Opinion
No. 05-19-01508-CV
10-15-2020
ANTIONETTE DIONNE DECKER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ABIGAIL BRIANNA DECKER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CHRIS ALLEN DECKER, DECEASED, Appellants v. COLUMBIA MEDICAL CENTER OF PLANO, SUBSIDIARY, L.P. D/B/A MEDICAL CITY PLANO AND C/HCA, INC., Appellees
On Appeal from the 471st Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 471-00815-2019
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Myers, and Justice Nowell
Opinion by Justice Nowell
Appellants filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's order dismissing their claims against appellees under section 74.351 of the civil practice and remedies code. In a single issue, appellants argue the trial court erred by concluding the expert report they provided failed to show the expert was qualified to opine on the hospital's standard of care. We reverse the trial court's order and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
According to appellants' live pleading, Chris Decker collapsed at work and was transported to Medical City Plano on February 13, 2017. Following an echocardiogram, he was diagnosed with acute cardiac tamponade due to a syncopal episode and ectopic tachycardia.
In appellants' pleading, Medical City Plano is named as Defendant Columbia Medical Center of Plano Subsidiary, L.P. d/b/a Medical City Plano.
Dr. Timothy Dao evaluated Decker for acute cardiac tamponade and performed an ultrasound-guided pericardiocentesis to drain hemorrhagic fluid. Decker was admitted to the intensive care unit and a pericardial drain was inserted. Over the next two days, additional fluid was drained. On February 16, 2017, the drain was removed and Dao discharged Decker. At that time, the pericardial fluid cytology results were pending. Decker was instructed to follow-up with Dao in two weeks. However, Decker died on February 27, 2017, from cardiac tamponade.
Dr. Dao is not a party to this appeal.
Appellants sued Dao and appellees for negligence and alleged appellees were vicariously liable for Dao's acts and omissions. As required by section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, appellants timely served an expert report from and a curriculum vitae of Cam Patterson, M.D., M.B.A. Appellees objected to the report on several grounds, including Patterson's qualifications to render an opinion on a hospital's standard of care with respect to the allegations in his report. The trial court sustained appellees' objections to Patterson's qualifications and gave appellants a 30-day extension to cure the deficiencies.
After appellants timely filed an amended report, appellees filed a second motion to dismiss asserting the amended report again failed to demonstrate Patterson's qualifications to opine about the standard of care for a hospital. After sustaining appellees' objections to Patterson's amended report, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.
LAW & ANALYSIS
In their sole issue, appellants argue the trial court erred by concluding Patterson's expert report and curriculum vitae failed to show he was qualified to opine on the hospital's standard of care.
Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires claimants in a health care liability case to serve an expert report on each defendant. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351. The report must fairly summarize "the expert's opinions as of the date of the report regarding applicable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed." Id. § 74.351(r)(6). The purpose of this requirement "is to weed out frivolous malpractice claims in the early stages of litigation, not to dispose of potentially meritorious claims." Abshire v. Christus Health Se. Tex., 563 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2018).
The expert must establish that he is qualified to provide the report. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351(r)(5)(B). A person may qualify as an expert on the issue of whether a health care provider departed from the accepted standards of care only if the person:
(1) is practicing health care in a field of practice that involves the same type of care or treatment as that delivered by the defendant health care provider, if the defendant health care provider is an individual, at the time the testimony is given or was practicing that type of health care at the time the claim arose;Id. § 74.402(b); see also id. § 74.351(r)(5)(B) ("expert" means "with respect to a person giving opinion testimony regarding whether a health care provider departed from accepted standards of health care, an expert qualified to testify under the requirements of Section 74.402."). When determining whether a witness is qualified on the basis of training or experience, the court shall consider whether, at the time the claim arose or at the time the testimony is given, the witness:
(2) has knowledge of accepted standards of care for health care providers for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of the illness, injury, or condition involved in the claim; and
(3) is qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer an expert opinion regarding those accepted standards of health care.
(1) is certified by a licensing agency of one or more states of the United States or a national professional certifying agency, or has other substantial training or experience, in the area of health care relevant to the claim; and
(2) is actively practicing health care in rendering health care services relevant to the claim.Id. § 74.402(c).
We review a trial court's order on a motion to dismiss a health care liability claim based on the sufficiency of an expert's report for an abuse of discretion. See Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P. v. Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d 453, 461 n.37 (Tex. 2017) (trial court within its discretion to determine medical provider's training and prior experience qualified her to opine on the standard of care.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to guiding rules or principles. Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 539 (Tex. 2010).
Appellants served appellees with Patterson's expert report and curriculum vitae. Patterson is the Chancellor and Professor of Medicine (Cardiology) at the University of Arkansas School for Medical Sciences. He is a licensed physician actively practicing Adult Cardiology, and he is Board Certified in Cardiovascular Medicine. He presently is or previously has been licensed to practice in the following states: Georgia, Texas, North Carolina, New York, and Arkansas. He has published peer-reviewed articles and lectured on numerous cardiology-related topics. Patterson also has experience in hospital administration. He served as physician-in-chief of the UNC Center for Heart and Vascular Care, Executive Director of UNC McAllister Heart Institute, and Chief of the Division of Cardiology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Patterson's report states he is familiar with the applicable standards of care and is qualified to express opinions in this case based on his education, training, teaching, and experience, which includes more than twenty years of clinical practice and teaching as a Professor of Cardiology at multiple institutions of higher education and board certification in Cardiovascular Medicine. He is familiar with the evaluation and treatment of cardiac patients with clinical presentations similar to Decker.
Patterson's report and curriculum vitae demonstrate he is qualified to opine about the standard of care applicable to appellees. He is licensed to practice medicine in several states, board certified in cardiovascular medicine, actively engaged in the practice of his cardiology, and is a Professor of Cardiology. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.402(c). Additionally, he has experience in hospital administration, and his background includes "the development, implementation and enforcement of safe, appropriate and efficacious cardiovascular care pathways as well as guidelines and policy development for optimal interventional clinical care for hospital cardiovascular treatment."
Patterson's report and curriculum vitae establish that he has knowledge of accepted standards of care for health care providers for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of the illness, injury, or condition involved in the claim, and he is qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer an expert opinion regarding those accepted standards of health care. See id. § 74.402(b)(2), (3). Based on his expert report and curriculum vitae, we conclude Patterson has the training and experience to provide an opinion about a hospital's policies and procedures with respect to the treatment of cardiology patients, and the trial court abused its discretion by concluding Patterson did not meet the requirements of section 74.402. See Tex. Children's Hosp. v. Knight, 604 S.W.3d 162, 171-72 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. filed) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.402(c); Mem'l Hermann Healthcare Sys. v. Burrell, 230 S.W.3d 755, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.)). We sustain appellants' sole issue.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's order granting appellees' second motion to dismiss, and we remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
/Erin A. Nowell/
ERIN A. NOWELL
JUSTICE 191508F.P05
JUDGMENT
ANTIONETTE DIONNE DECKER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ABIGAIL BRIANNA DECKER, INDIVIDUALLY, ET AL., Appellants V. COLUMBIA MEDICAL CENTER OF PLANO, SUBSIDIARY, L.P. D/B/A MEDICAL CITY PLANO AND C/HCA, Appellees On Appeal from the 471st Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 471-00815-2019.
Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell. Chief Justice Burns and Justice Myers participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the trial court's Order Granting Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal. Judgment entered this 15th day of October, 2020.