Opinion
C/A 7:23-cv-05018-TMC-KFM
02-16-2024
Keymo Dawkins, Plaintiff, v. Alan Wilson, Christopher Runyun, Don A. Thompson, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee awaiting adjudication of his civil commitment proceedings, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights (doc. 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee awaiting adjudication of his civil commitment proceedings under the South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVP Act”), filed this action seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants (doc. 1). By orders filed October 24, 2023, November 21, 2023, and December 28, 2023, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (docs. 8; 13; 17). Although the plaintiff has still failed to submit all of the proper form documents, the plaintiff substantially complied with the court's order to bring his case into proper form. Nevertheless, upon review of the plaintiff's complaint, the undersigned recommends that it be dismissed.
Detainees in a county detention center awaiting civil commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predators Act have a custody status most resembling that of other pretrial detainees. Tylerv. Byrd, C/A No. 4:16-cv-00400-MGL-BM, 2017 WL 875859, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 839535 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2017), aff'd C/A No. 17-6325 (4th Cir. July 25, 2017).
ALLEGATIONS
Of note, this matter concerns pending SVP Act proceedings involving the plaintiff in the Spartanburg County Court of Common Pleas. See Spartanburg County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2023CP4200954) (last visited January 25, 2024).
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges violations of his rights due to an illegal seizure, ineffective counsel, violations of the due process clause, and violations of his equal protection rights (doc. 1 at 4, 5). The plaintiff alleges that on December 20, 2020, he was released on home detention to be followed by probation and that he then violated his probation (id. at 6). He contends that he was given time served for the probation violation and his probation was supposed to be terminated (id. at 7). The plaintiff's alleged injuries include violations of his rights and malicious prosecution (id. at 8). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages and to have his state charges expunged (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Younger Abstention
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger abstention may apply in noncriminal proceedings when three elements are met: (1) ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Brown-Thomas v. Hynie, 441 F.Supp.3d 180, 219 (D.S.C. 2019) (citing Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Hum. Rels., 28 F.3d 1392, 1398 (4th Cir. 1994)). Here, the plaintiff's complaint, as noted above, seeks damages and injunctive relief relating to an SVP Act civil commitment proceeding in the Spartanburg County Court of Common Pleas (which remains pending at this time) (see doc. 1). As such, the first criterion is met as the SVP Act proceeding remains pending at this time. The second criterion is also met because the South Carolina Supreme Court has upheld the SVP Act and its procedures as a constitutionally valid exercise of the State's power to protect its citizens from sexually violent predators. See Tylerv. Byrd, C/A No. 4:16-cv-00400-MGL-BM, 2016 WL 4414834, at *3 (D.S.C. July 27, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 4374982 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2016) (citing In re Luckabaugh, 568 S.E.2d 338, 348 (S.C. 2002)). Third, the plaintiff has the ability to raise his objections to matters in the SVP Act civil commitment proceedings in the Spartanburg County Court of Common Pleas as well as in the South Carolina appellate courts. Additionally, the plaintiff has failed to alleged “extraordinary circumstances” justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where ‘extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm.”). As such, Younger abstention applies, and this action should be dismissed.
Failure to State a Claim
Even aside from Younger, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. As an initial matter, to the extent the plaintiff's complaint can be construed as requesting that his state criminal convictions be expunged and he be released from the Detention Center, such relief may only be obtained in a habeas action, not in a § 1983 case. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (complaint or petition challenging the fact or duration of confinement should be construed and processed as a habeas corpus petition, while a complaint or petition challenging the conditions of confinement should be construed and processed as a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that release from prison is not a remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983” (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488-90)). Therefore, the plaintiff may not seek release from custody in this action.
Heck v. Humphrey
To the extent the plaintiff seeks expungement, dismissal of, or money damages relating to his prior criminal proceedings in the Spartanburg County General Sessions Court (doc. 1 at 8), his claims are barred by Heck. In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages for imprisonment in violation of the Constitution, the imprisonment must first be successfully challenged. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. The Court stated:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. (footnote omitted); see also Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (the preclusive rule of Heck extended to § 1983 claims challenging procedural deficiencies which necessarily imply the invalidity of the judgment). This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff has not indicated which criminal charges he seeks to have expunged; however, judicially-noticed, publicly-available online records for the Spartanburg County General Sessions Court indicate that since 2015, the plaintiff has pled guilty to more than 20 criminal charges - and none of those charges indicate a favorable termination. See Spartanburg County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2015A4210200775, 2015A4210200776, 2015A4210202451, 2016A4210101879, 2016A4210101880, 2016A4210101881, 2016A4210102374, 2018A4210102187, 2018A4210102190, 2018A4210102191, 2018A4210102203, 2018A4210102204, 2019A4210203095, 2019A4210205225, 2020A4210204624, 2021A4210101486, 2021A4210101488, 2021A4210101489, 2021A4210101490, 2021A4210101491, 2021A4210202309, 2021A4210202310, 2021A4210203189) (last visited January 25, 2024). As such, to the extent the plaintiff seeks money damages or to have prior convictions expunged from his record, his claims are barred by Heck at this time, because he has not received a favorable termination on them.
Prosecutorial Immunity
Two of the defendants named in this action, Alan Wilson, Esq., and Christopher Runyun, Esq., are representing the state of South Carolina in the SVP Act civil commitment proceeding, and are entitled to dismissal in this action because they are immune from suit. In South Carolina, the Attorney General and his assistants (including Mr. Wilson and Mr. Runyun) function as prosecutors in criminal appeals, postconviction relief actions, and in proceedings under the SVP Act; thus, these two defendants have absolute immunity for their prosecution-related activities. Hendricks v. Bogle, C/A No. 3:13-cv-02733-DCN, 2013 WL 6183982, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 25, 2013) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings such as criminal trials, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, pretrial motions hearings, and ancillary civil proceedings. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 267-71 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Michau v. Warden, C/A No. 2:11-cv-00286-RMG, 2011 WL 4943631, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2011) (finding an assistant attorney general involved in prosecution of plaintiff in a state court SVP Act proceeding immune from suit). As such, the plaintiff's claims against Mr. Wilson and Mr. Runyun are subject to summary dismissal.
Not a State Actor
The plaintiff's claims against Don Thompson, Esq., his attorney in the SVP Act commitment proceedings, are subject to summary dismissal because Mr. Thompson, Esq., is not a state actor. As noted, the plaintiff's claims against Mr. Thompson are based upon his representation of the plaintiff during the pending SVP Act proceeding in the Spartanburg County Court of Common Pleas (see doc. 1). It is well-settled that “[a]nyone whose conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the state' can be sued as a state actor under § 1983.” Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 383. To determine whether state action is present, no single factor is determinative and the “totality of the circumstances” must be evaluated. See Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 341-43. However, purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 310. The law is well-established that defense attorneys, whether appointed or retained, are not state actors. See Goodyear v. Hornung, C/A No. 2:07-cv-276-FtM-29SPC, 2007 WL 1362735, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2007) (dismissing § 1983 claim because “[p]laintiff's privately retained defense counsel and his paralegal are not state actors”); see also Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 n.13 (1981); Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no state action under § 1983, even where the plaintiff's attorney was court-appointed). As such, Mr. Thompson is entitled to summary dismissal because he is not a state actor.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).