Opinion
November 22, 1943.
The infant plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when the sled upon which he was riding collided with an automobile owned by defendant Gerard and operated by defendant Floyd. His father sues for loss of services and for expenses. The actions were tried together. The claimed negligence was that the defendants violated subdivision 11 of section 81 Veh. Traf. of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which provides: "The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, driveway, garage or stable shall stop such vehicle immediately before entering the intersecting roadway, and thereafter shall enter the roadway with care." The court, in dismissing the complaints, held that while the evidence would justify a finding that defendants breached the statute, there was no causal connection between their negligence and the infant's injuries. Judgments reversed on the law and the facts and a new trial granted, with costs to appellants to abide the event. In our opinion it was for the jury to determine as a question of fact, and not for the court to decide as matter of law, whether defendants' breach of the statutory duty was the proximate cause of the infant's injuries. Close, P.J., Hagarty, Carswell, Johnston and Adel, JJ., concur.