Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:21-CV-90
2022-07-27
Jason DEGOLLADO and Maria de la Guzman, individually and as heirs to the Estate of Angel Degollado, Plaintiffs, v. Aaron SOLIS and Zapata County, Defendants.
Rodolfo Castillo, Law Office of Rudy Castillo, PC, San Antonio, TX, Gregory Vincent Gallagher, Dorsett Johnson Swift LLP, Austin, TX, Jeffrey S. Edwards, The Edwards Law Firm, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff Jason Degollado. Rodolfo Castillo, Law Office of Rudy Castillo, PC, San Antonio, TX, Gregory Vincent Gallagher, Dorsett Johnson Swift LLP, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff Maria De La Guzman. John-Michael Wyman Hayward, Ricardo J. Navarro, Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal & Zech, P.C., Harlingen, TX, for Defendants.
Rodolfo Castillo, Law Office of Rudy Castillo, PC, San Antonio, TX, Gregory Vincent Gallagher, Dorsett Johnson Swift LLP, Austin, TX, Jeffrey S. Edwards, The Edwards Law Firm, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff Jason Degollado.
Rodolfo Castillo, Law Office of Rudy Castillo, PC, San Antonio, TX, Gregory Vincent Gallagher, Dorsett Johnson Swift LLP, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff Maria De La Guzman.
John-Michael Wyman Hayward, Ricardo J. Navarro, Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal & Zech, P.C., Harlingen, TX, for Defendants.
ORDER
Marina Garcia Marmolejo, United States District Judge In March 2021, Angel Degollado died after Deputy Aaron Solis shot him (Dkt. No. 1 at 3). His parents, Jason Degollado and Maria de la Guzman (collectively, "the Degollados"), initiated this civil rights action in their individual capacities and as heirs to the estate of their son (id. at 1). The Degollados’ lawsuit sues Deputy Solis in his individual capacity and Zapata County (id. ). Both Defendants have moved to dismiss the lawsuit, and the matter is now fully briefed (Dkt. Nos. 7, 12, 15). Having reviewed the arguments, record, and applicable authorities, the motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 7) is hereby DENIED .
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
At this stage, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true. See Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd. , 974 F.3d 577, 582 (5th Cir. 2020). The Degollados allege the following: On the morning of March 14, 2021, unbeknownst to Angel's parents, Angel's girlfriend called 911 and expressed concerns about his mental health (Dkt. No. 1 at 2–3). Meanwhile, Angel called his father and asked to be taken home (id. at 3). After Mr. Degollado drove Angel home, Angel went outside, sat on a chair, and relaxed (id. ). Mr. Degollado started cleaning his house, but he stopped when he heard yelling outside (id. ). Mr. Degollado made his way towards the voices and saw Deputy Solis's gun drawn and pointed at Angel (id. ). Both Deputy Solis and Angel were in the street (id. ).
Thereafter, three additional officers arrived: a Zapata County deputy, a Texas Department of Public Safety ("DPS") trooper, and a Texas Parks and Wildlife Department officer (id. ). Angel stood still and held a kitchen knife pointed downward by his waist (id. at 4). Deputy Solis told Angel to drop the knife, and Angel repeatedly said "No" (id. ). Angel slowly backed away from Deputy Solis, and Deputy Solis followed him (id. ). When the two stopped moving, a "significant" distance spanned between them (id. ).
Angel's family attempted to de-escalate the situation (see id. ). Roberto, Angel's uncle, asked Deputy Solis not to shoot Angel and to let him talk to his nephew (id. at 3–4). Deputy Solis denied Roberto's requests (id. at 4). Roberto was told to "get back," and Roberto complied (id. ). Mr. Degollado then asked Angel if he would like to speak with his mother on the phone, but Angel refused (id. ). After an unknown amount of time elapsed, the DPS trooper tased Angel (id. at 4–5).
