Opinion
No. 00C-06-045-JRJ
Submitted: July 26, 2002
Written Decision: October 17, 2002
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Negligent Credentialing Claim — GRANTED C.A. No. 00C-06-045-JRJ
John P. Kopesky, Esquire, Sheller, Ludwig Badey
Christian J. Singewald, Esquire, White and Williams
Dennis D. Ferri, Esquire, Morris, James, Hitchens Williams, LLP
Dear Counsel:
I was pleased to hear the parties have resolved this matter. I thank counsel for their exemplary efforts in this regard. The following is my written opinion memorializing my "bench" ruling on July 30, 2002, granting summary judgment on the plaintiffs' negligent credentialing claim.
Background
This wrongful death medical negligence suit arises from emergency room ("ER") care provided to decedent, Vincent James Davis, Sr., by defendant, Jamie E. Roques, M.D., on February 9, 1999 at St. Francis Hospital ("St. Francis"). In a complaint filed in this Court on June 6, 2000, plaintiffs allege that St. Francis was liable based on the theory of respondeat superior, or apparent ostensible agency. On, August 2, 2001, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint asserting additional allegations, including a negligent credentialing claim against St. Francis. On July 11, 2002, St. Francis filed a motion for partial summary judgment on this issue. St. Francis contends that while plaintiffs have offered testimony to establish St. Francis' failure to follow the St. Francis Department of Emergency Medicine Delineation of Clinical Privileges ("Delineation") was a violation of St. Francis' own standards, plaintiffs have presented no expert testimony establishing a causal connection between the deviation and the alleged injury. In response, the plaintiffs argued that causation is established by the fact that St. Francis violated its by-laws and, as a proximate result of that violation, Dr. Roques was in the ER on February 9, 1999, the day the decedent sought emergency medical care. In other words, according to the plaintiffs, if St. Francis had not deviated from its own standards, Dr. Roques would not have been in the ER and would not have treated the decedent. Plaintiffs point out that it was St. Francis, not the decedent, who had control over the selection of Dr. Roques as the attending physician. Plaintiffs also point out that Dr. Roques was the only physician on duty in the St. Francis Hospital ER on the morning of February 9, 1999. Thus, the plaintiffs maintain that a jury may properly find St. Francis' violation of its own policies was a contributing factor in the death of the decedent.
Facts
On November 24, 1998, St. Francis Hospital's Board of Directors approved the appointment and clinical privileges of Dr. Roques, an internist, as "Provisional Staff, Department of Emergency Medicine, Class II." After six months, Dr. Roques was granted "Class II" privileges. To obtain "Class II" privileges, a physician must:
[b]e qualified for appointment in the Department of Emergency Medicine on completion of three years postdoctoral education in an ACGME or AOA approved Emergency Medicine residency program or other acceptable training or experience that leads to eligibility for board certification by the American Board of Emergency Medicine by any of their special application categories or the American Osteopathic Board of Emergency Medicine.
On February 9, 1999, the decedent presented at the St. Francis ER with complaints of a burning epigastric pain radiating to the chest. The decedent advised ER personnel that he had a history of hypertension and that he smoked approximately thirty (30) cigarettes per day. A basic work up was performed, including an electrocardiogram (EKG) and various other tests. Dr. Roques examined the decedent and diagnosed non-cardiac chest pain, esophagitis and diabetes. He instructed the decedent to follow-up with a family practitioner. It is undisputed that at the time decedent presented at the ER, Dr. Roques was not board-eligible in emergency medicine.
The next day, Dr. Baag examined the decedent. Apparently, relying on Dr. Roques' diagnosis that the decedent's chest pain was "non-cardiac" in etiology, Dr. Baag diagnosed the decedent with dyspepsia and new onset Type II diabetes mellitus. Dr. Baag referred the decedent to a nurse for instruction on diabetes management.
On February 13, 1999, the decedent collapsed at home and was later pronounced dead at St. Francis. An autopsy performed on February 14, 1999 revealed that the decedent died as a result of an acute massive myocardial infarction.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment may only be granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Wilson v. Joma, Inc., 537 A.2d 187, 188 (Del. 1998).
Oliver B. Cannon Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 312 A.2d 322, 325 (Del.Super.Ct. 1973).
