Opinion
No. 4-517 / 03-1920.
September 29, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joel E. Swanson, Judge.
Judy Davis appeals from the judgment of the district court dismissing her petition for writ of certiorari and affirming the Webster County Board of Adjustment's grant of a variance to Becker Florists, Inc. AFFIRMED.
James Fitzgerald, Fort Dodge, for appellant.
Barbara Hering and Sarah Kouri of Hopkins Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, and Timothy Schott, Fort Dodge, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Zimmer, JJ.
Judy Davis appeals from the judgment of the district court dismissing her petition for writ of certiorari and affirming the Webster County Board of Adjustment's grant of a variance to Becker Florists, Inc. Finding no errors at law, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Becker Florists, Inc. (Becker) owns two adjoining lots, 11 and 12, and Davis owns the adjoining lot 10 of a subdivision known as the Becker Addition in Webster County. A 1997 Webster County Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance) classified the Becker Addition and subject lots as Residential District (R-1). A minimum lot width of 100 feet is required in an R-1 district.
Sometime prior to January 24, 2003, Becker decided to put one duplex on lot 11 and one duplex on lot 12. The R-1 classification allows for duplexes. However, both lot 11 and lot 12 have a lot width of only 89.5 feet. Consequently, because these lots did not meet the 100 foot requirement of the Ordinance, Becker filed an application for variance with the Webster County Planning and Zoning Administrator. On February 24, 2003, in accordance with the Open Meetings Law, the Webster County Board of Adjustment (Board) held a public hearing on Becker's request for a variance. Davis attended the hearing and lodged the following objections: 1) the road in front of the Beckers' property was in poor condition, 2) there was not enough space for a septic tank and leachfield to service the proposed duplexes, 3) water pressure would decrease if residents of the proposed duplexes were allowed to use the current well, and 4) the conditions required for granting a variance, as set forth in the Ordinance, had not been satisfied.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board granted the variance to Becker. Davis filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Iowa Code section 414.15 (2003) in the District Court for Webster County. The petition alleged that Davis had been aggrieved in the enjoyment, use and value of her property by the Board's decision to grant the variance. Davis further alleged that the Board's decision was illegal because: 1) it was issued without written findings; 2) it was not supported by substantial evidence; 3) it was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious; and 4) the Ordinance's requirements for granting a variance were not complied with.
On October 23, 2003, a hearing on Davis's writ of certiorari was held in the district court resulting in the court dismissing Davis's petition and affirming the Board's grant of a variance. Davis appeals.
II. Scope of Review
"A writ of certiorari shall only be granted . . . where an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, is alleged to have exceeded proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401. A district court's judgment on certiorari is thus limited, "to sustaining the proceedings below, or annulling the same wholly or in part, to the extent that they were illegal or in excess of jurisdiction." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1411. Therefore, "certiorari is an action at law to test the legality of an action taken by a court or tribunal acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity." Petersen v. Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 580 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Iowa 1998). "An illegality is established if the board has not acted in accordance with a statute; if its decision was not supported by substantial evidence; or if its actions were unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious." Perkins v. Board of Supervisors of Madison County, 636 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted).
In a certiorari proceeding in a zoning case the district court finds the facts anew on the record made in the certiorari proceeding, which will include the return to the writ and any additional evidence offered by the parties. Baker v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Johnston, Iowa, 671 N.W.2d 405, 412 (Iowa 2003) (citations omitted), see also Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354, 359 (Iowa 1928) (noting that "[i]f all the material facts appear in the record, or are not disputed, or only questions arising upon the record are presented, the taking of evidence [by the district court] is not necessary"). However, the district court is not allowed to decide the case anew; illegality of a challenged board action is established only if the district court's findings of fact do not provide substantial support for the board decision. Id., Board of Adjustment of the City of Johnston, Iowa, 671 N.W.2d at 412. If the district court's finding of fact leave the reasonableness of the Board's decision open to a reasonable difference of opinion, the district court may not substitute its decision for that of the Board. Id.
Our review of a district court's ruling on certiorari is limited to corrections of errors at law. See W.G. McKinney Farms, L.P. v. Dallas County Board. Of Adjustment, 674 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Iowa 2004). The question we consider on appeal is whether the correct legal procedure and standards were followed by the Board in arriving at its decision; and that the "Board's decision is supported by competent and substantial evidence." See Petersen, 580 N.W.2d at 793 (citation omitted); see also Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Dallas County, 675 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Iowa 2004) (reviewing court is "bound by the district court's findings if supported by substantial evidence"). "Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings." Petersen, 580 N.W.2d at 793 (citation omitted).
III. Issues
On appeal, Davis argues that the district court erred when it found the Board acted legally by granting a variance to Becker. Davis also contends the Board did not make written factual findings as it was required to do, so that its decision was not supported by substantial evidence. A. Findings of Fact
Davis further asserts the Board did not apply the correct standard in finding that denial of the requested variance would be a hardship to Becker, but this argument was not raised in her petition for writ, only minimally referenced in her trial brief and the trial court did not rule on this issue other than to state that "the board of adjustment acknowledged the potential hardship to the applicants in denying the variance." Thus, we may not address this issue as it was not "presented to and passed upon by the district court." Metz v. Amoco Oil Co., 581 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1998).