The complaint is unclear, but it appears Angel did not fall after being tased. Rather, it seems Angel remained standing while his body shook in response to the taser's electric currents (see id. at 5). As he convulsed, Angel did not raise or move his knife, which remained at his waist, pointed downward (id. ). After an unknown amount of time elapsed, Deputy Solis fired three shots (id. ). One of the shots struck Angel and killed him (id. ). Angel was 21 years old (id. ).
The allegations conclude with the following: At no point did Angel raise his knife, threaten anyone, or advance toward any officer (id. ). B. Procedural History
After the incident, the Degollados filed this lawsuit, which asserts five claims against Deputy Solis and Zapata County:
1. An excessive force claim against Deputy Solis in his individual capacity based on the three gunshots he fired (not the taser);
2. An unconstitutional failure-to-train claim against Zapata County, based on the allegation that the County failed to train its officers on how to respond to subjects with potential mental health issues;
3. An unconstitutional failure-to-train claim against Zapata County, based on the allegation that the County failed to train its officers on crisis intervention techniques;
4. An unconstitutional failure-to-train claim against Zapata County, based on the allegation that the County failed to train its officers on the appropriateness of using deadly force after tasing an individual; and
5. An unconstitutional failure-to-train claim against Zapata County, based on the allegation that the County failed to accommodate individuals experiencing, or who may be experiencing, mental health crises.
Although the original complaint states the Zapata County Sheriff "failed to supervise" Deputy Solis and avers the Degollados assert a claim under "the Texas wrongful death statute," these remarks are, at best, passing references (Dkt. No. 1 at 7–8). Neither claim is enumerated under a separate count (id. ). Rather, they are buried in numbered paragraphs primarily focused on other topics (id. ). Regarding the wrongful death claim: The Degollados do not cite a statutory provision for this claim, do not enumerate its elements, and do not identify which Defendant is subject to this cause of action. To the extent the Degollados wish to assert these claims, the pleadings do not give Defendants fair notice. As such, the Court will not construe the pleadings as asserting a failure-to-supervise or a wrongful death claim. See In re Ozcelebi , 635 B.R. 467, 474–76 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2021) (noting a complaint was ambiguously pled and "[a]ttempting to pick and choose which claims Plaintiffs actually intended to plead" was "simply too confusing").
The Degollados’ complaint does not identify another instance in which a Zapata County official used excessive force against an individual experiencing a mental health crisis.
Deputy Solis and Zapata County filed a joint motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 7). Deputy Solis urges two bases for dismissal: The Degollados failed to sufficiently plead an excessive force claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Deputy Solis is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim (id. at 4). Zapata County seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the Degollados have not adequately pled a failure-to-train claim, as this lawsuit arises from only one incident (id. at 8). The Degollados then filed a response, to which Defendants filed a reply (Dkt. Nos. 12, 15).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Dismissal for Failing to State a Claim
To provide a defendant fair notice of a claim and the grounds upon which it rests, every pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the cause of action and sufficient factual allegations to show the plaintiff is plausibly entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). While the Federal Rules "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for [an] imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted," a plaintiff's complaint must contain enough factual matter which, if taken as true, raises a reasonable hope or expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim. See Johnson v. City of Shelby , 574 U.S. 10, 11, 135 S.Ct. 346, 190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014) ; Lormand v. U.S. Unwired , 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009). If, after accepting all the factual allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the district court finds the claim is implausible or cannot reasonably infer the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct, dismissal is proper. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Assessing a complaint for plausibility is a "context-specific task," and the court must "draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 at 679. Notably, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation omitted); see also Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]").
Importantly, at the motion to dismiss stage, the district court cannot evaluate a plaintiff's likelihood of success. Thompson v. City of Waco , 764 F.3d 500, 502–03 (5th Cir. 2014). For this reason, motions to dismiss are "viewed with disfavor" and are "rarely granted." Leal v. McHugh , 731 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2013) ; see Roberts v. Zev Techs., Inc. , No. 1:15-cv-309, 2015 WL 7454688, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2015) (denying a motion to dismiss and allowing a gross negligence claim to proceed, even though the plaintiff had "a long road ahead of him to actually prove the elements").