In Cleotex Corp. v. Catrett, the United States Supreme Court held that where the non-moving party bears the ultimate burden of proof, summary judgment may be granted if the moving party can demonstrate a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case. "In such a situation there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." The Delaware Supreme Court has applied this standard to the plaintiff's burden of presenting expert testimony to establish liability in a medical malpractice case.
477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Id. at 322-23.
See, e.g., Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991), cert denied, 504 U.S. 912 (1992).
Pursuant to title 18, section 6853 of the Delaware Code, before liability can be found in a medical negligence action, plaintiffs bear the burden of presenting expert medical testimony as to both an alleged deviation from the applicable standard of care and a causal connection between the deviation and the alleged injury.
DEL. CODE ANN tit. 18, § 6853 (2002); Burkhart, 602 A.2d at 59.
Discussion
St. Francis claims it is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' negligent credentialing claim because plaintiffs have failed to offer proof concerning the "essential element of causation." Before liability can be established in a medical malpractice action, plaintiff must present expert medical testimony "as to the alleged deviation from the applicable standard of care in the specific circumstances of the case and as to the causation of the alleged personal injury or death." In the absence of an applicable statutory exception or competent medical testimony establishing negligence, defendant is entitled to summary judgment."The law is clear that [in a medical malpractice action] an expert medical opinion must be provided not only for liability but for causation." The plaintiffs argue that this Court should apply the "substantial factor" definition of proximate cause. This, the Court cannot do. In Culver v. Bennett, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to the "but for" definition of proximate cause, not the "substantial factor" test. The "but for" definition is summarized as follows: "The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it." Therefore, in accord with section 6853, the plaintiff must present expert testimony to show that the defendant's action breached a duty of care in a manner that proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.
§ 6853; Russell v. Kanaga, 571 A.2d 724, 732 (Del. 1990).
588 A.2d 1094, 1097 (Del. 1991).
Id. (citing Prosser and Keeton on Torts 266).
As noted above, the plaintiffs argue that causation is established by the fact that St. Francis violated its policy by granting Class II privileges to Dr. Roques, which in turn, placed Dr. Roques in the ER, and thus, in a position to serve as the decedent's attending physician. This broad theory of negligence suggests that Dr. Roques was not qualified to be in the ER at all, however, the plaintiffs have identified no expert medical witness to testify that St. Francis' failure to adhere to the Delineation was a proximate cause of the decedent's death. And, in fact, the plaintiffs' experts admitted in deposition that Dr. Roques' training in internal medicine rendered him competent to treat patients in an ER. The plaintiffs' ER expert, John Oldham, M.D., a board certified internist like Dr. Roques, testified, "I would be impeaching myself if I said that having internal medicine training would make [Dr. Roques] not qualified [to treat Mr. Davis in the emergency room]. I have internal medicine training and I do feel I am qualified to treat chest pain." When questioned as to whether "the hospital's violation of its, bylaws, either in allowing Dr. Roques to work there or in allowing him to be alone in the emergency room [had] any cause and effect relationship with the quality of care?" Dr. Oldham replied, "[t]he quality of care is a totally different issue than the credentialing issue" When pressed, Dr. Oldham admitted he was not opining to a reasonable degree of medical probability that there was "any cause and relationship between the two." In addition, the plaintiffs' expert on issues of hospital administration, Arthur Kaufman, M.D., testified that, although based on the hospital's bylaws, Dr. Roques should not have been in the ER, he would not opine that "but for Dr. Roques' treating Mr. Davis, Mr. Davis would not have died." Thus, neither Dr. Oldham nor Dr. Kaufman opined that St. Francis' failure to abide by the Delineation was a proximate cause of the decedent's death.
Compare Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Boyd, No. C.A.96C-05-122-WTQ, 2000 WL 303308, at *5 (Del.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 755 A.2d 390 (Del. 2000) (holding that the testimony of one expert physician, whose expertise in credentialing was suspect, was insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact in order to survive a motion for summary judgement).
Deposition of John Oldham, M.D., May 1, 2002 at 89 (Hereinafter "Oldham Dep. at ___").
Id. at 95-96.
Id.
Deposition of Arthur M. Kaufman, M.D., June 26, 2002 at 87 (Hereinafter "Kaufman Dep. at ___").
Conclusion
Without competent medical testimony establishing that the breach 2of the Deliniation proximately caused the decedent's death, i.e., that but for the breach, the decedent would not have died, the Court must grant summary judgment on the credentialing claim. For the foregoing reasons, St. Francis' Motion for Partial Summary Judgement is GRANTED.