Opinion
D081009
10-18-2023
DONNA DAVIS, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SECOND ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION CHURCH OF GOD IN CHRIST, SAN DIEGO, Respondent.
Donna K. Davis, in pro. per., for Appellant. Dillon Miller Ahuja & Boss, Scott Allan Miller, and Robert C. Harvey for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. 37-2022-00000880-PR-LA-CTL Julia C. Kelety, Judge. Affirmed.
Donna K. Davis, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Dillon Miller Ahuja & Boss, Scott Allan Miller, and Robert C. Harvey for Respondent.
BUCHANAN, J.
Donna K. Davis, in propria persona, appeals from an order of the probate court sustaining a demurrer to her second amended petition seeking an order directing conveyance or transfer of real property from the Southern California Second Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Church of God in Christ, San Diego (Church) to the Estate of Billy Joyce Davis. We conclude that Donna has forfeited any claim of error by failing to make any legal argument or cite any legal authority in her briefs, failing to address the legal grounds for the probate court's ruling, and relying on factually unsupported assertions without citation to the record. Accordingly, we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Billy Joyce Davis died in November 2017. She was survived by nine children, including Donna. Donna sought appointment as administrator of her mother's estate.
In 2022, Donna filed three successive petitions in probate court for an order directing conveyance or transfer of real property located on 47th Street in San Diego ("Property"). The petitions each sought an order directing transfer of the Property from the Church to the Estate of Billy Joyce Davis (Davis Estate). Each of the three petitions asserted different theories of ownership.
A. Original Petition
Donna's original petition filed in February 2022 asserted that under a 2019 court-approved settlement agreement in a quiet title action, the Property was supposed to be transferred to Mason Memorial Church of God (Mason Memorial) but was instead transferred to the Church, in violation of the settlement agreement. The petition further alleged that Mason Memorial was a registered corporation, and that the Davis Estate was the sole owner of Mason Memorial and therefore the rightful owner of the Property.
The Church filed an objection to the petition, along with a copy of Mason Memorial's articles of incorporation and other exhibits. The articles of incorporation stated: "This corporation is a religious corporation and is not organized for the private gain of any person. It is organized under the Non- profit Religious Corporation Law exclusively for religious purposes." They further stated: "The property of this corporation is irrevocably dedicated to religious purposes and no part of the net income or assets of this organization shall ever inure to the benefit of any director, officer, or member thereof, or to the benefit of any private persons."
The Church's objection to Donna's petition asserted that because Mason Memorial was a non-profit religious corporation which did not issue shares of stock, and was not owned by any private person, the decedent could not have had any ownership interest in Mason Memorial as a matter of law.
The Church's objection further asserted that (1) Mason Memorial became the record title holder of the Property in 1980; (2) after resigning from Mason Memorial in 2015, the decedent executed and recorded a grant deed claiming to be the vice president of Mason Memorial and purporting to transfer title to the Property to American Lending for no consideration; (3) a 2018 quiet title action eventually resulted in a settlement agreement and transfer of the Property from American Lending and Mason Memorial to the Church; and (4) the Church subsequently filed a 2021 unlawful detainer action against Donna, which resulted in her removal from the Property.
B. First Amended Petition
Ten days after the Church filed its objection to the original petition, Donna filed a first amended petition (FAP). This time, she did not allege that either the decedent or her estate owned any interest in Mason Memorial. Instead, she alleged that the decedent directly owned the Property because: (1) Mason Memorial transferred the Property to Glorious Church of Jesus Christ, Inc. (Glorious Church) in 1980; (2) Glorious Church thereafter transferred the Property to the decedent's husband, Marvin Davis; and (3) the decedent survived her husband and died intestate.
In anticipation of a demurrer to the FAP, counsel for the Church sent a meet-and-confer email to Donna's counsel. Among other things, the email pointed out that the 1980 grant deed transferred the Property from Glorious Church to Mason Memorial, not the other way around as alleged in the FAP.
C. Second Amended Petition
Six days after receiving the meet-and-confer email, Donna filed a second amended petition (SAP). She no longer alleged that Glorious Church acquired the Property from Mason Memorial, or that the decedent's husband acquired the Property from Glorious Church. Instead, she alleged for the first time that there were really two different Mason Memorial entities: (1) the nonprofit religious corporation Mason Memorial Church of God in Christ of San Diego, Inc., and (2) Mason Memorial Church of God in Christ in San Diego, Inc., a separate fictitious business entity solely owned by the decedent and her spouse that was never registered as a corporation. According to the SAP, Glorious Church in 1980 transferred the Property to the latter entity owned by the decedent and her husband, not to the nonprofit religious corporation. The SAP further alleged that the Davis Estate was the sole owner of the Property as a result of adverse possession by the decedent.
D. Demurrer to Second Amended Petition and Ruling
The Church filed a demurrer to the SAP on grounds including the sham pleading doctrine.
On August 3, 2022, the probate court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Citing Smyth v. Berman (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 183, 195, the court noted that under the sham pleading doctrine, the plaintiff filing an amended complaint may not omit damaging allegations made in previous complaints without explanation. Unless the plaintiff provides a plausible explanation, the trial court will take judicial notice of the harmful allegations and disregard the new and contrary allegations. The sham pleading doctrine prevents abuse of process that would arise if parties could circumvent prior adverse rulings simply by omitting damaging allegations without explanation.