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity "attempts to balance two competing societal interests: ‘the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’ " Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett , 981 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ). As such, qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Because qualified immunity is "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," a district court should resolve the issue at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Pearson , 555 U.S. at 231–32, 129 S.Ct. 808.
To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show (1) the official's conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. McLin v. Ard , 866 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 2017). A court can begin its assessment with either prong, but both must be satisfied to deny immunity. Gibson v. Kilpatrick , 773 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 2014).
With respect to the second prong, the federal right "must be sufficiently clear to put a reasonable officer on notice that certain conduct violates that right." Sanchez v. Swyden , 139 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1998). That is, the case law must "clearly set parameters under which an objectively reasonable officer would know what is permissible and what is excessive." Reyes v. Bridgwater , 362 F. App'x 403, 408 (5th Cir. 2010). There need not be a case "with exactly the same facts" to put a reasonable officer on fair notice of what conduct violates federal law. Id. ; Hope v. Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 740, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (holding the law can be clearly established "despite notable factual distinctions"). When evaluating whether the law was clearly established, "the subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant[.]" Sanchez , 139 F.3d at 467 (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Excessive Force Claim Against Deputy Solis
At this early stage of litigation, the Degollados have plausibly alleged an excessive force claim against Deputy Solis, and Deputy Solis is not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court's discussion proceeds in three steps: (1) the Court first outlines the general principles governing an excessive force claim; (2) the Court then reviews applicable case law; and (3) the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the Degollados’ allegations against this body of law.
1. Excessive-Force Claims
"The Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable seizures governs excessive-force claims." Roque v. Harvel , 993 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2021). To prevail on an excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury (2) that directly resulted from a use of force that was clearly excessive and (3) the excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable. Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't , 806 F.3d 268, 275 (5th Cir. 2015). Because officers must be allowed to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are "tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving," evaluating an excessive-force claim is "necessarily fact-intensive." Darden v. City of Fort Worth , 880 F.3d 722, 738–39 (5th Cir. 2018) ; see Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 383, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (noting courts have an obligation to "slosh" through "the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness’ " in excessive-force cases).
To clarify, "the Fourth Amendment's ‘objectively reasonable’ analysis does not collapse with the clearly established law's reasonableness inquiry, such that one reasonableness inquiry covers both bases. Reasonableness plays two distinct roles, informing the Fourth Amendment merits (was the use of force reasonable?) and the clearly established law (was the officer's understanding of his authority to use force reasonable?)." Joseph , 981 F.3d at 332 n.42 (cleaned up) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Ordinarily, a court considers three factors to determine whether the use of force is reasonable: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Joseph , 981 F.3d at 332. However, in excessive-force cases where the use of deadly force is at issue, the Fifth Circuit has narrowed the inquiry to only the second factor. See Barnes v. Felix , 532 F. Supp. 3d 463, 469 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (collecting cases). That is, "the use of deadly force is permitted only to protect the life of the shooting officer or others: ‘Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.’ " Cole v. Carson , 935 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) ).
The district court must confine its threat assessment to the moment prompting the officer's use of deadly force. Rockwell v. Brown , 664 F.3d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 2011). This focused inquiry is required because "an exercise of force that is reasonable at one moment can become unreasonable in the next if the justification for the use of force has ceased." Lytle v. Bexar Cnty. , 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2009). "To say otherwise would grant officers an ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect who was threatening earlier." Amador v. Vasquez , 961 F.3d 721, 730 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (citations omitted).
