Opinion
Civil Action 20-5762
07-26-2022
JACLYN DEFREHN, Plaintiff v. TJX COMPANIES, INC., et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jaclyn Defrehn brings this action against TJX Companies, Inc. and Marmaxx Operating, Corp. (collectively “Defendants”) alleging that she suffered severe injuries after slipping and falling in a TJ Maxx store (the “Store”) due to Defendants' negligence.
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Because the Court finds there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants had notice of the hazardous condition that caused Plaintiff's fall, Defendants' motion will be denied.
As required at the summary judgment stage, the Court views the facts “in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party and draws “all reasonable inferences” in the party's favor. Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 174 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania. Defendants are Delaware corporations that maintain principal places of business in Massachusetts. Defendants operated the Store in Langhorne, Pennsylvania by and through their agents, servants, and/or employees.
The parties do not dispute that there is complete diversity and the amount in controversy requirement for this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) is satisfied in this case.
On December 16, 2018, Plaintiff slipped and fell on a clear, gel-like substance while shopping in the Store. As a result of the fall, she ruptured a vertebral disc and required two surgeries and physical therapy for back and leg pain.
Plaintiff testified in her deposition that a mop, bucket, and caution sign were present at the end of the aisle before she slipped and fell. See Defrehn Dep. 33:6-11, ECF No. 79-4. Plaintiff also recalled seeing footprints going through the spill and extending down the aisle. Id. at 35:10-18. However, Esteban “Joel” Arbelo, who manages the front of the Store and responded to Plaintiff's fall, testified that he retrieved a mop, bucket, and sign after Plaintiff had already fallen, and that he did not know if any other employee had gotten a sign or mop to clean the spill before his arrival. Arbelo Dep. 22:2023:5, ECF No. 79-4. Mr. Arbelo does not recall seeing footprints through the spill. Arbelo Dep. 23:6-10, ECF No. 79-4. Though Defendants' “Health and Safety Guidelines” required that managers take photographs of the aisle and spill to preserve evidence after a fall, see Am. Compl. Ex. A ¶ 10, ECF No. 52; neither Mr. Arbelo nor Store manager Lisa Rademan took any photographs following Plaintiff's fall. See Am. Compl. Ex. A, ECF No. 52; Arbelo Dep. 20:6-7, ECF No. 173 (admitting that he did not photograph the aisle conditions); Rademan Dep. 51:16-24, ECF No. 79-4 (same).
Shortly after Plaintiff's fall, Ms. Rademan filled out an incident report and sent it to Defendants' insurance carrier, Zurich Insurance Group (“Zurich”). On December 31, 2018, Zurich contacted Keith Martin, Defendants' Loss Prevention District Manager, and requested that he preserve all footage from 20 minutes before and after the fall. After receiving Zurich's request, Mr. Martin responded that no video existed of the incident. However, Mr. Martin later testified in his deposition that he “reviewed” the footage, but ultimately chose not to preserve it because he “didn't think it was relevant.” Martin Dep. at 20:21-23, 40:17-20, ECF No. 83-9. He further testified that the cameras would have captured when an employee removed the cleaning supplies from the janitor's closet. Id. 24:7-12.
Given Mr. Martin's testimony that, in his thirteen years of experience as loss prevention district manager, he frequently received requests from Zurich to preserve video in connection with injuries suffered in stores, he was on notice that Zurich would request the footage from Plaintiff's incident. See Martin Dep. at 17:7-22, ECF No. 83-9.
On October 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed her original complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, alleging that Defendants' negligence caused her fall and subsequent injuries. On November 18, 2020, Defendants removed the action to this Court.
On June 29, 2021, Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add allegations of spoliation based on Defendants' failure to preserve the surveillance footage. The Court granted the motion, and Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on July 20, 2021. Defendants later filed a motion to dismiss and strike the spoliation allegations, which the Court denied.
Defendants now seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for the Court's review.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence' of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there is a genuine issue of material fact.” Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Am. Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 581. “After making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997)). While the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, meeting this obligation shifts the burden to the nonmoving party who must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (1963)).
IV. DISCUSSION
Under Pennsylvania law, a claim for negligence requires proof of four elements:
The parties agree that Pennsylvania law applies to Plaintiff's negligence claim.
(1) a duty or obligation recognized by the law, requiring an actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks; (2) a failure to conform to the standard required; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting in harm to the interests of others.Felix v. GMS, Zallie Holdings, Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 430, 435 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (Robreno, J.) (citing Nw. Mut. Life Ins., Co. v. Babayan, 430 F.3d 121, 139 (3d Cir. 2005)).
