In applying this cardinal rule, it is necessary to look to the entire will, and the testator's intent must be ascertained from what the testator has written into the will and not from what some interested party supposes that the testator intended to do. Burdick v. Giloin, 325 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tenn. 1959); Davis v. Price, 226 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tenn. 1949). Where a testator expresses a controlling or predominant purpose, it is the duty of the court to effectuate that purpose and construe all subsidiary clauses to bring them into alignment with that purpose.

After looking at the stock records, Johnston testified that R.J. Reynolds had declared two stock splits since the 1974 will, once in December of 1979 and once in May of 1985. At the close of the plaintiffs' proof, the trial court sustained a motion to dismiss the complaint based upon this Court's opinion in Davis v. Price, 189 Tenn. (25 Beeler) 555, 226 S.W.2d 290 (1949). Although the Chancellor noted that his impression at the outset of the case "was that Mrs. Worthington clearly had the intent to treat the three daughters, as she described them, equally," he found that the testatrix had specifically divided the shares that she "presently owned" with knowledge that there could be future stock splits.

Since this statute is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed. Davis v. Price, 189 Tenn. 555, 226 S.W.2d 290, 292 (1949); see also McDonald v. Ledford, 140 Tenn. 471, 205 S.W. 312, 313 (1917). Upon reviewing the Decedent's will, we cannot agree with the probate court that the clause at issue constitutes a residuary clause.

The courts have no right in such cases to resort to a fanciful or conjectural construction, grounded on the circumstances of his property, his family, or himself.' (Emphasis supplied)" and, as stated in Davis v. Price, 189 Tenn. 555, 226 S.W.2d 290 (1950) that: "This Court may not speculate concerning testator's intention, Hastings v. U.S., 6 Cir., 133 F.2d 218, which is to be derived from the words of the will itself.

See also In re Jaynes' Will, 3 Misc.2d 118 [154 N.Y.S.2d 89]; In re Maher's Will, 5 Misc.2d 135 [164 N.Y.S.2d 671]; 7 A.L.R.2d 281, note 5; 96 Corpus Juris Secundum 1000, note 4; 28 Ruling Case Law 344, paragraph 339. We are satisfied that the few cases to the contrary, such as Cuppett v. Neilly, 143 W. Va. 845 [ 105 S.E.2d 548], and Davis v. Price, 189 Tenn. 555 [ 226 S.W.2d 290], are not only contrary to the rule adopted by the majority of the states, but are also not as well analyzed as those expressing the majority rule. There is considerable indication that the courts in the Cuppett and Davis cases were following the "stock dividend" rule, which is a distinctly different rule based on different reasoning than the majority rule relating to "stock split" cases.

If the language of the will is clear, we are instructed not to go outside that language. Davis v. Price, 226 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tenn. 1949); American Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Auman, 746 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). See also Estate of Higgins v. Commissioner [Dec. 47,155(M)], T.C. Memo. 199147; Estate of Klein v. Commissioner [Dec. 46,914(M)], T.C. Memo. 1990-527, affd. [91-2 USTC ¶ 60,089] 946 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1991).

Thus in some jurisdictions where the courts refused to grant the legatee of a bequest of stock the additional shares created by a stock split, they based their decisions primarily on statutes providing that a will shall speak as of the time of the testator's death. See North Carolina Natl. Bank v. Carpenter, 12 N.C. App. 19 (1971); Davis v. Price, 189 Tenn. 555 (1949); Cuppett v. Neilly, 143 W. Va. 845 (1958). Massachusetts does not have such a statute, but, as stated above, adheres to the principle that the intent of the testator is to be ascertained from the language of the will read in the light of the circumstances known to the testator at the time of its execution.

fter execution of his will and before his death, are: Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Emrie (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 198 (1961); Heinneman v. Colorado College (Colo.), 374 P.2d 695 (1962); In re Helfman's Estate, 193 Cal.App.2d 652, 14 Cal.Rptr. 482 (1961); In re Parker's Estate (Fla. App.), 110 So.2d 498 (1959), cert. denied, 114 So.2d 3; In re Rees' Estate, 210 Or. 429, 311 P.2d 438 (1957); Clegg v. Lippold, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 590, 123 N.E.2d 549; In re McFerren's Estate, 365 Pa. 490, 76 A.2d 759, 22 A.L.R.2d 451; Allen v. National Bank of Austin, 19 Ill. App.2d 149, 153 N.E.2d 260; In re Hicks' Will, 272 App. Div. 594, 74 N.Y.S.2d 246; Chase Nat'l Bank v. Deichmiller, 107 N.J. Eq. 379, 152 A. 697. See also cases collected in Anno., 7 A.L.R.2d, Sec. 5, pp. 281-285. Recent cases holding that a legatee of a specified number of shares of stock under a will does not take the additional shares as a result of a stock split are: Cuppett v. Neilly, 143 W. Va. 845, 105 S.E.2d 548 (1958); Davis v. Price, 189 Tenn. 555, 226 S.W.2d 290; In re Woodward's Estate, 407 Pa. 638, 182 A.2d 732 (1962); McGuinness v. Bates (Mass.), 189 N.E.2d 212 (1963). An analysis of the reported cases considering the question shows that the courts have used different approaches in arriving at testator's intent for the purpose of determining to whom the additional shares resulting from a stock split shall pass. Some took a formalistic view and relied on the general or specific nature of the bequest, with the general result that if the legacy was in the former category the additional shares did not pass with the legacy of a specified number of shares, and if in the latter the legatee was entitled to the additional shares.

Those cases, however, involve an ambiguity. Where there is no ambiguity there is no warrant for construction. Davis v. Price, 189 Tenn. 555, 559, 226 S.W.2d 290. Even a casual examination of the above quoted will shows that it is a mandatory direction to the Executor to pay these beneficiaries $100 per month out of the estate commencing immediately and continuing for the life of each. The fourth assignment complains of the case being disposed of without having R.I. Moore individually made a party.

Respondents bring to our attention but one case which is not in harmony with what we have hereinbefore said. We refer to Davis v. Price, 189 Tenn. 555, 226 S.W.2d 290, which appears to be outside the current of authority because of a local statute. This is recognized by the court itself, at page 293, where it dispatches many of the cases we rely upon here in these words: "These cases are not in point, not helpful here, because they are not based on a statute such as that contained in [Tenn] Code sec 8133 * * *."