2. Case Law
The following cases were decided prior to March 14, 2021—the day Angel died. See Hope , 536 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (noting that for qualified immunity purposes, "the salient question" is whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation). In the cases below, the Fifth Circuit held an officer who used deadly force was not entitled to qualified immunity:
1. Where a suspect refuses to drop a knife, stands "several feet away" from officers and others, holds his hands upwards in a surrender position for several seconds, and remains stationary in the officers’ line of sight, shooting him is excessive and violates clearly established law. Amador , 961 F.3d at 725, 729–30.
2. Where an officer shoots a suspect and incapacitates him, such that the suspect can move his head, but not his arms or the trunk of his upper body, shooting him two more times is excessive and violates clearly established law. Mason , 806 F.3d at 277–78.
3. Where a suspect stands 10 to 40 feet away from an officer, is motionless, holds a knife, and makes no threats towards anyone, shooting him is excessive and violates clearly established law. Bacque v. Leger , 207 F. App'x 374, 376 (5th Cir. 2006).
4. Where a suspect refuses to put down his knife, stands "a safe distance away" from officers, and makes no threatening gesture towards the officer, shooting him is excessive and violates clearly established law. Reyes , 362 F. App'x at 405–07.
5. Where a suspect holding a gun is shot in the groin, falls down with the gun in hand, never harasses or threatens an officer, and never moves aggressively, shooting the suspect a second time constitutes excessive force and violates clearly established law. Graves v. Zachary , 277 F. App'x 344, 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2008).
Although Bacque, Reyes , and Graves are unpublished cases, the Fifth Circuit has held that "in the absence of controlling authority, a consensus of cases of persuasive authority might, under some circumstances, be sufficient to compel the conclusion that no reasonable officer could have believed that his or her actions were lawful." McClendon v. City of Columbia , 305 F.3d 314, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (cleaned up). Above, the Court cites two published opinions to show the law was clearly established. If Defendants believe such authority does not clearly establish the unconstitutionality of Deputy Solis's actions, the combination of binding and persuasive authority above shows a reasonable officer could not have believed Deputy Solis's alleged actions were lawful. See also Marshall v. Russell , 391 F. Supp. 3d 672, 686–87 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (denying qualified immunity where officer shot a suspect who held a drill, stood a safe distance from the officer, and made no threatening movements towards the officer); Bennett v. Spencer , No. 3:14-cv-402, 2015 WL 13664569, at *7–8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (denying qualified immunity where officer shot a mentally ill suspect who refused to drop a knife, stood 30 feet from officers, and made no threatening movements); Meadours v. Ermel , No. 4:04-cv-102, 2005 WL 1923596, at *6–9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2005) (denying qualified immunity where officers shot a mentally ill suspect who held a screwdriver and made no threats).
As counterexamples, the following cases held an officer who used deadly force was entitled to qualified immunity:
1. Where a suspect refuses to put down a kitchen knife, displays erratic behavior, and quickly moves within striking distance of a bystander, an officer's use of deadly force does not violate clearly established law. Kisela v. Hughes , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153–54, 200 L.Ed.2d 449 (2018).
2. Where a suspect wields two 8-inch knives, shoves an officer into a toilet with enough force to shatter it, and runs towards a second officer while swinging the knives, the second officer's use of deadly force is neither excessive nor a violation of clearly established law. Rockwell , 664 F.3d at 991–92.
3. Where an intoxicated and agitated suspect breaks windows, shouts, turns towards officers and raises an 18-to 20-inch sword "in a relatively confined space," shooting the suspect does not constitute excessive force. Mace v. City of Palestine , 333 F.3d 621, 624–25 (5th Cir. 2003).
In Kisela , the Supreme Court did not decide whether the shooting constituted excessive force. However, after the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the shooting was reasonable under the circumstances. See Hughes v. Kisela , No. CV 11-366, 2013 WL 12188383, at *6 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2013), aff'd , 891 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2018).
Mace did not address the "clearly established law" inquiry.
