Although we also review discovery orders and sanctions for an abuse of discretion, we review de novo the question of whether a trial court weighed the appropriate factors when issuing a discovery order.See Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321, 327 n. 8 (Alaska 1984). Progressive sought appointment of a discovery master pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 53.

Charles responds that: (1) Elizabeth waived these defenses by failing to raise them in the superior court; (2) even if Washington law applied, the out-come would be the same because "Washington applies the same constructive trust principles"; and (3) even if Washington's three-year statute of limitations applied, his petition was timely because the limitations period did not begin to run until 2003 when his siblings refused to quitclaim their interests in the Washington property. Elizabeth cites Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321, 328 (Alaska 1984) (holding that because questions of law lie with a judge, it was error to refer to a master to decide whether a fraudulent conveyance of real property occurred). Elizabeth cites Rausch v. Devine, 80 P.3d 733, 742 (Alaska 2003) (discussing existence and extent of equitable interests in land governed by law of land's situs) and Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(3) (providing three-year limitation period for action on oral contract or liability).

This requirement of knowing waiver requires that waiver can be found only where the requisite participation occurs after the party is informed that the judge before whom he or she is appearing is the judge permanently assigned to hear the case or is assigned for trial.Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage Sch. Dist., 631 P.2d 67, 73 (Alaska 1981); see also Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321, 324 (Alaska 1984). Staso did not waive his peremptory challenge by failing to object to the State's motion to reassign Judge Woodward. He cannot have known that Judge Woodward would be the permanently assigned judge until she was assigned and until any objection to her assignment was ruled upon.

DesJarlais's case presented no factual questions that could have been resolved by a jury; thus DesJarlais's argument concerning his right to a jury trial is without merit. See, e.g., Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1245 (Alaska 2007) (noting that factual questions should be resolved by a jury); Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321, 328 (Alaska 1984) (noting that “the responsibility for deciding questions of law lies with the judiciary”). D. The Superior Court Did Not Improperly Refuse To Order The Attorneys And Court To Produce Proof Of Their Law Licenses.

DesJarlais's case presented no factual questions that could have been resolved by a jury; thus DesJarlais's argument concerning his right to a jury trial is without merit. See, e.g., Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1245 (Alaska 2007) (noting that factual questions should be resolved by a jury); Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321, 328 (Alaska 1984) (noting that "the responsibility for deciding questions of law lies with the judiciary"). D. The Superior Court Did Not Improperly Refuse To Order The Attorneys And Court To Produce Proof Of Their Law Licenses.

Id. In Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321 (Alaska 1984), we stated that "[t]he effect of a peremptory disqualification of a master is that the master loses the capacity to proceed further." Id. at 325.

Because no objection was made to the initial order of appointment, Gonzales has waived his right to challenge the initial order on appeal. The motion to discharge, of course, is properly presented on appeal. However, in view of its timing, denial of the motion was clearly proper. See Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321, 326-327 (Alaska 1984) (holding that a party objecting to the propriety of the superior court's reference to a master "should do so prior to or at the time of the reference," or, if such objection is unfeasible, should do so before the judge at the earliest possible opportunity). E. Attorney's fees and costs.

Objections to the referee are unavailing. See, e.g., Hayes v. Foodmaker, Inc., 634 F.2d 802, 803 (5th Cir. 1981); First Iowa Hydro Electric Cooperative v. Iowa-Illinois Gas Electric Co., 245 F.2d 613, 628 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871, 78 S.Ct. 122, 2 L.Ed.2d 76 (1957); Ramsey v. Home Mortgage Co., 47 F.2d 621, 636 (E.D.N.C. 1931); Magnaleasing, Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 428 F. Supp. 1039, 1045 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd. 563 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1977); Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321, 326 (Alaska 1984). Here, appellant could have made a motion to a judge prior to the April hearing or, at the very least, immediately thereafter.