Opinion
C/A 0:20-4120-BHH-PJG
02-09-2022
Johnnie Davis, Plaintiff, v. Sheik Johnson; The South Carolina Department of Corrections, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, Johnnie Davis, a state prisoner who is represented by counsel, filed this action alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 27 & 29.) Plaintiff filed responses in opposition to the motions (ECF Nos. 31 & 32), and Defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) filed a reply (ECF No. 78). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendants' motions should be granted in part and Plaintiff's federal claims dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The state claims should be remanded.
The defendants removed this action from the Dorchester County Court of Common Pleas. (ECF No. 1.)
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. Plaintiff alleges that on or about October 18, 2018, while housed at the Lieber Correctional Institution, he was being escorted to visitation by Defendant Johnson when Johnson struck Plaintiff repeatedly in the head with a pair of handcuffs. Johnson was ultimately restrained by another correctional officer and Plaintiff received medical treatment for his injuries. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1-1.)
Plaintiff raises claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of excessive force and a violation of due process under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a state law claim of gross negligence. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief. (Id.)
Plaintiff concedes in his response memorandum that his state law claim cannot be brought against Defendant Johnson as an individual employee and lies solely against the state agency, SCDC. (ECF No. 31 at 5.)
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standards
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his federal claims. A prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” This requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Generally, to satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of every level of available administrative review. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); but see Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016) (describing limited circumstances where exhaustion may be excused). Those remedies neither need to meet federal standards, nor are they required to be plain, speedy, and effective. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739). Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). Thus, “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The defendant has the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Pursuant to South Carolina Department of Corrections policy (see SCDC Policy GA-01.12 “Inmate Grievance System, ” ECF No. 27-4 at 12-26), an inmate seeking to complain of prison conditions generally must first attempt to informally resolve his complaint. Next, an inmate may file a “Step 1 Grievance” with designated prison staff. If the Step 1 Grievance is denied, the inmate may appeal to the warden of his facility via a “Step 2 Grievance.” Moreover, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, review from the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (“ALC”), a state executive-branch tribunal, is generally part of the available administrative remedies an inmate must exhaust. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-500 (“There is created the South Carolina Administrative Law Court, which is an agency and court of record within the executive branch of the government of this State.”) (emphasis added); see Furtick v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 649 S.E.2d 35, 38 (S.C. 2007) (reaffirming that “the ALC has jurisdiction over all inmate grievance appeals that have been properly filed”) (citing Slezak v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 605 S.E.2d 506 (S.C. 2004)); (SCDC Policy GA-01.12 “Inmate Grievance System” at § 13.9, ECF No. 27-4 at 12-26).
The law is clear that exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit and must be completed prior to filing an action. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 676-77 (4th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Page v. Paduly, No. 9:09-cv-0952-RMG-BM, 2010 WL 4365644, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2010) (finding that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies where he either did not properly pursue a grievance concerning the issues raised in the case prior to filing the lawsuit, or did not even file grievances until after the lawsuit had already commenced); Cabbagestalk v. Ozmint, C/A No. 9:06-3005-MBS, 2007 WL 2822927, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2007) (noting that the court must look to the time of filing-not the time the district court is rendering its decision- to determine if exhaustion has occurred); see also Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument that § 1997e(a) “permits suit to be filed so long as administrative remedies are exhausted before trial”); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding a prisoner “may not exhaust administrative remedies during the pendency of the federal suit”).
It is not disputed that Plaintiff failed to file any grievance whatsoever with regard to his claims. Rather, Plaintiff argues that because the Division of Police Services investigated Defendant Johnson's conduct (as a result of a grievance filed by a different inmate whom Johnson had also assaulted on the same day), Plaintiff “assumed . . . that no formal filing of [a] grievance was necessary.” (Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n, ECF No. 31 at 3.) He also argues that it was unnecessary to file a grievance because he seeks only monetary damages, which are unavailable through the administrative remedy process. Plaintiff provides no legal authority to support these arguments.
Plaintiff admits that he did not file a Step 1 grievance. (Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n, ECF No. 31 at 3.) Additionally, the defendants present unrefuted evidence in the form of affidavit testimony from Felecia McKie, Chief of the Inmate Grievance Branch, who affirms that Plaintiff did not avail himself of the available administrative remedies. (McKie Aff. ¶¶ 22-23, ECF No. 27-4 at 10.)
This court has recently held that “there is no precedent in this Circuit . . . to find that other inmates' grievances satisfy another inmate's exhaustion requirement.” Simpson v. S.C Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 2:19-2245-RMG, 2019 WL 4254228, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 9, 2019); see also Littlejohn v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 0:19-cv-2101-JFA, 2020 WL 1672532, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 6, 2020) (“Defendants' argument suggests that no inmate should ever file a grievance about an occurrence in the prison when they are investigating the same. This argument assumes that inmates and SCDC personnel discuss ongoing investigations to such an extent that the inmates would have sufficient knowledge of the details to believe that filing a grievance on the same matter would be unnecessary. The Court is unwilling to make this same assumption.”). Moreover, the law is clear that a plaintiff seeking only monetary relief is still beholden to the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA. See Booth v. Churner, 531 U.S. 956 (2001) (holding that the PLRA requires an inmate to exhaust his administrative remedies even if the grievance procedure does not allow monetary damages and the inmate seeks only monetary damages). Plaintiff makes no allegation that grievance system was not available to him during the applicable period of time. Accordingly, Plaintiff's federal claims should be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, the court observes that, while not argued in Defendant SCDC's motion, SCDC, as a state agency, is not a “person” under § 1983 and therefore cannot be held liable for Plaintiff's federal claims. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67-68, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a State, nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983 and finding that Congress did not intend to override the State's sovereign immunity by enacting the statute).
2. State Law Claim
In light of the court's recommendation that Plaintiff's federal claims should be dismissed, the court should exercise its discretion to remand the state law claim against SCDC to the Dorchester County Court of Common Pleas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (authorizing a district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental claim); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1988) (discussing the factors in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after removal). Here, Plaintiff raises a state law claim that, in the interest of comity, is more appropriate for consideration in South Carolina's courts because it includes complex issues of state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (listing bases for declining supplemental jurisdiction, including the presence of novel or complex issues of state law and the dismissal of federal claims); Hinson v. Nw. Fin. S.C, Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 617 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion to remand the case to state court where the federal claims were no longer at issue, the state claims predominated, and the state claims involved interpretations of complex state statutes on which there was no state precedent).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants' motions be granted in part and Plaintiffs federal claims be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. It is further recommended that Plaintiffs state law claim against SCDC be remanded to the Dorchester County Court of Common Pleas.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).