Opinion
6:22-cv-00774-TMC-JDA
03-17-2022
Jarell Dawkins, Plaintiff, v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Does 1-10, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jarell Dawkins (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, files this action against Experian Information Solutions, Inc., and Does 1-10. This matter is before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned concludes that Defendant Does 1-10 should be summarily dismissed from this action.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on March 9, 2022. [Doc. 1.] In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc., (“Experian”) under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (“FCRA”). [Id. at 1.] Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that Experian has failed to provide him the appropriate disclosures under the FCRA and failed to conduct an appropriate investigation to verify and/or delete inaccurate information in Plaintiff's credit file. [Id. at 2.] Plaintiff seeks money damages under the FCRA. [Id. at 12-13.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. This Court possesses the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307S08 (1989); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”) (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua sponte, and it exists independent of the ‘defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules.”); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining the court may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without issuing a summons or following other procedural requirements). Accordingly, “[t]he present Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous.” Trawick v. Med. Univ. of S.C., No. 2:16-cv-730-DCN-MGB, 2016 WL 8650132, at *4 (D.S.C. June 28, 2016) (citing Carter v. Ervin, No. 0:14-cv-00865-TLW-PJG, 2014 WL 2468351, *3 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014); Mayhew v. Duffy, No. 2:14-cv-24-RMG, 2014 WL 468938, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2014) (exercising inherent authority to summarily dismiss a frivolous case where pro se plaintiff filed new case seeking to vacate a previously-adjudicated case)).
Plaintiff is a non-prisoner litigant and is proceeding pro se. Further, Plaintiff has paid the full filing fee. As such, this Court does not review the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Nevertheless, the Court has the inherent authority to review the pro se Complaint in accordance with the standards set forth above.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that, if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but the Court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
Upon review of the Complaint, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has asserted viable claims against Experian to survive initial review. As such, Plaintiff's Complaint against Experian will be authorized for service of process.
On the other hand, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts or claims against Defendant Does 1-10. Therefore, Defendant Does 1-10 should be dismissed from this action without issuance and service of process for the reasons below.
Regarding unknown “Doe” defendants, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed:
The designation of a John Doe defendant is generally not favored in the federal courts; it is appropriate only when the identity of the alleged defendant is not known at the time the complaint is filed and the plaintiff is likely to be able to identify the defendant after further discovery.Chidi Njoku v. Unknown Special Unit Staff, 217 F.3d 840, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). The Fourth Circuit has further explained:
While we recognize the necessity for allowing John Doe suits in the federal courts, we are not unaware of the right of the district court to manage its docket and the danger of permitting suits with unnamed parties to remain on the docket unprosecuted. Thus, if it does not appear that the true identity of an unnamed party can be discovered through discovery or through intervention by the court, the court could dismiss the action without prejudice.Schiff v. Kennedy, 691 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted). One District Court has evaluated claims asserted against unknown defendants in the Fourth Circuit in light of Iqbal and Twombly as follows:
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence seems to indicate that complaints naming unidentified parties as defendants should be dismissed. ... On its face, a complaint asserting allegations against a person whose identity is not known cannot do more than simply offer naked assertions and speculative facts. Where a party is not known or identified, a cause of action simply does not yet exist. No relief can be granted against an unidentified party. Additionally, federal courts maintaining jurisdiction over actions against John Doe defendants may very well be unconstitutional. Without an identified defendant, can a “case or controversy” truly exist under Article III? . . . Allowing lawsuits against John Doe defendants to proceed is contrary to the Supreme Court's determination that “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.Price v. Marsh, No. 2:12-cv-05442, 2013 WL 5409811, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 25, 2013) (discussing the applicability of Iqbal and Twombly to claims against unknown defendants) (final alteration added).
Here, the only mention in the Complaint of Defendant Does 1-10 is Plaintiff's cursory assertion that they “are currently unknown to [him]” and that the “Complaint will be amended when facts are discovered regarding unknown parties.” [Doc. 1 at 4.] The Complaint is otherwise wholly devoid of any allegations about the unknown Doe Defendants. As such, not only has Plaintiff failed to identify the Doe Defendants, he has failed to include any allegations about them or even assert that they exist. Plaintiff's failure to present any factual allegations concerning the Doe Defendants is fatal to his claims against them. Further, because the Complaint contains no information about the Doe Defendants or their role in the events giving rise to this action, their true identities cannot be ascertained through discovery. Simply put, Plaintiff has failed to present any allegations of wrongdoing against Defendant Does 1-10 and any claim against them is frivolous as their existence and/or conduct is not apparent from the face of the Complaint. See Goodwin v. Beasley, No. 1:09-cv-151, 2010 WL 2539795, at *6 (M.D. N.C. June 18, 2010) (“[A] John Doe's involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct must be clear from the complaint in order for the claim to be permissible.”), Report and Recommendation adopted as modified by 2011 WL 238640 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 24, 2011). Thus, they should be dismissed. See Lodhi v. Sepehri, No. 1:15-cv-425, 2016 WL 6892104, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2016) (dismissing John Doe defendant where complaint contained no allegations of wrongdoing and noting that “frivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Keno v. Doe, 74 F.R.D. 587, 588 (D.N.J. 1977) (dismissing complaint against a John Doe defendant as frivolous and noting “by naming ‘John Doe' as defendant, there is no specific person to be served with process and called upon to answer and defend, ” which “would rob any proceeding on [plaintiff's] complaint of any semblance of due process, and would convert it into an ex parte action”), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978).
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss Defendant Does 1-10 from this action without issuance and service of process. The action remains pending against Experian.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).