3. Whether the Degollados’ Excessive Force Claim Survives
Against this body of case law, the law was clearly established that, as alleged, Deputy Solis's three gunshots violated the Fourth Amendment. Like the suspects in Amador, Bacque , and Reyes , Angel stood a "significant" distance from the officers and other bystanders (Dkt. No. 1 at 4). See Amador , 961 F.3d at 729 ("several feet away"); Bacque , 207 F. App'x at 376 (10 to 40 feet away) ; Reyes , 362 F. App'x at 407 ("a safe distance away"). And like the suspect in Mason and Graves , Angel was incapacitated and unable to use his weapon at the time he was tased (Dkt. No. 1 at 4–5). See Mason , 806 F.3d at 278 (holding knife and unable to move upper body); Graves , 277 F. App'x at 348 (on the ground with a gun). And like the suspects in Amador, Bacque , Reyes , and Graves , Angel neither threatened to use his knife, nor did he make a threatening gesture (Dkt. No. 1 at 5). Amador , 961 F.3d at 729–30 (suspect remained stationary and held hands up in surrender); Bacque , 207 F. App'x at 376 (standing, not "menac[ing] anyone," and no threats); Reyes , 362 F. App'x at 407 (no threatening gesture); Graves , 277 F. App'x at 346 (no verbal threats, no weapon pointed at officers, and no aggressive movements).
These allegations—which the Court must accept as true at this stage—distinguish the Degollados’ case from Kisela , Rockwell , and Mace , in which a suspect moved towards an officer or bystander with a sharp object. See Kisela , 138 S. Ct. at 1154 (moving within striking distance of bystander with a knife); Rockwell , 664 F.3d at 991 (running towards officers and swinging two knives); Mace , 333 F.3d at 624–25 (turning towards officers and raising sword "in a relatively confined space"). On these allegations, it is reasonable to infer Angel posed no immediate threat to the officers or Angel's family. See also Reyes , 362 F. App'x at 407 ("The immediacy of the risk presented by a man armed with a kitchen knife at his side is far less than that of a man armed with a gun."). It is therefore plausible that Deputy Solis's use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Further, in light of the case law reviewed, the allegations plausibly aver a violation of clearly established law. Deputy Solis's request to dismiss the Degollados’ excessive force claim is DENIED .
B. Failure-to-Train Claims against Zapata County
The Court now turns to the Degollados’ failure-to-train claims. As before, the Court outlines the general legal principles of failure-to-train claims, examines applicable case law, and assesses the sufficiency of the Degollados’ allegations against this body of law.
1. Failure to Train
A municipality can be liable for a number of constitutional torts. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. , 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ; Brown v. Bryan Cnty. , 219 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000). For example, liability can attach where a municipality promulgates an unconstitutional policy, unconstitutionally fails to supervise an employee, or unconstitutionally fails to train an employee. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston , 237 F.3d 567, 581 (5th Cir. 2001) ; Parker v. Blackwell , 23 F.4th 517, 525 (5th Cir. 2022). Here, only a failure-to-train claim is at issue.
The Supreme Court has held that in "limited circumstances," a municipality's failure to train its employees on avoiding constitutional violations may lead to municipal liability. Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011). To prevail on a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the training procedures of the municipality's policymaker were inadequate, (2) the policymaker was deliberately indifferent to the training policy's inadequacies, and (3) the inadequate training directly caused the plaintiff's injury. Conner v. Travis Cnty. , 209 F.3d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 2000).
The second element, "deliberate indifference," is a "stringent standard, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action" for which a "showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice." Valle v. City of Houston , 613 F.3d 536, 542, 547 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (holding municipal liability "attaches where—and only where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official ... responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question").
"Deliberate indifference may be proven in one of two ways." Jackson v. Valdez , 852 F. App'x 129, 136 (5th Cir. 2021). First, a plaintiff can point to a pattern of similar constitutional violations made by municipal employees. Id. By pointing to a pattern of similar incidents, the factfinder can infer the need for more training was obvious. Id. If the factfinder makes this inference, the factfinder can also find a municipality was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional right at issue. Id. This proof-by-pattern method is "ordinarily necessary" to show deliberate indifference in a failure-to-train case. Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. , 894 F.3d 616, 624 (5th Cir. 2018).
