Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-cv-00370
11-14-2018
ANGELO LENELL DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
(CONNER, J.)
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a pro se prisoner civil rights action for damages. At the time of its filing, the plaintiff, Angelo Lenell Davis, was incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, which is located in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action.
In his complaint, Davis alleges that the various defendants have violated his federal constitutional rights by unlawfully incarcerating him for approximately ten years, and denying him early release on parole, without having received and maintained a valid copy of the sentencing order issued by the state court that convicted and sentenced him. Davis alleges that the defendants unlawfully detained him for ten years in violation of his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He further claims that the defendants violated his rights under the Pennsylvania state constitution and various state statutes.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 15, 2006, following a jury trial, Davis was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, of felony aggravated assault. Commonwealth v. Davis, Docket No. CP-22-CR-0003275-2006 (Dauphin Cty. C.C.P.). On January 30, 2007, he was sentenced by that court to serve a term of 40 to 120 months in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania an December 26, 2007. Commonwealth v. Davis, Docket No. 367 MDA 2007 (Pa. Super. Ct.). He did not file a timely petition for allocatur with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. On August 13, 2014, he filed a petition for leave to file a nunc pro tunc allocatur petition, but this petition was summarily denied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on September 29, 2014. Commonwealth v. Davis, Docket No. 126 MM 2014 (Pa.).
Davis subsequently filed a PCRA petition in the state trial court on May 22, 2008, which was dismissed by the PCRA court on December 31, 2008. Commonwealth v. Davis, Docket No. CP-22-CR-0003275-2006 (Dauphin Cty. C.C.P.). This PCRA order was affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on October 25, 2010. Commonwealth v. Davis, Docket No. 191 MDA 2009 (Pa. Super. Ct.). Davis did not file a timely petition for allocatur with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. On December 30, 2010, he filed a petition for leave to file a nunc pro tunc allocatur petition, but this petition was summarily denied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on August 10, 2011. Commonwealth v. Davis, Docket No. 20 MM 2011 (Pa.).
Davis challenged his state court judgment in federal habeas proceedings before this very same federal district court, which dismissed his § 2254 petition as untimely filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Davis v. Folino, Civil Action No. 1:CV-12-0205, 2012 WL 6859440 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2012) (report and recommendation), adopted by 2013 WL 152539 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2013), certificate of appealability denied, C.A. No. 13-1315 (3d Cir. May 21, 2013). Davis then filed a second federal habeas petition challenging this same state court judgment, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). See Davis v. Harry, Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-01807, 2015 WL 674 6217 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2015) (report and recommendation), adopted by 2015 WL 6735807 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2015). He then filed a third federal habeas petition challenging this same state court judgment, which was likewise dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). See Davis v. Harry, Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-00357, 2016 WL 2641816 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2016) (report and recommendation), adopted by 2016 WL 2624959 (M.D. Pa. May 9, 2016).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner is seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 Fed. App'x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it is "frivolous" or "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See generally Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and standards).
An action is "frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Thomas v. Barker, 371 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (M.D. Pa. 2005). To determine whether it is frivolous, a court must assess a complaint "from an objective standpoint in order to determine whether the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual contention." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992)); Thomas, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 639. Factual allegations are "clearly baseless" if they are "fanciful," "fantastic," or "delusional." See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33. "[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Id. at 33. A district court is further permitted, in its sound discretion, to dismiss a claim "if it determines that the claim is of little or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial." Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1089.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) or § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brodzki v. Tribune Co., 481 Fed. App'x 705, 706 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Banks, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 588. "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Nor is it required to credit factual allegations contradicted by indisputably authentic documents on which the complaint relies or matters of public record of which we may take judicial notice. In re Washington Mut. Inc., ___ Fed. App'x ___, No. 17-2360, 2018 WL 4600668, at *2 n.3 (3d Cir. Sept. 25, 2018); Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1075 (E.D. Pa. 2017); Banks, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 588-89.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Favorable Termination Rule
This action is barred pursuant to the favorable termination rule articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that, where judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a § 1983 action for damages would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's criminal conviction or sentence, the plaintiff must first demonstrate "that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus [under] 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Id. at 486-87. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this rule and broadened it to encompass equitable remedies as well, holding that "a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter what the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration." Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82.
Here, Davis's exclusive theory of liability is that he has been held in prison for ten years without a valid state court judgment. Thus, judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this case clearly would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction or sentence. But Davis has failed to demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Indeed, as recited above, he has tried to do so several times, but entirely without success. Accordingly, under Heck, Davis's federal civil rights claims against these defendants are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As such, these claims lack any arguable basis in law and should be dismissed as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim. Saunders v. Bright, 281 Fed. App'x 83, 85 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Ruth v. Richard, 139 Fed. App'x 470, 471 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Boykin v. Siena House Gaudenzia Program, 464 F. Supp. 2d 416, 424 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
We note that, although Heck does not typically bar Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims, see Sanders v. Downs, 420 Fed. App'x 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (noting that an unreasonable search or seizure does not necessarily imply that a conviction is unlawful because "doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error" can permit the conviction to stand despite a constitutional violation), under the factual circumstances alleged here, it is clear that Davis's Fourth Amendment unlawful detention claim does necessarily impugn the integrity of his state court conviction and sentence. See Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 411 F.3d 427, 448-51 (3d Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds, Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, it is recommended that the plaintiff's claims be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and § 1915A(b)(1).
B. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). In this case, the plaintiff's claims clearly and universally lack merit and are legally frivolous. Dismissal without further leave to amend is recommended, as allowing him leave to amend his pleadings would be futile.
IV. PLRA "THREE STRIKES" WARNING
The plaintiff is hereby notified that a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
If this recommended disposition is adopted by the presiding United States District Judge, the dismissal of this action as frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and § 1915A(b)(1) will constitute a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and the accumulation of additional strikes may bar the plaintiff from proceeding in forma pauperis in later cases while incarcerated, absent a showing of imminent danger. See generally Byrd v. Shannon,715 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2013) (articulating Third Circuit standard for application of § 1915(g) "three strikes" rule).
V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that:
1. The plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and § 1915A(B)(1); and
2. The Clerk be directed to CLOSE this case. Dated: November 14, 2018
/s/_________
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated November 14, 2018. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Dated: November 14, 2018
/s/_________
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge