintained by defendant G& B Realty, LLC (defendant). On February 19, 2014, the plaintiff Elsa Delgado (plaintiff) was walking in the parking lot of defendant's property when she was caused to slip and fall due to an accumulation of ice and snow. As a result, the plaintiff suffered severe and painful injuries.
The plaintiff commenced this suit by way of writ and summons dated January 15, 2016, alleging negligence based on premises liability in that the defendant failed to maintain its parking lot in a reasonably safe condition. On March 21, 2016, the defendant filed its answer to the complaint and, with it, asserted four counts in a counterclaim. The first two counts sound in breach of contract, based upon a breach of a residential lease between the plaintiff and defendant, and the second two counts allege unjust enrichment. The counterclaims allege damages in contract stemming from a landlord/tenant relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. Count one alleges that upon taking ownership of the property in which the plaintiff resides, and which property is the subject of the plaintiff's negligence action, the defendant submitted a residential lease agreement to the plaintiff for use and occupancy of the premises. In August of 2013, the plaintiff neglected to fill out the lease agreement but remained in possession of the apartment and began paying the amount stipulated in the residential lease agreement, which was $700.00 per month. As a result of the plaintiff's conduct, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff became a month-to-month tenant with an implied contract to pay $700.00 per month. The defendant alleges that while in possession of the premises, the plaintiff breached the implied contract in that she failed to pay the rent and late charges beginning on January 14, 2014. The plaintiff vacated the premises in June 2014, and the defendant, as a result of plaintiff's failure to pay rent and breach, has incurred economic damages. Count two alleges a breach of implied contract and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1-8 of count one and further alleges that the plaintiff breached the implied lease contract in that she left the premises in a damaged condition. Counts three and four are unjust enrichment based on failure to pay rent and damage to the property, respectively.
The plaintiff has moved to strike all four counts of the defendant's counterclaim on grounds that the counterclaims do not arise out of the same transaction as the subject of the complaint. The defendant filed an objection and a memorandum in support and argues that its counterclaim alleges facts and issues of law which arise from the same transaction as alleged in the plaintiff's complaint and presenting the two claims together avoids a duplication of efforts by both parties. The defendant argues that because the plaintiff's status as a tenant is a critical issue in both the complaint and the counterclaim, its counterclaim arises from the same transaction as the plaintiff's complaint. Oral argument was heard on the motion at short calendar on May 23, 2016.
DISCUSSION
" A motion to strike shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest: (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . ." Practice Book § 10-39(a). " A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 529, 69 A.3d 880 (2013). The court must " construe the [pleading] in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009).
" [A] counterclaim is a cause of action existing in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff and on which the defendant might have secured affirmative relief had he sued the plaintiff in a separate action . . . A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a cause of action and may properly be used to challenge the sufficiency of a counterclaim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) JP Morgan Chase Bank, Trustee v. Rodrigues, 109 Conn.App. 125, 131, 952 A.2d 56 (2008).
The test courts apply to determine if a counterclaim is properly before the court is commonly referred to as the " transaction test." The transaction test is set forth in our rules of practice. Practice Book § 10-10 provides that " [i]n any action for legal or equitable relief, any defendant may file counterclaims against any plaintiff . . . provided that each such counterclaim . . . arises out of the transaction or one of the transactions which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint . . ." Section 10-10 " is a common-sense rule designed to permit the joinder of closely related claims where such joinder is in the best interests of judicial economy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co., 202 Conn. 234, 251, 520 A.2d 1008 (1987), overruled on other grounds by Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 682 A.2d 106 (1996). " The transaction test is one of practicality, and the trial court's determination as to whether that test has been met ought not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) JP Morgan Chase Bank, Trustee v. Rodrigues, supra, 109 Conn.App. 131-32. " [R]elevant considerations in determining whether the 'transaction test' has been met include whether the same issues of fact and law are presented by the complaint and the [counter]claim and whether separate trials on each of the respective claims would involve a substantial duplication of effort by the parties and the courts." (Internal quotation marks omitted. South Windsor Cemetery Assn., Inc. v. Lindquist, 114 Conn.App. 540, 547, 970 A.2d 760, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 932, 981 A.2d 1076 (2009).
" In assessing the legal viability of a counterclaim and, in particular, whether it arises from the same transaction as the complaint, we have not required a complete identity of issues. Rather, the claims must have a sufficient closeness that the trial of the complaint and counterclaim will not imperil judicial economy." Citimortgage, Inc. v. Rey, 150 Conn.App. 595, 606, 92 A.3d 278, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 905, 99 A.3d 635 (2014). " Where the underlying purposes of Practice Book § [10-10], to wit, judicial economy, avoidance of multiplicity of litigation, and avoidance of piecemeal disposition of what is essentially one action, are thwarted rather than served by the filing of a cross claim, the cross claim may properly be expunged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wallingford v. Glen Valley Associates, Inc., 190 Conn. 158, 161, 459 A.2d 525 (1983). Thus, " [t]he question to decide is whether the subject of the defendant's counterclaim is sufficiently intertwined with the complaint that it arises from the same transaction." Citimortgage, Inc. v. Rey, supra, 150 Conn.App. at 608.
In Geraghty v. Hamilton Park Associates, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. KNLCV106006647S, (May 30, 2014, Cole-Chu, J.), which is factually similar to the present case, the plaintiff filed a negligence action based on premises liability alleging that she was a tenant at an apartment owned by the defendant and that " she fell while walking down exterior stairs from that apartment and sustained injuries, allegedly due to the defendants' neglect including failure to illuminate the staircase after dark. The complaint also alleges nuisance, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and wilful misconduct--all concerning the 281 Hamilton Avenue apartment." Id.