Second, a single incident can also establish deliberate indifference. See City of Canton , 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) ; Littell , 894 F.3d at 624. This "single-incident exception" is available where a plaintiff shows the risk of the constitutional violation would be "obvious" or "a highly predictable consequence" of a municipality's failure to train. See City of Canton , 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) ; Littell , 894 F.3d at 624. Because the single-incident exception is available "in only very narrow circumstances," it is "generally reserved for when an employee has received no training at all." Littell , 894 F.3d at 624 n.5, 626 (teachers received no training on the Constitution's restraints on searches); Brown , 219 F.3d at 453, 462 (police officer with violent history did not take state's mandatory program for law enforcement, received no description of job duties, and received no on-the-job training about excessive force).
Municipal liability will not attach merely because "a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained" or "an otherwise sound program has occasionally been negligently administered." City of Canton , 489 U.S. at 390–91, 109 S.Ct. 1197 ; Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council—President Gov't , 279 F.3d 273, 288 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting a difference between a complete failure to train and a failure to train "in one limited area"). This heightened standard of fault and causation exists to prevent federal courts from engaging "in an endless exercise of second-guessing employee-training programs," as federal courts are not only "ill suited" to evaluate a municipality's training program, but their doing so may violate the principles of federalism. Id. at 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197.
2. Case Law
In Hobart v. City of Stafford , 784 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. Tex. 2011), the district court permitted a failure-to-train claim to survive a motion to dismiss under the single-incident exception. Id. at 753–55. There, a mother called 911 and informed the dispatcher about her son's mental health crisis. See Hobart , No. 4:09-cv-3332, Dkt. No. 54 at 1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2010). She said her son was unarmed, not under the influence of any drug, and requested a crisis intervention team ("CIT"). Id. at 1, 3. Instead of sending a CIT, the dispatcher sent "a regular" patrol officer. Id. at 4.
Because the Hobart opinion ruled on a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, the opinion's fact section summarized both the plaintiffs’ allegations and the summary judgment evidence. See 784 F. Supp. 2d at 739–43. To ensure the Court's discussion is faithful to the motion-to-the-dismiss analysis, the Court will cite to the Hobart plaintiffs’ complaint, rather than the opinion's fact section.
After the son struck the officer, the two stood some distance from one another. Id. at 4. "Rather than using his non-lethal chemical spray or collapsible baton," the officer shot the son in the hip, which caused the son to collapse on the floor with his back to the officer. Id. The officer then fired five to six more shots and killed the son. Id. at 4–5. The complaint alleged the officer received no training "on how not to escalate a mental health situation into violence" and asserted a failure-to-train claim. Id. at 6, 11–12 (emphasis added). The complaint further averred the officer received no training on the proper use of non-lethal weapons, appropriate crisis intervention techniques, or how to limit the use of deadly force. Id. at 12.
The city filed a motion to dismiss, which the court denied. See 784 F. Supp. 2d at 753–55. The court found the plaintiffs plausibly alleged deliberate indifference under the single-incident exception, as (1) the plaintiffs alleged the police chief and others knew their training did not address intervention techniques for those with mental health issues, (2) it was obvious that officers would find themselves in situations where they had to use force, (3) it was obvious that officers would have to respond to mental health crises as part of their job, and (4) inadequate training on how to work with individuals experiencing mental health crises would inevitably lead to the wrongful killing of some of these individuals. See id. Thus, for the limited purpose of a motion to dismiss (as opposed to a motion for summary judgment), the Hobart court concluded the plaintiffs plausibly alleged deliberate indifference based on a single incident. Id.
