Opinion
IP 01-1885-C-B/S
July 17, 2002
Entry on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Defendants City of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Police Department ("IPD"), and Chief of Police Jerry L. Barker move to dismiss claims brought against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. Defendants contend principally that Plaintiffs have failed to state an Equal Protection claim under the U.S. Constitution and that IPD Chief Barker is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss..
Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs cannot maintain a suit for damages under Article I, section 23 of the Indiana Constitution and that IPD is not a proper party to this lawsuit. These contentions do not require substantive analysis because they are effectively resolved by Plaintiffs' Response to the Motion to Dismiss. First, Plaintiffs emphasize that they seek only declaratory and injunctive relief for their state law claims "because they are not entitled to monetary damages for a violation of the Indiana Constitution." Ps' Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 18. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs' claims could be construed as seeking monetary damages for such alleged violations, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Second, Plaintiffs "concede that IPD may be dismissed from this suit because Defendant City of Indianapolis is ultimately liable for IPD's unconstitutional enforcement of G.O. 8.00." Id. at 19. Therefore, because the City remains a named defendant in this matter, and because Plaintiffs concede that IPD may be dismissed from this action, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss claims against IPD is GRANTED.
Defendants do not address in the Motion to Dismiss, and so we do not consider, Plaintiffs' apparent Equal Protection claim arising from the exclusion of non-resident officers from consideration for special duty positions within IPD.
Factual Background
Lieutenant Jeffrey Decker and Sergeant Michael Duke are currently, and were at all times relevant to this lawsuit, IPD officers residing in Hendricks County, Indiana. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12. Officer James Trythall is currently, and was at all times relevant to this action, an IPD officer residing in Hamilton County, Indiana. Id. ¶ 13. Effective June 18, 2001, IPD enacted General Order 8.00 ("G.O. 8.00") regarding authorized uses of official vehicles, also known as the "take-home policy":
On March 14, 1996, IC 36-8-4-2 was enacted. This statute allows officers to maintain their residence outside of Marion County in the seven contiguous counties.
Officers who moved their residence outside of Marion County after March 14, 1996, and new officers residing outside of Marion County are not eligible to participate in the take-home car program. Officers not participating in the take-home car program will utilize a district or branch pool vehicle for the duty assignment.
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Officers who live outside Marion County presently assigned to any special duty position authorized by the Chief of Police will be allowed to park their department vehicle at their residence. These units have special equipment and communications needs which require a department vehicle in order to be most effective.
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Officers who live outside of Marion County will not be allowed to apply for any special duty position requiring a department vehicle. Officers who are presently assigned to such a position and decide to move out of Marion County will be removed from that special duty position. The special duty positions covered by this directive will be determined by the Chief of Police and will be available for review in the Planning and Research office.
G.O. 8.00, §§ II(E), II(F). For officers who participate in the take-home program, the expenses of owning and maintaining their vehicles are paid by IPD. Id. ¶¶ 35, 53. Moreover, although Indiana Code § 36-8-3.5-13 does not rely on residency as a factor in rating a municipal police officer for promotion, the terms of G.O. 8.00 preclude non-resident IPD officers from consideration for certain special duty positions that entail the use of a department vehicle. Because Plaintiffs reside outside Marion County, they are ineligible to participate in or receive any of the benefits related to the squad car take-home program. Compl. ¶ 33.
Standard of Review
A party moving for dismissal under 12(b)(6) must show that "the pleadings themselves fail to provide a basis for any claim for relief under any set of facts." Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 161 F. Supp. d 948 (S.D.Ind. 2001), quoting Ed Miniat, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Group Inc., 805 F.2d 732, 733 (7th Cir. 1986). Under this analysis, we examine only the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the lawsuit. Autry v. Northwest Premium Servs., Inc., 144 F.3d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998); Zoghlin v. Renaissance Worldwide, Inc., 1999 WL 1004624, at *3 (N.D.Ill. 1999). Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff cannot establish any set of facts that would entitle him to the relief sought. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Mosley v. Klincar, 947 F.2d 1338, 1339 (7th Cir. 1991). In applying this standard, we treat all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and we construe all inferences that reasonably may be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Szumny v. American Gen. Finance, 246 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 2001); Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2001).
