Davis v. Insurance Co.

10 Citing cases

  1. Consolidated Mut. Cas. Co. v. Radio Foods Co.

    108 N.H. 494 (N.H. 1968)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that "in the absence of an express choice of law validly made by the parties, the contract is to be governed, both as to validity and performance, by the law of the State with which the contract has its most significant relationship"

    The Trial Court ruled that the policy was to be interpreted and construed in accordance with the laws of New Hampshire. In years gone by, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention of the parties as to what law was to govern (Davis v. Insurance Co., 67 N.H. 218, 219; Goulet v. Goulet, 105 N.H. 51, 52), the choice-of-law rule in contracts was based, as in the case of torts, on a rigid and fairly mechanistic approach. Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, s. 106, p. 202 (1964).

  2. Davis v. Insurance Co.

    44 A. 521 (N.H. 1895)

    On the question whether this was the suppression of a material fact, the plaintiff was permitted, subject to exception, to read to the jury as evidence, s. 214, c. 112, Mass. P. S., which is as follows: "Every railroad corporation and street railway company shall be responsible in damages to a person or corporation whose buildings or other property may be injured by fire communicated by its locomotive engines, and shall have an insurable interest in the property upon its route for which it may be so held responsible, and may procure insurance thereon in its own behalf." This is the same case as Davis v. Insurance Co., 67 N.H. 218. The plaintiff moves for a rehearing on the opinion delivered in that case, on the point that the contract should be construed by the laws of Massachusetts. Samuel C. Eastman, for the plaintiff.

  3. Diamond Intern. Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co.

    712 F.2d 1498 (1st Cir. 1983)   Cited 18 times
    Applying New Hampshire law

    This principle is equally applicable to the determination of implied intent on choice of law issues. Cf. Goulet v. Goulet, 105 N.H. 51, 192 A.2d 626 (1963); Davis v. Aetna Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 67 N.H. 218, 34 A. 464 (1892). Although the court in these cases did not recite the principle, it is evident from the decisions that the court put its own independent interpretation of intent on the factual circumstances found by the trial courts.

  4. Priddle v. Insurance Company

    119 A.2d 97 (N.H. 1955)   Cited 5 times

    Hinchey v. Surety Company, 99 N.H. 373, 377. See Davis v. Insurance Company, 67 N.H. 218; Lovell v. Railroad, 75 N.H. 568, 570; Cunningham v. Ferguson, 81 N.H. 380, 382; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, s. 332 (f), comment c; s. 358, comment b. A literal interpretation of s. 167(3) of the Insurance Law would support the argument of the defendant company that it is under no obligation to provide coverage with respect to "any liability of the insured because of . . . injuries to his . . . spouse."

  5. Schwartzman v. Fire Insurance Co.

    2 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1928)   Cited 22 times
    In Schwartzman v. London Lancashire Fire Insurance Co. 318 Mo. 1089, the umpire appointed by the court, pursuant to the terms of an insurance policy, was held to be disqualified by virtue of the fact that, after he was appointed and before he took oath as an appraiser, the company of which he was secretary, treasurer and stockholder, was, to all intents and purposes, appointed an agent of one of the insurance companies involved.

    3 N.Y.S. 431; Continental Ins. Co. v. Vanlandingham, 116 Ky. 287; Van Winkle v. Fire Ins. Co., 55 W. Va. 286; Mason v. Ins. Co. (Mo. App), 258 S.W. 759; Bishop v. Ins. Co., 130 N.Y. 563; Jones v. Northern Assur. Co., 182 Ky. 701. (3) Trevor's visit to the scene of the fire did not render him incompetent, since under the law appraisers have the right and are expected to examine the damaged property. Christianson v. Norwich Ins. Co. (Minn.), 88 N.W. 16; Kent Purdy Paint Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 165 Mo. App. 44; Hall v. Norwalk Fire Ins. Co., 57 Conn. 105. (4) An appraiser is supposed and expected, in a restricted sense, to represent the party appointing him, and within reasonable limits to see to it that no legitimate consideration favorable to the party so appointing him is overlooked by the other appraiser. American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Landau, 62 N.J. Eq. 93; Dennis v. Fire Ins. Co. (N.J. Ch.), 107 A. 161; Whelen v. Goldman, 115 N.Y.S. 1006; Jones v. Northern Assurance Co., 182 Ky. 701; Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1456; 26 C.J. 527. (5) A preconceived opinion, resulting from an intimate knowledge of the subject-matter, does not disqualify one from acting as an appraiser. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Brien, 75 Ark. 198; Produce Co. v. Norwich Ins. Co., 91 Minn. 216. (6) The award was not invalidated by reason of the relationship existing between the umpire, Paul Von Kuster, and the David C. Bell Investment Company, since there is no evidence of any misconduct reflecting bias as a result of that relationship to overcome the presumption of the regularity of the proceedings before the board of appraisal.