Davis first asserts the Board did not comply with the requirements of the Ordinance because it failed to make written findings of fact in granting the variance. "Boards of adjustment shall make written findings of fact on all issues presented . . . sufficient to enable a reviewing court to determine with reasonable certainty the factual basis and legal principles upon which the board acted." Citizens Against the Lewis and Clark Landfill v. Pottawattamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 277 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Iowa 1979). Written Minutes were kept, and later approved, for the February 24, 2003, public hearing at which the variance in question was discussed and granted. Recorded in the Minutes were the reason for the variance request, the points of opposition to this variance raised by Davis, as well as the reasons why the Board voted to approve the variance.
Moreover, the Minutes formally adopted the report of the Zoning Administrator. This report provided a breakdown of the facts applicable to the Becker variance request, including that the lots in question were platted before 1997 so that they did not meet the later width requirement of the Ordinance. The report noted that none of the other lots in the development met the 100 foot width requirement either and three duplexes already existed in the development. The Zoning Administrator concluded the report by recommending approval of the variance request. We therefore find that the Minutes and the incorporated Zoning Administrator's report satisfy the requirement that the Board make "written findings of fact" in compliance with the rule adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court in Citizens Against the Lewis and Clark Landfill, 277 N.W.2d at 925. Consequently, the district court did not err in accepting the Minutes of the Board, as providing the written findings of its decision.
B. Variance Procedure and Substantial Evidence
Section 5.3 of article 18 of the 1997 Webster County Zoning Ordinance provides the procedure for considering and granting a variance. First, a written application must be submitted demonstrating that certain factors justifying a variance exist. See Webster County, Iowa, Zoning Ordinance, art. 18, § 5.3.1 (1997). Second, upon proper notice, a public hearing must be held. See id. § 5.3.2. The Board must next make a finding that the "reasons set forth in the application justify granting of the variance, and that the variance is the minimum variance that will make possible the reasonable use of the land, building, or structure." Id. § 5.3.3. The Board must also make a finding that "the granting of the variance will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this Ordinance, and will not be injurious to the neighborhood, or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare." Id. § 5.3.4.
Davis does not contend that Becker's variance application was insufficient, nor does she contest that a public hearing was held upon proper notice. Thus, the only procedural issue before us on appeal is whether the Board made the findings required to avoid violation of the Ordinance, and consequently whether substantial evidence supports the findings made. Substantial compliance with a zoning ordinance is all that required to avoid violation of the ordinance. Pemberton v. Hardin County Bd. of Adj., 241 Iowa 1356, 1359, 440 N.W.2d 901, 902 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989) (citing Granger v. Board of Adjustment, 44 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 1950)).
The reasons for granting the variance set forth in the application are: Becker did not cause the special circumstances, a denial of the variance would deprive Becker of rights enjoyed by other properties in the zoning district, and granting the variance would not be a special privilege. The Minutes of the February 24, 2003, public hearing indicate Board member Kesterson expressed his opinion that he "believes the application meets the criteria for variance." Immediately following this statement, Kesterson moved to approve the variance, and the Board members present approved the variance unanimously. As discussed above, the Minutes of the hearing reflect the consideration given the request. Therefore, substantial evidence exists demonstrating that the Board did find, as required by the Ordinance, that the reasons set forth in the application justify a variance. Moreover, the Ordinance provides the Board with the option of prescribing "appropriate conditions and safeguards in conformity with this ordinance." Webster County, Iowa, Zoning Ordinance, art. 18, § 5.3.6. The Board did exactly this and imposed three conditions on the grant of the variance. These conditions ensure the variance was "the minimum variance that will make possible the reasonable use of the land, building, or structure."
The Minutes of the February 24, 2003, hearing indicate that the Board approved the variance subject to the following conditions: "1) Comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws pertaining to water and sewer systems in the subdivision known as Becker's Subdivision. 2) Comply with water and road maintenance agreement between homeowners in Becker's Subdivision and Becker Florists Inc. 3) Maximum number of rental units per lot shall be two."
The Board also specifically discussed the effect granting the requested variance would have on the neighborhood and general welfare. In so doing, the Board specifically found that the road will continue to have some problems, but that "[e]ffort has been shown by the Beckers that they intend to take care of road." Additionally, the conditions imposed will operate to protect the neighborhood and public from any potential negative effects of the variance.
In reviewing the Board's grant of a variance, the district court specifically noted the Board's consideration and acknowledgement of the following evidence:
1. That Lots 11 and 12 of the subdivision were the only two remaining lots without structures.
2. All 14 numbered lots in the subdivision were less than 100 feet in width and previous variances had allowed construction.
3. Concerns of Ms. Judy Davis of the road conditions, septic tanks, water pressure were addressed with acknowledgement of agreements between the applicant and other residents of the subdivision.
4. The variance granted was subject to compliance with Federal, State, and local law pertaining to water and sewer systems, that the applicant maintain the water and roads, as agreed to.
5. The subdivision itself was platted in 1967, long before the County Zoning Ordinance became effective.
6. The Board of Adjustment acknowledged the potential hardship to the applicants in denying the variance.
Moreover, the Minutes of the February 24, 2003, Board meeting evidence the Board's review of the Zoning Administrator's Report, which carefully considered the land-use implications of the request, and recommended granting the variance. Therefore, we find the Board substantially complied with the findings requirements mandated by section 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 of article 18 of the 1997 Webster County Zoning Ordinance. Consequently, the district court did not err in finding that the Board "has acted legally in its actions to grant a variance to Becker Florists, Inc." and that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
IV. Conclusion
In reviewing the Board's actions, the district court found that the Board acted legally in its actions to grant a variance to Becker and that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Because the Board followed the applicable legal procedure and because substantial evidence supported this decision, the district court did not err in denying the relief requested in Davis's petition.