1. Equal Protection claim
The parties agree that, because G.O. 8.00 implicates neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, the policy must withstand only rational basis scrutiny in order to be upheld. Under this standard of review, a statute is presumed constitutional, and "a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); see also Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 424 (7th Cir. 2000). "[T]he State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative `any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.'" Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2001), quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 320. The deferential rational basis standard "cannot defeat the plaintiff's benefit of the broad Rule 12(b)(6) standard." Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 459 (7th Cir. 1992). However, in order to overcome a 12(b)(6) motion under rational basis scrutiny, a plaintiff must allege facts "sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality that applies to government classifications." Id. at 460.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants failed to offer any legitimate justification for the take-home policy until filing this Motion to Dismiss. Under the applicable legal standards, however, this allegation is of no consequence. The Equal Protection Clause does not require policymakers to articulate any reason for their actions, F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992). Nor does it require record evidence of a legitimate purpose. Id.; Panama City Medical Diagnostic, Ltd. v. Williams, 13 F.3d 1541, 1546 (7th Cir. 1994). Any legitimate justification, even a hypothesized one, will suffice. Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 902 F.2d 521, 522 (7th Cir. 1990); Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the burden rests on the party challenging the policy to "negative every conceivable basis which might support it," Beach Communications, 507 U.S. at 315, quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973), not simply those justifications proffered by the policymaker. We recognize, and Plaintiffs do not directly dispute, that increasing the visibility of IPD's presence in the community in which it must operate is a valid and legitimate law enforcement objective.
Plaintiffs also contend that the Defendants' failure to suggest a justification for G.O. 8.00 put Plaintiffs at a pleading disadvantage by not allowing them the opportunity to address the justification in their Complaint. We disagree. As discussed at length above, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that no reasonable basis exists to justify the policy, not simply refute the justification offered by the policymaker.
Plaintiffs contend that G.O. 8.00 cannot possibly further the goal of increasing the police presence in Marion County or any other legitimate law enforcement objective. Rational basis scrutiny requires that the means employed by the government need only "bear a rational relation to some legitimate end." Eby-Brown Co., LLC. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Agriculture, ___ F.3d ___, 2002 WL 1456611, at *3 (7th Cir. Jul. 8, 2002), quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). A policy may withstand review even if it "`is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'" Heller, 509 U.S. at 320-21, quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); see also City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 606 (7th Cir. 1999). The Seventh Circuit has noted that, under rational basis review, courts should "not invalidate a statute unless it draws distinctions that simply make no sense." U.S. v. Jester, 139 F.3d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiffs offer several arguments attacking the effectiveness of the take-home policy. First, Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent that officers keep their vehicles garaged at their homes in order to comply with directives to keep their vehicles in good condition, the policy cannot lead to greater visibility. Second, because the policy permits officers to drive their IPD vehicles in Marion County and the seven contiguous counties, it is not necessarily tailored to serve Marion County. Relatedly, Plaintiffs contend that by allowing officers to use IPD vehicles to travel outside Marion County to other employment opportunities, so long as they generally benefit Marion County residents, the policy admits that police presence outside Marion County may benefit Marion County residents. Third, Plaintiffs argue that in Beech Grove, Lawrence Township or Speedway, the City's interest in visibility is not furthered because those areas also enjoy the presence of active township police departments, so IPD's take-home policy carries no added benefit. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that allowing non-resident officers to participate in the take-home program would advance the City's goal of increasing the police presence in Marion County.
Plaintiffs also argue that the City applies G.O. 8.00 inconsistently, in that several non-resident IPD officers and civilian employees, including the grant writer, special unit officers, fleet coordinator, and crime watch specialist, currently participate in the take-home program. Plaintiff further states that these officers "are more visible to the citizenry than the officers precluded from participating in the take-home program." These allegations do not assist Plaintiffs in fending off this Motion to Dismiss. The policy states that "[o]fficers who live outside Marion County presently assigned to any special duty position authorized by the Chief of Police will be allowed to park their department vehicle at their residence." Plaintiffs have not alleged that these officials' positions have not been authorized by Chief Barker to participate in the take-home program. Therefore, their participation does not suggest inconsistent enforcement of the policy.