  6. Duval v. Company

    136 A. 400 (N.H. 1927)   Cited 79 times
    In Duval v. Company, 82 N.H. 543, a group insurance policy similar to the present one was issued, and the plaintiff was originally validly covered.

    The provisions of our statute (P. L., c. 277, s. 6) that the soliciting agent is the representative of the company and not of the insured, is here relied upon. The contract was neither made nor to be performed in this state, and the statute does not apply. Davis v. Insurance Co., 67 N.H. 218. But it is urged that, since the question is one of evidence, it relates to the remedy and so the statute will be effective. Although the question is presented by a ruling upon the admissibility of a fact as proof, it is one of substantive law. Bunten v. Davis, ante, 304, 310.

  7. McQuesten v. Steinmetz

    58 A. 876 (N.H. 1904)   Cited 5 times

    Had it appeared that parties in New York telegraphed proposals offering to bet upon horse races with persons in Nashua, who accepted the same by telegraph, the contracts would be completed at Nashua when the messages of acceptance, directed to the parties in New York, were delivered at the telegraph office. Busher v. Insurance Co., supra; Davis v. Insurance Co., 67 N.H. 218; Lescallett v. Commonwealth, supra. But the case discloses that the transactions were not so conducted; that the defendant, acting as agent for persons at Nashua, upon receipt of their money telegraphed it to various persons in New York, who there wagered the money as directed. Under these circumstances the bets were made in New York, and the business conducted by the defendant at Nashua was lawful.

  8. Busher v. Insurance Co.

    58 A. 41 (N.H. 1904)   Cited 14 times

    An exception, however, is recognized when the parties to such a contract are at a distance from one another and the offer is sent by mail or by telegraph, in which case it is commonly held, and such is the law of this state, that the reply accepting the offer may be sent through the same medium, and the contract will be complete when the acceptance is mailed, or delivered at the telegraph office, properly addressed to the party making the offer and beyond the acceptor's control. Abbott v. Shepard, 48 N.H. 14; Davis v. Insurance Co, 67 N.H. 218. The theory advanced in support of such a holding is, that when one makes an offer through the mail or like agency he authorizes the acceptance to be made through the same medium, and constitutes that medium his agent to receive the acceptance; and that the acceptance, when mailed or delivered at the telegraph office, is then constructively communicated to the offerer. 2 Lang. Cont. 995, s. 15, par. 2.

  9. Insurance Co. v. McKellar

    44 A. 516 (N.H. 1895)   Cited 5 times

    Crawford v. Parsons, 63 N.H. 438." Davis v. Insurance Co., 67 N.H. 218, 219. Applying these rules to the contract in question, there is no doubt that the parties contracted with reference to the laws of Massachusetts, and therefore the laws of Massachusetts should control their mutual rights and liabilities. As a result of notice from the plaintiffs that the company would hold the defendants Priest and Bell for the amount of the bond, a conference was held between the parties in Boston, where it was agreed that the company should receive $204.17 in cash and a note for the balance of the bond, drawn at six months, with interest, signed by McKellar, and indorsed by Bell and Priest. There is no dispute that the entire contract, to carry out which the note was given, was made in Massachusetts.

  10. Keeley v. Indemnity Co. of America

    222 Mo. App. 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928)   Cited 24 times
    In Keeley v. Indemnity Co. of America, 222 Mo.App. 439, 7 S.W.2d 434, 436, plaintiff brought suit on a fire insurance policy issued by the defendant on three automobile trucks and recovered judgment, plus penalties.

    rance Co., 45 Mo. 221; Hicks v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 196 Mo. App. 162, 190 S.W. 661; Coscarella v. Insurance Co., 175 Mo. App. 130; Stix v. Indemnity Co., 175 Mo. App. 171; Rabok Mfg. Co. v. Scottish Union and National Ins. Co., 236 S.W. 918; Liebel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 241 S.W. 647; Grove v. Great Eastern Cas. Co., 212 Mo. App. 316, 246 S.W. 1002; Ramsey v. Underwriters Assn., 71 Mo. App. 380; Lieberman v. American Bonding Casualty Co., 244 S.W. 102; Ricks v. National Fire Ins. Co., 254 S.W. 414; Waddle v. Insurance Co., 184 Mo. App. 571; Keller v. Home Life Ins. Co., 198 Mo. 440; Ayers v. Continental Ins. Co., 217 S.W. 555; Ruse v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. 516; Bottomley v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 Mass. 274, 49 N.E. 438; Galloway v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 45 W. Va. 237, 31 S.E. 969; Minor on Conflict of Laws, p. 328; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124; Banco de Sonora v. Bankers Mutual Casualty Co., 124 Iowa 576, 100 N.W. 532, 12 C.J. 450; Davis v. Insurance Co., 67 N.H. 218. DAUES, P.J.