Some district courts have not applied Hobart's reasoning. See, e.g., Cantu v. Austin Police Dep't , No. 1:21-cv-84, 2021 WL 5599648, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2021), R. & R. adopted , 2022 WL 501719 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2022) ; Ondrej v. City of San Antonio , No. 5:21-cv-281, 2021 WL 5416994, at *1, *5–6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2021) ; Rivera v. Cameron Cnty. , No. 1:19-cv-141, 2021 WL 8531607, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2021). In Cantu, Ondrej , and Rivera , the courts dismissed failure-to-train claims because the allegations suggested an officer received some training, rather than no training at all. See Cantu , 2021 WL 5599648, at *6 (suggesting officer received some training on the use of deadly force, but the training was nevertheless inadequate); Ondrej , 2021 WL 5416994, at *1, *5–6 (suggesting officer received some training, but needed additional training on how to properly respond to individuals experiencing mental health crises); Rivera , 2021 WL 8531607, at *6 (suggesting officer received some training, but received no training on the proper use of force). Thus, even though the Fifth Circuit has stated the single-incident exception is "generally" reserved for instances in which an officer has received no training at all, the courts in Cantu, Ondrej , and Rivera would hold that it is reserved only for such instances. See Littell , 894 F.3d at 624 n.5 ; Cantu , 2021 WL 5599648, at *6 ; Ondrej , 2021 WL 5416994, at *1, *5–6 ; Rivera , 2021 WL 8531607, at *6 ("Plaintiffs have failed to plead any facts showing the jail officials received no training whatsoever before being thrown into the job.").
The Fifth Circuit recently issued a precedential decision that seems to support Cantu , Ondrej , and Rivera . See Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty. , 994 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2021). In Hutcheson , a man under the influence of cocaine and methamphetamine died after police officers restrained him in the county jail. Id. at 478–79. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ failure-to-train claim based on the single-incident exception, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 481–83. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit articulated two statements in tension with one another: (1) "The single-incident exception is generally reserved for those cases in which the government actor was provided no training whatsoever," and (2) "Plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of [the single incident exception] because they do not allege that there was no training whatsoever." Id. at 483 (citations omitted) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). Notably, in Hutcheson , the plaintiffs conceded the county had protocols on how to restrain suspects safely and how to handle interactions with those who were mentally ill or under the influence of drugs. Id.
3. Whether the Degollados’ Failure-to-Train Claims Survive
Because the Degollados do not allude to other similar instances, they have not alleged deliberate indifference under the proof-by-pattern theory. Thus, the Court must decide whether the Degollados have plausibly pled deliberate indifference under the single-incident exception. They have.
First, the Court is persuaded by Hobart ’s reasoning. Second, the Court concludes Hutcheson does not require dismissal. The Court begins with Hobart .
Like the plaintiffs in Hobart , the Degollados allege the County failed to provide any training on how to respond to subjects with mental health crises or on crisis intervention techniques (Dkt. No. 1 at 6–7). Drawing from the Court's "judicial experience and common sense," as the Court is "require[d]" to do, it is unremarkable to conclude that officers must work with individuals experiencing mental health crises as part of their duties. See Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Sanchez v. Gomez , 283 F. Supp. 3d 524, 545, 547 (W.D. Tex. 2017). It is also easy to conclude that it is "obvious" and "highly predictable" that failing to train officers on how to work with mentally ill individuals—such as how to discern when a mentally ill person poses an immediate threat to others—will inevitably lead to the unlawful use of deadly force. See Hobart , 784 F. Supp. 2d at 753–55. As a district judge in the Western District of Texas noted:
Police officers are often asked to serve many roles in our community and involve themselves in many undesirable situations .... [O]ne of those situations involves interacting regularly with mentally ill individuals who may be disturbed, confused, aggressive, depressed, or delusional. If officers are given the authority to use deadly force when they fear for their safety, they must be given the tools to adequately discern when they are in danger and how to minimize and reduce that danger .... One of these tools is adequate training [on how to make initial contact with a mentally unstable individual, how to use deescalation tactics, how to minimize the use of deadly force, and how to respond to crisis intervention calls]. It is the City's responsibility that those armed with lethal force know how to use it appropriately[.]