The probate court concluded that "the sham pleading doctrine prevents Petitioner from alleging that there are two separate Mason Memorial entities." The court reasoned: "The SAP's allegations of two separate entities contradict the allegations in the Petition and the FAP wherein Petitioner claimed an interest in the Property through a single Mason Memorial entity that was a corporation. Petitioner does not explain in the SAP or her opposition to the demurrer why she changed the alleged facts. However, the reason for the change is apparent. Petitioner filed the FAP after Respondent filed an opposition to the Petition asserting that Petitioner cannot claim ownership of Mason Memorial or its assets. Petitioner filed the SAP after Respondent provided her with a Grant Deed recorded on September 2, 1980 . . ., which shows that Glorious Church of Jesus Christ transferred the Property to Mason Memorial, not the other way around as alleged in the FAP."
Relying on the allegations of the original petition and FAP, the probate court concluded that Donna's claim that the decedent owned the Property through a Mason Memorial entity separate from the nonprofit religious corporation necessarily failed. The court further concluded that Donna had failed to adequately allege the elements of adverse possession of the Property by the decedent.
Donna appeals from the order of August 3, 2022.
DISCUSSION
Donna was represented by counsel in the probate court, but is representing herself on appeal. Her two-page opening brief relies on unsupported factual assertions without citations to the appellate record and includes no discussion of either the sham pleading doctrine or adverse possession. She cites no legal authorities and makes no effort to show how the probate court erred in its application of the sham pleading doctrine or the elements of adverse possession. Nor does her brief mention or rely on the operative allegations of the SAP that the decedent purportedly owned the Property through a Mason Memorial entity separate from the nonprofit religious corporation. We therefore conclude that Donna has forfeited any challenge to the probate court's ruling as to the SAP.
On appeal, a reviewing court begins with a fundamental presumption that the trial court's judgment or orders are correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is the burden of the party challenging a judgment or order to affirmatively demonstrate error. (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125.)
"In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record." (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286287.) The appellant must present argument and authority on each point made. (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 544, fn. 8; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) A reviewing court is "not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants." (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.)" 'It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness.'" (Flores v. Department of Corrections &Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 204.) "When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as forfeited." (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075.)
We are mindful that Donna is self-represented on appeal, and that a party who proceeds without the assistance of legal counsel may encounter unique challenges not encountered by those who employ the services of competent legal counsel. But the basic rules of appellate procedure apply equally to self-represented litigants: "A self-represented party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants having attorneys." (Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574; see Burkes v. Robertson (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 334, 344-345 ["The same burdens are imposed uniformly and equally on all appellants, and self-represented parties are' "held to the same restrictive procedural rules as an attorney."' "].)
Because Donna has failed to cite any legal authority or make any legal argument addressing the dispositive grounds relied on by the probate court for sustaining the Church's demurrer to the SAP, she has forfeited any claim of error. The "failure of appellant to advance any pertinent or intelligible legal argument . . . constitute[s] an abandonment of the [claim of error]." (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1117.) Donna has also failed to cite to the record and relied on factually unsupported assertions, including new allegations of bribery and collusion by other family members that were not included in any of her petitions below. On appeal, we do not consider facts or contentions not supported by citations to the record. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [briefs must "[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears"].)
Even if we were to reach the merits, however, we would find no error in the probate court's ruling. Under the sham pleading doctrine, in the absence of any explanation by the plaintiff for pleading new facts that contradict the allegations made in an earlier pleading, the court may disregard the new facts and read into the amended complaint the allegations of the earlier pleading. (American Advertising &Sales Co. v. Mid-Western Transport (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 875, 879.) As explained by the probate court, the SAP's allegations of ownership through another previously unmentioned Mason Memorial entity separate from the religious corporation contradicted the allegations of the original petition and FAP, in which Donna asserted that the Davis Estate had an interest in the Property through a single Mason Memorial religious corporation. Because Donna provided no explanation for these inconsistent allegations, the probate court properly disregarded them and sustained the Church's demurrer.
Finally, we note that Donna appears to be asserting a fourth theory of ownership for the first time in her reply brief. She argues: "In 1977, the Superior Court of California, San Diego County awarded Elder Marvin Davis Sr. the property in Davis v. Taylor (1977) (case #393405)....Since 1977, the Davis family and no others have owned the disputed property." (Italics added.) None of Donna's three petitions below mentioned a 1977 judgment or asserted that the Davis family and no others had continuously owned the Property since 1977. On the contrary, all three of Donna's petitions alleged that the decedent and/or her husband acquired ownership of the Property after 1977 through either a Mason Memorial entity or Glorious Church. Specifically, her SAP alleged that Glorious Church in 1980 transferred the Property to the Mason Memorial fictitious business entity owned by the decedent and her husband. An appellant may not assert a new theory of liability for the first time in the reply brief (Fretland v. County of Humboldt (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1489), particularly not when it is just the last in a string of other contradictory theories.
DISPOSITION
The order of August 3, 2022 is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J., RUBIN, J.