“Under Massachusetts law, an operator of an automobile is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of his or her vehicle.” Deguio v. United States, 732 F.Supp. 1240, 1245 (D. Mass. 1990). An individual breaches that duty “if he, either by act or omission, failed to exercise the degree of care that a reasonably prudent driver would have exercised under the same driving conditions and circumstances that [he] faced on the [day of the accident].”

7. "Under Massachusetts law, an operator of an automobile is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of his or her vehicle." Deguio v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 1240, 1245 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing Fraser v. Flanders, 248 Mass. 62, 66, 142 N.E. 836, 838 (1924)). Reasonable care is "the degree of care that a reasonably prudent driver would have exercised under the same driving conditions and circumstances."

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), the United States is liable, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, for personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government committed while acting within the scope of his or her employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 2674; Deguio v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 1240, 1244 (D.Mass.), aff'd, 920 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1990). The law of the place where the act or omission occurred is employed in determining liability.

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge. Appellants Grace Deguio, conservator of the estate of Dwight Deguio, and Grace Deguio individually (collectively "appellant") appeal from a judgment entered March 22, 1990 in the District of Massachusetts, in favor of appellee United States in a negligence action arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") 732 F. Supp. 1240. On appeal, appellant asserts several claims of error relating to the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant contends that these putative errors are sufficient to warrant reversing the district court's judgment.

However, our courts have not ruled, and the defendants offer no basis for the assertion that, in order for a jury to consider the violation of a regulation as evidence of negligence, a witness must testify that the regulation was violated. See, e.g., Perry v. Medeiros, 369 Mass. 836, 842, 343 N.E.2d 859 (1976) (it was for jury to find violation of building code as evidence of negligence without testimony by building inspector that there was a violation of the code); Matteo v. Livingstone, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 658, 663, 666 N.E.2d 1309 (1996) (finding it proper to exclude expert witness testimony regarding building code allegedly violated in negligence case); Deguio v. United States, 732 F.Supp. 1240 (D.Mass.1990) (ruling in a jury-waived trial applying Massachusetts law that circumstantial evidence could be relied upon to determine if regulation violated). See also Toubiana v. Priestly, 402 Mass. 84, 90, 520 N.E.2d 1307 (1988) (fact that expert gave testimony on issue contrary to the jury verdict did not render the jury verdict erroneous).