Notwithstanding these arguments, we find that the distinction drawn by G.O. 8.00 between resident and non-resident officers is rationally related to the goal of increasing police visibility within Marion County. Regardless of the traffic patterns or means of storage for vehicles assigned to resident officers, it is reasonable to assume that the presence of marked IPD vehicles in residential areas of Marion County will enhance the police presence in these areas. Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that allowing resident officers to park their vehicles at home and drive them from their homes to work or other activities will increase IPD's visibility in the community. The fact that other law enforcement agencies, such as township police departments, may maintain a presence in certain portions of Marion County does not mean that the presence of IPD vehicles in these same areas would have no added benefit from the City's perspective. Finally, the fact that other strategies might also (or, for argument's sake, more effectively) advance the City's goal of increased police visibility does not undermine the constitutionality of the policy currently in place.
Plaintiffs also misquote Defendants as arguing that allowing non-resident officers to participate in the take-home program will decrease police visibility within Marion County. P's Surreply to D's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2. No such argument appears in any of the filings. Defendants merely contend that allowing non-resident officers to participate in the program "would not further this interest to an appreciable degree." Brief in Support of D's Motion to Dismiss at 5. This is an example of the type of legislative choice "the courts are compelled to accept, . . . even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends." Heller, 509 U.S. at 320-21.
In short, none of Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the effectiveness of G.O. 8.00 or the existence of more effective means to heighten the police presence in Marion County undermines the rationality of G.O. 8.00. It is far from nonsensical to conclude that by allowing resident officers to take vehicles to their Marion County homes the visibility of IPD officers in Marion County will be enhanced. Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to suggest that G.O 8.00 fails to meet rational basis scrutiny. Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Equal Protection claim is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs also contend that G.O 8.00 conflicts with Indiana statutory provisions that prohibit residency from being considered as a factor in rating non-resident IPD officers for promotion or advancement and that G.O. 8.00 impedes non-resident officers from obtaining promotions, because by the terms of the policy, non-resident officers are precluded from applying for a certain subset of jobs that include the use of an IPD vehicle. However, the Complaint does not suggest any connection between non-resident officers' inability to acquire a subset of specified "special duty" positions and any instance of IPD's failure to promote those officers. Plaintiffs do not plead any facts to suggest a link between those particular positions and the possibility of future advancement within IPD or even that IPD has a policy or custom of failing to promote non-resident officers. Even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, this alleged impact is not sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs' pleading burden under the rational basis standard, nor does it undermine our conclusion as to the policy's constitutionality.
2. Qualified Immunity
Defendants contend that IPD Chief Jerry Barker is entitled to qualified immunity from suit in his individual capacity, because the facts alleged on the face of the complaint fail to make out a claim for constitutional injury. Qualified immunity is available only to officials with discretionary or policymaking authority, including police officers, when sued in their individual capacities under § 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2000). Essentially, this defense is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Officials acting under qualified immunity are not subjected to suit "unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights then known to a reasonable officer." Ulichny v. Merton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 686, 706 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh Circuit has noted that the issue of qualified immunity "should be decided at the earliest possible stage," and so in cases where "the plaintiff may have stated a claim, . . . [but] not one `upon which relief can be granted' a court may properly address this purely legal question under Rule 12(b)(6)." Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 765 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2000), citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).
The primary inquiry in a qualified immunity analysis is "whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged." Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155 (2001). Here, Plaintiffs have fashioned an Equal Protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but, as explained in detail above, have failed to satisfy their pleading burden under the applicable legal standard. Because we dismiss the federal claims against all Defendants, including Chief Barker, we need not determine whether Chief Barker enjoys qualified immunity from suit in this matter in his individual capacity.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Equal Protection violations stemming from the enactment and enforcement of IPD's G.O. 8.00, the official vehicle take-home policy. Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth in detail above, we find that 1) Plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to support an Equal Protection claim analyzed under rational basis scrutiny; 2) Plaintiffs concede that IPD may be properly dismissed as a party to this action; 3) Plaintiffs do not seek damages for alleged violations of the Indiana Constitution, but only declaratory and injunctive relief; and 4) because Plaintiffs' Equal Protection claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim, we need not consider whether Chief Barker is entitled to qualified immunity in this action. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
It is so ORDERED this day of July, 2002.