Opinion
No. 01-8320-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS/BANDSTRA
November 1, 2001
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT IV OF PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count IV of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (DE 7) filed on April 20, 2001. The Motion has been filly briefed and is ripe for review. The Court has reviewed the entire record and is otherwise fully informed of the premises.
Background
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"). In October, 2000, Plaintiff had taken some time off work to undergo surgery due to an illness. When she attempted to return to work, Defendants asked her not to come unless she had a doctor's note certifying that she was ready to return to work. She returned to work on January 3, 2000 with a note from her doctor stating that she was permitted to perform light duty work with no heavy lifting. Plaintiff claims that "Defendants perceived her as disabled and refused to allow her to work" in violation of the Americans with Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Plaintiff further claims that Defendant James Gooth [sic] phoned the police to have Plaintiff removed from the workplace, that she was confined and arrested-handcuffed and booked by the police. Defendant James Gooth [sic] also made an "intentional harmful and offensive contact to the person" of Plaintiff. This suit followed.
¶¶ 5-24.
The Court assumes that Plaintiff's allegations contain a scrivner's error and that she returned to work on January 3, 2001.
Legal Standard
The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is predicated on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion to dismiss is appropriate when it is demonstrated "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102(1957). For the purpose of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all facts alleged by the plaintiff are accepted as true. Hishon v. King Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232-33, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). Regardless of the alleged facts, however, a court may dismiss a complaint on a dispositive issue of law. Marshall County Bat of Ethic. v Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).
Discussion
In Count IV of her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim from damages for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED"). Florida law recognizes a cause of action for IIED. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985). A plaintiff must establish the following four elements for a prima facie case of IIED: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the Defendant; (2) an intent to cause, or reckless disregard to the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) severe emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff; and (4) that the conduct complained of caused the plaintiff's severe emotional distress. See Hart v. United States, 894 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990). It is well settled that a claim which fails to satisfy the prima facie pleading requirements associated with it must be dismissed.
Of the above four elements, the first one is dispositive in this case. In order to sustain an action for IIED, a plaintiff must allege conduct so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Metropolitan, 467 So.2d. at 278-79. Florida courts routinely apply this rigid test and recognize the tort "only in the most outrageous circumstances." Habelow v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 389 So.2d 218, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Whether the conduct complained of is sufficiently outrageous and extreme to withstand a motion to dismiss is purely a question of law for the Court to decide. Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone, 983 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993). A complaint that does not contain a sufficient basis for a court to find that the behavior complained of is egregious enough to meet this rigid standard must be dismissed. See id. at 1575; Martin v. Baer, 928 F.2d 1067, 1073 (11th Cir. 1991).
In the employment context, courts have been particularly hesitant to sustain IIED claims. See id. at n. 7. Vance was a case in which a black female employee sued her employer for racial discrimination. She also brought a claim for IIED. Some of her allegations included the following: (1) that a rope "noose" was hung over her work station; (2) that she was suspended in a situation where similarly situated white employees were not; and (3) that her work was sabotaged. See id. Based on these allegations, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Vance plaintiff did not establish extreme and outrageous conduct of a level of severity required to sustain a claim for IIED.
Upon a review of the Complaint, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's Responses thereto, and the case law evaluating the circumstances which will or will not support a finding of extreme and outrageous behavior, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege facts that establish the requisite level of extreme and outrageous behavior by Defendants. The Complaint alleges that Defendant knew Plaintiff had recently had surgery, "perceived her as disabled," called the police, had her removed from the workplace, and made some unspecified intentional harmful and offensive contact with Plaintiff. These facts do not support a finding of extreme and outrageous behavior to support an IIED claim. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss does not cure this deficiency. Rather, in her response, Plaintiff simply asserts that "the third-amended complaint alleges specific facts to support intentional infliction of emotional distress by the Defendants." Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at ¶ 2.
As Plaintiff quite rightly indicated, the Court must ignore allegations that contain no more than opinions and legal conclusions. Id. at ¶ 7 (citing South Florida Water Management District v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 409 n. 10(11th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff does not specify facts sufficient to sustain a claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count IV of Plaintiff's Third-Amended Complaint (DE 7) be and is hereby GRANTED.