While shopping at the Store, Plaintiff was an “invitee.” See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 (defining “invitee” to include a “person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public”). “‘Possessors of land owe a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable harm' . . . only when the possessor ‘knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitee.'” Felix, 827 F.Supp.2d at 436 (first quoting Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (Pa. 1983); and then quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343). A possessor owes a duty to an invitee when the possessor has “‘actual or constructive notice' of the dangerous condition.'” Id. (quoting Est. of Swift v. Ne. Hosp. of Phila., 690 A.2d 719, 722 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)).
Defendants' motion argues only that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that they had actual or constructive notice of the spill. In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' motion should be denied for two reasons: (1) Defendants' destruction of the surveillance footage amounts to spoliation of evidence; and (2) even setting aside Defendants' destruction of evidence, the evidence presented creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants had notice of the spill. The Court will consider each of Plaintiff's arguments in turn.
A. Spoliation
Plaintiff first argues that Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied due to Defendants' failure to preserve the surveillance video, which she avers would have established that Defendants had notice of the spill. She argues that this amounts to spoliation of relevant evidence that should preclude summary judgment in Defendants' favor. The Court agrees.
Given that Mr. Martin's deposition testimony suggests that the surveillance footage would have at least shown when Store employees removed the cleaning supplies from the supply closet, which is relevant to establishing whether Defendants had notice of the spill, and that Mr. Martin chose not to preserve that footage after viewing it, Plaintiff is entitled at this stage of the proceeding to the benefit of an adverse inference that the video was not preserved because it contained evidence unfavorable to Defendants. See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he trier of fact generally may receive the fact of the . . . nonproduction or destruction [of relevant evidence] as evidence that the party that has prevented production did so out of the well-founded fear that the contents would harm him.”); see also Charoff v. MarMaxx Operating Corp., No. 18-cv-4712, 2020 WL 1694484, at *5-*6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2020) (applying an adverse inference in a factually similar negligence case against the same Defendants in which, as here, Mr. Martin failed to preserve surveillance footage).
“Spoliation occurs where: the evidence was in the party's control; the evidence is relevant to the claims or defenses in the case; there has been actual suppression or withholding of evidence; and, the duty to preserve the evidence was reasonably foreseeable to the party.” Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
The Court will make a separate and independent determination whether an adverse inference is warranted at trial.
Applying this adverse inference, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim. See Charoff, 2020 WL 1694484, at *8 (denying a motion for summary judgment after applying an adverse inference due to Mr. Martin's failure to preserve surveillance footage); see also generally State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Steffen, 948 F.Supp.2d 434, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (Noting that to survive the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff “must point to sufficient probative evidence for a jury to find an act of spoliation . . . and to draw the inference derived from such an act.” (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
B. Notice
Even without an adverse inference, Plaintiff has presented evidence that Defendants had actual notice of the spill. As previously noted, she testified that she recalled seeing footprints through the spill and that there was a mop, bucket, and “wet floor” sign at the end of the aisle prior to her fall. Defrehn Dep. 33:4-12, 35:10-8, ECF No 79-4. Courts regularly find that footprints through a spill, standing alone, are not sufficient to preclude summary judgment. See, e.g., Viccharelli v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., No. 06-cv-4890, 2007 WL 4276657, at *2-*3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2007) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff despite skid marks through a spill); Felix, 827 F.Supp.2d at 439 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (granting summary judgment after finding that the presence of dust particles was insufficient to show constructive notice). However, where a plaintiff presents evidence that a party took remedial steps to address a hazardous condition, a reasonable juror may infer the condition existed and the party had notice of it. See, e.g., Bennett v. Dollar General, Inc., No. 19-cv-3214, 2020 WL 3964971, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2020) (determining a reasonable juror could find a store had actual notice of water on the floor given that employees placed a mat and “wet floor” sign near the entrance during snowy weather); Dalton v. Little Lion, No. 19-cv-5358, 2021 WL 1293424, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2021) (concluding that a reasonable juror could find a hazardous condition existed on the floor because a restaurant employee put out a caution sign).
Plaintiff's testimony that Defendants had placed a mop, bucket, and sign at the end of the aisle before her fall is evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants had actual notice of the spill. Mr. Arbelo's contradictory testimony that he retrieved these supplies after Plaintiff fell only creates a genuine dispute of material fact to be decided by the jury. The Court will accordingly deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied in full.
An appropriate order follows.