The defendant Hamilton filed an amended answer which included a counterclaim in which it alleged that " the plaintiff, as tenant, entered into a lease agreement with Hamilton, as landlord, [at another property], 16-D Adelaide Road in Norwich, Connecticut (16-D Adelaide Road). The plaintiff failed to make full and timely rent payments under that lease. She owes Hamilton $10, 070 in rent and/or use and occupancy payments for 16-D Adelaide Road. The lease required the plaintiff to pay Hamilton the cost of repairing damage she caused to the 16-D Adelaide Road premises. The plaintiff did cause damage to those premises, for the repair of which the plaintiff owes Hamilton money. In addition, in an addendum to the lease, the plaintiff agreed to pay Hamilton's expenses and reasonable attorneys fees if Hamilton was required to bring a legal action against her. Hamilton was required by the plaintiff's nonpayment of rent to commence a summary process action against the plaintiff for possession of 16-D Adelaide Road, and did so, incurring attorneys fees. The plaintiff breached the lease by not paying all rent, use and occupancy payments and, implicitly, by not paying Hamilton for the claimed repair of damage to 16-D Adelaide Road or for its claimed attorneys fees for the summary process action against the plaintiff." Id. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the counterclaim on the ground that, because the counterclaim sounds in contract and the complaint sounds in tort, the subjects of the pleadings are not so connected that consideration of the counterclaim is necessary for a full determination of the rights of the parties.
In striking Hamilton's counterclaim, the court in Geraghty cited " the seminal case [of Springfield-Dewitt Gardens, Inc. v. Wood, 143 Conn. 708, 125 A.2d 488 (1956)] regarding analysis of the propriety of a counterclaim in a landlord-tenant context. In Springfield-Dewitt, the plaintiff sued in contract to 'recover unpaid rent, damages for repairs which [the defendant] was required to make in the leased premises, and attorneys fees which the lease provided . . . The counterclaims sound in tort and contain the usual allegation that the defendants were tenants in the plaintiff's building and were injured by reason of a defect in the portion of the premises which was used in common by all of the tenants. It was not alleged that the defendants were injured through any breach of a lease or through any defect in leased premises." Id., at 712-13, 125 A.2d 488. The court concluded: " In the instant case the matter in controversy under the complaint arises out of a contract, the written lease, while the counterclaims concern tortious neglect of the plaintiff in performing certain duties owed because the parties stood in a landlord and tenant relationship. Although we subscribe to the view that our Practice Act and the rules under it should be liberally construed, we do not consider that the subject matter of the counterclaims is so connected with the matter in controversy under the complaint as to make its consideration necessary to a full determination of the rights of the parties." Id., 714.
Likewise, in the present case, the defendant's counterclaims are not sufficiently intertwined with the amended complaint. All of the defendant's counterclaims are based upon a breach of the lease agreement. Plaintiff's complaint is a negligence action based upon a theory of premises liability. Indeed, as the defendant points out, the status of the plaintiff at the time of her injury will determine what duty, if any, the defendant owes to her. Plaintiff alleges that she was an invitee at the time she fell. The defendant alleges that because the plaintiff allegedly failed to pay rent, her status was one other than an invitee. Certainly, this may be evidence submitted at trial to rebut the plaintiff's claim that she was an invitee at the time of her fall, however, it in no way can be said that " the subject of the defendant's counterclaim is sufficiently intertwined with the complaint that it arises from the same transaction." Citimortgage, Inc. v. Rey, supra, 150 Conn.App. at 608. Although the defendant's duty to the plaintiff is based upon her status on the premises at the time of the accident, the plaintiff also has to prove breach of the duty owed, causation and damages. Defendant on the other hand has to prove the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's breach and damages suffered.
As previously noted, the court in Springfield-Dewitt, stated: " The counterclaims sound in tort and contain the usual allegation that the defendants were tenants in the plaintiff's building and were injured by reason of a defect in the portion of the premises which was used in common by all of the tenants. It was not alleged that the defendants were injured through any breach of a lease or th[r]ough any defect in [the] leased premises. The rule under the statute is stated in Harral v. Leverty, 50 Conn. 46, 63, as follows: '[A] defendant by a counterclaim under the statute, cannot bring in for adjudication any matter that is not so connected with the matter in controversy under the original complaint that its consideration by the court is necessary for a full determination of the rights of the parties as to such matter in controversy . . ." As in Springfield-DeWitt, the tort liability claimed by the plaintiff in the present case against the defendant arises from the neglect of a landlord to keep a common area of the leased premises, namely, the parking lot, in a reasonably safe condition, free from snow and ice. The plaintiff has not alleged that she was injured through any breach of a lease or th[r]ough any defect in [the] leased premises. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that the counterclaim arises out of any of the matters alleged in the complaint or, therefore, that it meets the requirements of Practice Book § 10-10. As the court stated in Geraghty, " [t]here is no basis upon which to conclude that litigation of the counterclaim is necessary to the full determination of the rights of the plaintiff or defendant raised by the complaint. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Appell, 39 Conn.Supp. 85, 88, 468 A.2d 949 (1983). There is no basis on which to conclude that separate trials will mean substantial duplication of effort by the parties or by the court. Not only is it within the court's discretion to strike the counterclaim See Ceci Bros., Inc. v. Five Twenty-One Corp, supra, 81 Conn.App. at 423 n.3, 840 A.2d 578[; but] to deny the present motion might be an abuse of that discretion." Geraghty v. Hamilton Park Associates, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-No. KNLCV106006647S, at *8 . Thus, the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's counterclaim is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion to strike all four counts of the defendant's counterclaim is granted.