In claim four, Appellant asserts that trial counsel failed to use available prior inconsistent statements given by Mitchell and Liebl to effectively impeach them. A criminal defendant raises a legally sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where he or she specifies what portion of a witness's testimony could have been impeached with a prior inconsistent statement and how counsel's failure to impeach prejudiced the defendant. SeeDelarosa v. State , 24 So.3d 741, 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; see alsoWillich v. State , 79 So.3d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).Here, Appellant cited several examples of prior inconsistent statements that could have been used to impeach Liebl. For example, Appellant explained that, in her first statement to law enforcement, Liebl told police that she never went in Appellant's car and did not know whether or when the back seats had been removed.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to impeach a witness are cognizable in a Rule 3.850 motion. See Lowe v. State, 2 So.3d 21, 30 (Fla.2008) (affirming the denial of such a claim based on insufficient prejudice); Delarosa v. State, 24 So.3d 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing the denial of such a claim as conclusory); Williams v. State, 673 So.2d 960 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (disagreeing with trial court's conclusion that the claim was procedurally barred because it could have been raised on appeal). Similarly, a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress may be raised in a Rule 3.850 motion.
In ground two, Mr. Willich stated a cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in alleging that trial counsel failed to impeach Patricia Salamanca with her prior inconsistent statement to investigating officers. See, e.g., Delarosa v. State, 24 So.3d 741, 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (concluding that allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach a state witness with a prior inconsistent statement was legally sufficient). Because the claim is not conclusively refuted by the record on appeal, we reverse the trial court's order as to disposition of ground two only, and remand to the trial court with directions that it either attach portions of the record conclusively refuting the allegations in ground two of the amended motion, or, in the alternative, conduct an evidentiary hearing on the allegations.
In ground two, Mr. Willich stated a cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in alleging that trial counsel failed to impeach Patricia Salamanca with her prior inconsistent statement to investigating officers. See, e.g., Delarosa v. State, 24 So. 3d 741, 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (concluding that allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach a state witness with a prior inconsistent statement was legally sufficient). Because the claim is not conclusively refuted by the record on appeal, we reverse the trial court's order as to disposition of ground two only, and remand to the trial court with directions that it either attach portions of the record conclusively refuting the allegations in ground two of the amended motion, or, in the alternative, conduct an evidentiary hearing on the allegations.
This court agreed with the postconviction court that the claim was facially insufficient but reversed and remanded for the postconviction court to strike the claim and give Mohr "leave to amend within a reasonable amount of time in accordance with Spera." Id.; see also Delarosa v. State, 24 So.3d 741, 742 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (noting "that even if this court had determined that ground (2)(a) was conclusory, we would be constrained to reverse and remand for the postconviction court to strike the claim with leave for Delarosa to amend within a reasonable period of time" under Spera); Monroe v. State, 13 So.3d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing summary denial of "conclusory and facially insufficient" claim and remanding in accord with Spera); Baldwin v. State, 978 So.2d 257, 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (reversing summary denial of claim that counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the prosecutor's closing argument in which the prosecutor allegedly vouched for the credibility of witnesses and remanding the "conclusory and facially insufficient" claim pursuant to Spera). Here, the postconviction court denied the claim as "conclusory," but the claim appears to be similar to the facially insufficient claim in Mohr. Potentially, a claim could be so conclusory and vague as to not warrant amendment, such as a