Sanchez , 283 F. Supp. 3d at 545, 547.
Because it is plausible that the training deficiencies identified by the Degollados were obviously needed, allowing the Degollados’ failure-to-claims to survive does not flout the Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit's instruction to avoid an "endless exercise of second-guessing employee-training programs" in "one limited area." City of Canton , 489 U.S. at 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197 ; Cozzo , 279 F.3d at 288 ; see also Connick , 563 U.S. at 67, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (rejecting failure-to-train liability based on a single incident because the alleged defect was too "nuance[d]"); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth , 588 F.3d 838, 849 (5th Cir. 2009) (granting summary judgment because the city provided "extensive training on the use of force," but training did not specifically address "knee strikes"). Accordingly, at this early stage of litigation, the Degollados have plausibly alleged deliberate indifference under the single-incident exception.
As for Hutcheson , after carefully reviewing the decision, the Court concludes the case does not mandate dismissal. By stating the single-incident exception is "generally" reserved for instances in which an officer received no training at all, Hutcheson recognized some training, but a failure to train in an obviously needed area, could still establish deliberate indifference towards a constitutional right. 994 F.3d at 483. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has announced this rule on at least five occasions, and it has yet to be overruled. See Anokwuru v. City of Houston , 990 F.3d 956, 966 (5th Cir. 2021) ; Garza v. City of Donna , 922 F.3d 626, 638 (5th Cir. 2019) ; Peña v. City of Rio Grande City , 879 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir. 2018) ; Littell , 894 F.3d at 624 n.5 ; Hutcheson , 994 F.3d at 483.
Further, the facts alleged in Hutcheson are materially different from the facts alleged by the Degollados. In Hutcheson , the allegations conceded the officers received training on how to restrain suspects safely and how to work with those that were mentally ill or under the influence of drugs. Id. Accordingly, it was not plausible that the municipality's failure to provide "additional or different training" amounted to deliberate indifference. Id. In contrast, the Degollados allege the County provided no training on crisis intervention and working with mentally ill individuals. Hutcheson is therefore distinguishable.
The Court recognizes that other district courts would reach a different outcome. See Cantu , 2021 WL 5599648, at *6 ; Ondrej , 2021 WL 5416994, at *1, *5–6 ; Rivera , 2021 WL 8531607, at *6. But given the Fifth Circuit's repeated pronouncement that the single-incident exception is "generally" reserved for instances in which an officer received no training whatsoever, it appears contrary to binding precedent to dismiss a failure-to-train claim solely because the plaintiff concedes a police officer received some training, but the officer did not receive training in an obviously needed area from which a constitutional violation would be highly predictable. For example, the teachers in Littell presumably received some job-related training before teaching their first day of class. But the Fifth Circuit still allowed the failure-to-train claim to survive because the teachers received no training on the constitutional limits of searching a student's body. Id. at 624–25. Thus, the Court does not read precedent as requiring a plaintiff to allege "no training whatsoever before being thrown into the job" to avail himself of the single-incident exception. Rivera , 2021 WL 8531607, at *6.
In sum, the Court concludes the Degollados have plausibly alleged deliberate indifference under the single-incident exception. They have also plausibly alleged a failure-to-train claim against Zapata County. Zapata County's motion to dismiss this claim is therefore DENIED .
The Court notes that it does not reach this decision lightly. The Court is cognizant that "[a] municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train." Connick , 563 U.S. at 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350. Thus, in denying Zapata County's motion to dismiss, the Court "in no way ordains [the Degollados’] ultimate success." Littell , 894 F.3d at 627.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 7) is DENIED .
It is so ORDERED .