Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). When considering a due process claim under § 1983, the Court must first decide whether the defendants deprived the plaintiff of a liberty or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment "because the requirements of procedural due process only apply when such protected interests are implicated."Davis v. Rao, 982 F. Supp. 2d 683, 688 (E.D. Va. 2013), aff'd, 583 F. App'x 113 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.

"The first question in any procedural due process analysis is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment because the requirements of procedural due process only apply when such protected interests are implicated." Davis v. Rao, 982 F. Supp. 2d 683, 688 (E.D. Va. 2013), aff'd, 583 F. App'x 113 (4th Cir. 2014). Without a protected liberty or property interest, a fired employee fails to state a claim for deprivation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

While tenure itself is a protected property interest, "[t]enure review procedures, without more, do not give rise to a protected property interest." Davis v. Rao, 583 F. App'x 113, 114 (4th Cir. 2014). The "without more" presumably refers to the possible situation left open in Siu v. Johnson, where "the University's procedures and their application over time had given rise to an institutional 'common law of re-employment' under which the interest created by the probationary appointment had been elevated to something firmer than a mere 'unilateral expectation.'"

Second, Plaintiff points to the termination procedures as further evidence to rebut the presumption of at-will employment. However, a grievance procedure itself does not create a property interest, nor does it rebut the at-will presumption. Grant, 2019 WL 4858317, at *4 (citing Davis v. Rao, 982 F.Supp.2d 683, 689 (E.D. Va. 2013), aff'd, 583 Fed.Appx. 113 (4th Cir. 2014) ("The Fourth Circuit has ... indicated that at-will employees have no protectable property interest in procedure itself.")). Moreover, the grievance procedures Plaintiff cites, even when viewing them as incorporated into her contract, still do not rebut the at-will presumption.

Indeed, the only Fourth Circuit cases located by the court that discuss a de facto denial or constructive denial do so when a party fails to act on an application for an extended period of time. See Scoggins v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Ass'n, 718 F.3d 262, 272 (4th Cir. 2013) ("Under these circumstances, the HOA's failure to take any action for such an extended period operated as a constructive denial of the ATV request."); Davis v. Rao, 982 F. Supp. 2d 683, 694 (E.D. Va. 2013), aff'd, 583 F. App'x 113 (4th Cir. 2014) (calling the defendant's decision about the plaintiff's tenure position a "de facto denial" because the defendant did not respond to the plaintiff's appeal after being denied tenure); Piotrowski v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2013 WL 247549, at *9 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2013) ("Failing to act on an application for credit is a de facto denial."). And again, none of these cases relate to land-use decisions made by a local municipality.

Generally, a Due Process claim first requires that a governmental action have deprived individual(s) of life, liberty, or property. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); see also Davis v. Rao, 583 F. App'x 113, 114 (4th Cir. 2014 ("To state a procedural due process claim, [Plaintiff] must allege that: (1) she had a 'constitutionally cognizable life, liberty, or property interest;' (2) Defendants deprived her of that interest; (3) and 'the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate.'" (citation omitted)). However, although "[w]hen protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount," "the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite."

To state a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law. See Davis v. Rao, 583 F. App'x 113, 114 (4th Cir. 2014). Assuming arguendo that plaintiff has an identified property interest in the outcome of the lawsuit, it is plain that plaintiff has not alleged a violation of due process.